One prominent hypothesis about illnesses among Gulf War veterans is that some of the reported symptoms are the result of exposure to chemical warfare agents. During and after the Gulf War, some veterans reported that they had been exposed to chemical warfare agents. To investigate these incidents, and to assess the likelihood that chemical warfare agents were present in the Gulf, the Department of Defense developed a methodology for investigation and validation based on work done by the United Nations and the international community. The criteria include:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site;
• Physical evidence from the site such as weapons fragments, soil, water, vegetation or human/animal tissue samples;
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence;
• The testimony of witnesses;
• Multiple analyses; and
• A review of the evidence by experts.

While the methodology (Tab D) used to investigate suspected chemical warfare agent incidents is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence was often not collected at the time of an event. Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents, and each investigation must be tailored to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our methodology to provide a thorough, investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and to determine what happened. Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical warfare agent presence, nor is a single observation sufficient to validate the presence of a chemical warfare agent.

After following our methodology and accumulating anecdotal, documentary, and physical evidence; after interviewing witnesses and key specialists; and after analyzing the results of all available information, the investigator assesses the validity of the presence of chemical warfare agents on the battlefield. Because we do not expect to always have conclusive evidence, we have developed an assessment scale (Figure 1) ranging from Definitely Not to Definitely, with intermediate assessments of Unlikely, Indeterminate, and Likely. This assessment is tentative, based on facts available as of the date of the report publication; each case is reassessed over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 1. Assessment of chemical warfare agent presence

The standard for making the assessment is based on common sense: Do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were or were not present? When insufficient information is available, the assessment is Indeterminate until more evidence can be found.

The Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses published an interim case narrative, US Marine Corps Minefield Breaching, in July 1991. Following publication of that interim narrative, we received additional information from veterans and recommendations from the General Accounting Office (see Tab H). The case narrative that follows updates the original report, responds to those comments, and contains the result of additional research, including interviews with veterans and consultation with medical subject matter experts.

In the early morning of February 24, 1991, US Marine Corps forces began the liberation of Kuwait by breaching (clearing paths through) Iraqi minefields that stretched across southern Kuwait to engage Iraqi ground forces. From these breaching operations came accounts of incidents that described possible chemical warfare agent detections and possible chemical warfare agent exposures at different locations on the battlefield.

In post-war congressional and other public testimony, Gunnery Sergeant George Grass, the Marine in command of an XM93 Fox Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle assigned to Task Force Ripper (7th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division) reported that the mobile mass spectrometer aboard his Fox indicated the presence of what he identified as a trace of nerve agent vapor. He testified that the amount of vapor present was not enough to cause casualties, and he reported this finding to the Task Force Ripper nuclear, biological, chemical officer. This officer judged that even if an agent had been present, the trace amount reported by Gunnery Sergeant Grass would not have been harmful to troops moving rapidly through the breaches, and therefore, he did not warn 1st Marine Division units. Despite traveling through the minefield breaches unprotected from nerve agent vapor (with faces and hands exposed), no troops reported any chemical warfare agent exposure effects. No samples were taken, and no evidence of chemical warfare agent presence exists. Fox experts consulted for this case noted that in the mode in which the mobile mass spectrometer was operating, chemical warfare agent exposure casualties and fatalities to unprotected, exposed Marines would have occurred before the mobile mass spectrometer could indicate the presence of nerve agent vapor. For these reasons, the assessment for this incident is that the presence of chemical warfare agents in the 1st Marine Division breaching lanes is unlikely.

In a 2d Marine Division breaching lane (called lane Red 1), a Fox assigned to the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, alerted its crew to the possible presence of three chemical warfare agents—sarin, lewisite, and HQ mustard. Other possible indications of the presence of chemical warfare agents in this breaching lane came from a chemical agent monitor, M9 chemical warfare agent detector paper, and reports of chemical warfare agent injuries. Personnel in the area of the possible contamination took protective measures and continued their assault through the minefield breaches. The Fox could not stop to complete testing procedures, but a Fox crewman attempted to analyze an air sample with the mobile mass spectrometer. Experts from separate agencies analyzed the data printed automatically to a hard-copy tape and, although they could not completely rule out the presence of chemical warfare agents, the experts concluded that these alerts were most likely false positives, caused by the high concentration of airborne hydrocarbons from oil well fires and vehicle exhaust. Additionally, Iraq’s chemical warfare agent inventory did not contain two of the three agents to which the Fox mobile mass spectrometer alerted. The chemical agent monitor and M9 chemical warfare agent detector paper indicated the possible presence of chemical warfare agents, but these detectors are subject to numerous interferents. Uncorroborated by additional tests or confirmed injuries, their indications do not prove the presence of chemical warfare agents.

2d Marine Division Marines were briefed to expect a chemical attack, and information available to them at the time led them to expect the presence of landmines filled with chemical warfare agents (hereafter referred to as chemical mines). Many witnesses thought that the source of the reported chemical warfare agents was chemical mines, while others suggested enemy artillery as the source. The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq and the US intelligence community do not now believe that Iraq had chemical mines in its chemical weapons inventory. Based on a review of Iraq’s chemical weapons capability, unit logs, and witness’ testimony, we found no evidence to indicate that other possible delivery means (such as rocket or artillery fire) were the source of the suspected agents.

A report that chemical warfare blister agents injured two Marines in lane Red 1 appeared in a Marine Corps historical document. We identified four possible chemical warfare agent injuries to Marines in 2d Marine Division units. The doctor who examined the first Marine on the battlefield in 1991 reported that the Marine was not injured. However, witnesses provided conflicting accounts regarding the Marine’s condition, so we consulted a medical expert (physician) in chemical warfare agent injuries. This physician found that despite what this Marine experienced, chemical warfare agents were unlikely causes. A medical corpsman examined the second Marine and did not believe that chemical warfare agents caused an irritation on this Marine’s face. A third Marine, reportedly injured by chemical warfare agents, told us that chemical warfare agents did not injure him. We continue to search for information related to a fourth possible chemical warfare agent injury, but thus far, chemical warfare agent exposure does not seem to be the case. These incidents were random; the four Marines were in different locations on the battlefield, and other Marines, in the immediate vicinity of those reportedly injured, were unaffected—none reported any chemical warfare agent exposure symptoms.

In assessing the possible presence of the three suspected chemical warfare agents, we examined witness testimony, the Fox mobile mass spectrometer alert, information provided by mobile mass spectrometer experts, information from the intelligence community, and information from the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq. Experts concluded that the mobile mass spectrometer alerts were most likely false alarms. Other chemical warfare agent detector indications of possible agent presence remain uncorroborated and are unsupported by evidence. There is also a lack of evidence to indicate that artillery, rockets, or chemical mines were the source of the suspected chemical warfare agents. Finally, medical experts evaluated that the injuries reported are not indicative of chemical warfare agent exposure. Based on an examination of all evidence, the presence of chemical warfare agents in the 2d Marine Division breaching lane is assessed as unlikely.

In July 1991, the United States Marine Corps Research Center published a paper titled "Marine Corps NBC Defense in Southwest Asia." More commonly known as the "Manley Report," it was compiled by then Marine Captain Thomas F. Manley. The report is a contemporaneous analysis of the issues pertaining to nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense in the Marine Corps areas of operations during the Gulf War. The report focuses on training, doctrine, intelligence, individual NBC equipment, operational readiness, and major lessons-learned. To compile his report, Captain Manley interviewed many Marine veterans. He also developed a survey questionnaire for Marines with NBC-related specialties to provide anonymous observations about the conduct of the war. He developed some of his final report from the survey results and interviews. According to the report, "survey data indicates that a significant number of Marines believed they encountered threat chemical munitions or agents during the ground offensive."[2] At the same time, he concluded "there are no indications that the Iraqis tactically employed [chemical warfare] agents against Marines … [but] there are too many stated encounters to categorically dismiss the presence of agents and chemical agent munitions in the Marine Corps sector."[3]

The Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses does not categorically dismiss the possibility of the use of chemical warfare agents during the Gulf War.  We take seriously reports by veterans of possible encounters with such agents. One such case is the report that Marines encountered chemical warfare agents while breaching Iraqi minefields during the opening operations of the ground war.

The minefield breaching incidents were recounted in interviews and military reports such as the Manley report as well as in testimony before the US Congress and the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses.[4,5] These incidents were also discussed in the June 1997 MITRE Corporation draft report, "Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DoD,"[6] and in at least one book about the Gulf War.[7] The Office of the Special Assistant’s predecessor (the Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team) initiated an investigation of the incidents, which we completed and published as an interim narrative on July 27, 1997.[8] The interim narrative solicited veterans’ inputs, and noted that we were seeking expert medical evaluation of a reported chemical warfare agent-related injury. Following publication of that interim narrative, we received additional information from veterans, including comments from the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines Regiment Fox commander. In addition, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed the original narrative and concluded that artillery fire was present during breaching operations, other chemical detectors indicated possible chemical warfare agent presence, and our reports on laboratory yesting were incomplete, so we should reconsider our assessment in the interim breaching narrative.[9] A detailed discussion of the GAO comments is contained in Tab H. The case narrative that follows updates the original report with the data provided by veterans and results of additional research, including interviews with veterans and consultation with medical subject matter experts. It also responds to the GAO findings.

On February 24, 1991, US Marines launched an offensive into Kuwait to dislodge occupying Iraqi forces. The First and Second Marine Divisions (1st and 2d MARDIV), the ground maneuver elements of the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), were tasked to breach (clear openings in) two heavily defended minefield belts,[10] advance past Al Jaber Air Base, taking key sites along the way, and converge on Kuwait City to liberate the capital. Figure 2 shows each division’s area of responsibility (AOR). The 1st MARDIV opened 14 breaching lanes; the 2d MARDIV opened six.[11]

Figure 2. On February 24, 1991, the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions cleared openings in two Iraqi minefield belts in southern Kuwait

During Marine minefield breaching operations, several events occurred that led some Marines to believe that they were exposed to Iraqi chemical warfare agents. The most significant among these incidents were possible chemical warfare agent alerts involving XM93 Fox Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance Vehicles (hereafter referred to as the Fox). In addition, there were reports of chemical warfare agent injuries to Marines in one of the 2d MARDIV breaching lanes.

Final preparations and briefings for the breaching operations took place on February 23, 1991, as commanders reminded their troops about the strong possibility that the Iraqi forces would use chemical warfare agents,[12] reiterated the need for speed through the minefield breaches,[13] and, above all, urged subordinates to "take care of your men."[14] Lieutenant General Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., who, as a colonel, commanded Task Force Ripper, testified,

"We took this threat of chemical involvement very seriously. We had intelligence ... that the Iraqi forces had the potential, had the capability. We [had] the very best NBC equipment that the Marine Corps had in its inventory at that time. And throughout many months in Saudi Arabia, we trained very, very hard on the detection, protection, and decontamination of our forces."[15]

Before the Gulf War, the US intelligence community[16] warned that Iraq had a chemical weapons capability, and had used chemical weapons against its own citizens as well as against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.[17] Following the Gulf War, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), through its chemical and biological weapons inspections program, identified, inventoried and, in some cases, supervised Iraqi destruction of their chemical warfare agents and chemical weapons. Table 1 lists the chemical warfare agents (related to this case) and their delivery means that UNSCOM found Iraq possessed during the Gulf War. The glossary (Tab A) defines the term "chemical warfare agent" and contains additional information about several agents in Iraq’s inventory.

Table 1. Some of Iraq's chemical weapon capabilities at the time of the Gulf War [18]

A. Chemical	B. Delivery Means
Mustard (blister agent)	155mm artillery shells aerial bombs
Sarin (nerve agent)	122mm multiple-rocket-launcher rockets
Sarin/cyclosarin (nerve agent mixture)	122mm multiple-rocket-launcher rockets Scud (Al Hussein variant) surface-to-surface missiles  aerial bombs

Assessing the presence of any chemical warfare agents in the minefield breaching lanes must take into account how Iraq’s forces could have delivered the agents to the battlefield. Iraq’s air force did not fly ground-attack sorties after January 25, 1991, and therefore could not have delivered chemical warfare agent munitions against Coalition forces.[19] UNSCOM found 155mm artillery shells filled with the blister agent mustard, and 122mm rockets filled with the nerve agent sarin or a sarin/cyclosarin mixture. UNSCOM also found Scud missile warheads filled with either sarin or a combination of two substances, which when mixed with another compound, formed a sarin/cyclosarin mixture.[20] Other than these artillery shells, rockets, and surface-to-surface missiles, UNSCOM found no other delivery means for these chemical warfare agents.[21]

Before the start of Operation Desert Storm, the German government gave the United States 60 Fox vehicles. These 60 vehicles were modified for US forces. These modifications included the addition of the M43A1 chemical vapor detector as well as English language labels and English language software to the vehicle’s mobile mass spectrometer. The US military designated the modified German vehicle the XM93 Fox Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance Vehicle, but it was simply called the Fox (Figure 3).[23] The Fox was one of several chemical warfare agent detectors deployed by the Marines to detect Iraqi chemical warfare agents. Each Marine division was allocated four Fox vehicles, and usually one was assigned to each maneuver regiment.[24] An understanding of the Fox detection capabilities is important because US Marine Corps Foxes were involved in possible chemical warfare agent alerts in both the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions during minefield breaching operations.

Figure 3. A Fox vehicle

The Fox is a six-wheeled light-armored vehicle designed primarily to detect, identify, and mark areas of persistent liquid chemical warfare agent ground contamination. Pressurizing and sealing the vehicle protects the crew from exposure to outside contaminants, and allows the crew to work without the constraints of protective masks and gloves. The primary chemical warfare agent detection system in the Fox consists of a mobile mass spectrometer (the MM-1) and an air/surface sampler. This system is primarily a liquid chemical agent detector. The addition of the M43A1 augments the Fox MM-1 system by providing a credible nerve agent vapor detector. The MM-1 detects chemical warfare agents by analyzing the ionic activity of a sample that has been collected either by raising liquid samples from the ground to the retractable sampling probe, using silicon sampling wheels, or by sampling the surrounding air.[25]

The MM-1 continuously monitors samples passing through it, checking for the presence of chemical warfare agents identified on a pre-selected target list of 1 to 22 chemical compounds, which are primarily chemical warfare agents. This target list consists of a four-ion "fingerprint" for each chemical compound. During the initial identification step, the MM-1 fragments each sample into a unique pattern of ions and then compares each four-ion "fingerprint" on the target list against the sample, searching for a match.[26]

If the MM-1 makes an initial match, and the ion intensities are above a specific level (unique for each agent), an alarm sounds to alert the operator. This alert is also displayed on the MM-1 operator’s screen and printed on a paper tape.[27] This initial alert, however, does not verify the presence of a chemical warfare agent since there are many chemical compounds that have the same or similar ions as those compounds on the chemical warfare agent target list. These other compounds can therefore cause a false alarm for chemical warfare agents.[28] These initial indications continue until either the intensity units fall below the alarm level or the MM-1 operator changes sampling methods or modes.[29]

The MM-1 operator must perform a spectrum analysis in order to increase the confidence of the detection of the presence of a chemical warfare agent. A spectrum analysis involves optimizing the MM-1 by lowering the temperature of the sample line from 180 degrees Celsius to 120 degrees Celsius for better ion separation, discontinuing use of the sample wheels, cleaning the sample probe to remove residual ion activity (contamination), and lowering the probe to within three to five centimeters of the contamination. This allows the MM-1 to acquire a better-prepared sample. The MM-1 then searches its 60-compound chemical library of four-ion-peak fingerprints, compares them against this improved sample, and attempts to match the chemical warfare agent fingerprints with the sample.[30]

Using the proper procedures, it takes several minutes to collect a good sample and to obtain a good ion spectrum readout and analysis. This process is necessary to properly evaluate the sample for any suspected chemical warfare agent, and to assure that initial indications were not affected by contaminants from the battlefield (e.g., smoke, diesel exhaust, and oil). Although an MM-1 operator can produce a spectrum in other ways, this is the proper and most accurate method.[31] The MM-1 operator should also print a tape, which saves the details of the spectrum as a hard-copy historical record.[32]

Should the properly performed spectrum procedure identify a chemical warfare agent, the MM-1 operator and the Fox commander can be confident that the agent is present. Conversely, if the spectrum analysis does not identify one of the chemical warfare agents contained in the MM-1 library, the MM-1 operator and the Fox commander can be confident that the chemical warfare agent that was displayed during the initial alarm is not present. Further analysis of the spectrum tape printout by a mass spectrometry expert comparing the spectrum results to an established database of compounds can increase the confidence level of the detection. Additionally, the MM-1 operators were taught to collect a specimen of the contamination (e.g., a soil sample) to further aid confirmation of the substance by thorough analysis in a laboratory. When the MM-1 can not match any of the compounds in the library to the sample, the MM-1 indicates "unknown" on the operator’s screen and the tape printout. A reading of "fats, oils, wax" is considered a false alarm.[33]

A variety of battlefield interferents can cause the MM-1 to register an initial false positive alarm. Compounds that cause the MM-1 to issue false alarms are common solvents and insecticides,[34] riot control agents,[35] diesel fumes and fumes from explosives,[36] and hydrocarbons[37] (e.g., oil well smoke).

Although the MM-1 has a limited capability to detect chemical warfare agents in the air, the Fox was sometimes used for on-the-move vapor detection during the war. It is not optimized for this mission, nor is its detection capability in this method of operation as good as that of other chemical warfare agent detectors.[38]

Before leaving their assembly areas, the Marines of the 1st and 2d MARDIVs assumed Mission-Oriented Protective Posture Level 2 (MOPP-2)[39] —which requires wearing a chemical protective over-garment and boots. They carried their protective masks and gloves, which could be donned in seconds to increase the level of protection to MOPP-4 should there be any indication of a chemical warfare agent attack (Figure 4). Elements of the 1st MARDIV assumed MOPP-2 at 4:00 PM on February 23rd.[40] This level of protection was consistent with Marine doctrine, which defines the MOPP levels and the threat assessment process. Doctrine also advises commanders to balance the threat of exposure and the mission-degrading effects of wearing the protective overgarments (e.g., restricted mobility, higher risk of heat injury) while considering the "mission, environment, and soldier factors."[41]

Figure 4. A soldier at MOPP-2 and MOPP-4

The I Marine Expeditionary Force officially began the assault at 4:00 AM on February 24, 1991.[42] Its two Marine divisions breached the first minefield from positions to the north and northwest of the "elbow" (see Figure 2) of the southern Kuwait border. The 2d MARDIV entered Kuwait between the Umm Gudair and Al Manaquish oil fields, about 25 kilometers northwest of the 1st MARDIV.[43] The Marines breached the minefields in accordance with doctrine ("locate the leading edge, breach the lane, proof the lane, and mark the lane").[44]

However, the specific methods and order of maneuver for each Marine division differed slightly. After locating the leading edge of the minefield, combat engineers, using mine-clearing explosive line charges, opened lanes through the minefields. The line charges detonated the mines in the minefield or blew them out of position. Armored equipment with plows, rakes (Figure 5), or rollers followed the line charges to clear and proof the lanes. A team of combat engineers followed the proofing equipment and marked the edges and/or center of the lanes. While doing so, the engineers cleared mines or obstacles that might have fallen back into the cleared lanes and destroyed anything too dangerous to move. If anyone suspected a chemical warfare agent incident, he was directed to call a Fox to check out the area.[45] Using these procedures, the Marines cleared lanes (Figure 6) through the Iraqi minefields wide enough for their attacking forces to pass through.

Figure 5. A USMC M60A1 tank with a rake

Figure 6. A minefield breaching lane in Kuwait

The 1st Marine Division (1st MARDIV) consisted of units from the 1st Marine, 3d Marine, 7th Marine, and 11th Marine Regiments, as well as units from other Marine regiments, which were attached to the 1st MARDIV. For the conduct of the ground war, the division was further organized into Task Forces (e.g., Task Force Ripper, Task Force Papa Bear), tailored or task-organized collections of forces drawn from various units and built around a core combat team (i.e., an infantry regiment).[46]

On the morning of February 24, 1991, working in cool and drizzly weather with skies overcast from clouds and oil well fire smoke,[47] combat engineers of the 1st MARDIV opened four assault lanes in the first minefield by 7:15 AM and four more in the second minefield by 12:30 PM.[48] By 2:20 PM, all of the 1st MARDIV’s breaching lanes had been opened in both minefields. 1st MARDIV forces passed quickly through the minefield breaches (Figure 7), encountering light resistance in the first minefield belt and overcoming greater enemy resistance while breaching the second minefield belt. By evening, the Marines had reached Al Jaber air base in Kuwait.4

Figure 7. 1st Marine Division minefield breaching

1. Initial Report

After the war, Gunnery Sergeant George Grass, the commander of the 1st MARDIV Fox assigned to Task Force Ripper, testified to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses (PAC) and to subcommittees of Congress that, while he was crossing the first minefield breach, his vehicle’s mobile mass spectrometer detected "[s]mall traces of nerve agent in the air. The computer system notified us that the amount of chemical agent vapor in the air was not significant enough to produce any casualties. As a result, it was impossible for the Mass Spectrometer to run a complete check on the agent except by visually observing the agent and spectrum on the computer screen. These minute readings continued on the screen for the duration of each lane surveyed. Once my Fox vehicle departed the first minefield breach, those readings went away."[49]

Gunnery Sergeant Grass also indicated that his Fox mobile mass spectrometer was operating in a vapor method of detection. In his testimony to the PAC, he stated that after breaching operations, he reported the trace reading face-to-face to both the 3d Tank Battalion’s nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) officer and the Task Force Ripper NBC officer.[50] We found no evidence to suggest that follow-up testing was done to confirm this report.

2. Additional Information

We made efforts to confirm the events and to find evidence to substantiate the presence of chemical warfare agents. In congressional testimony, Chief Warrant Officer 3 (CWO3) Joseph P. Cottrell, the Task Force Ripper NBC officer, confirmed that he had been informed of the Fox’s’ findings, but he remembered the agent as being blister agent, not nerve agent. When questioned further, he said that he remembered the detection was of a "mustard-type blister" agent. He also stated that the reported levels were below an immediate threat to humans and below the level that would cause symptoms. Except for the agent type, this testimony is consistent with Gunnery Sergeant Grass’s testimony—that the trace amounts of vapor were not significant enough to cause casualties. CWO3 Cottrell decided that crossing the breach did not pose a threat or require subsequent decontamination because the suspected agent was at a trace level and the rapidly-moving Marines were in the area for only a short period of time. Given these factors, CWO3 Cottrell did not send out an NBC-1[51] report.[52]

In this case, after evaluating the situation, Gunnery Sergeant Grass and CWO3 Cottrell agreed that, without more proof, they would not inform division personnel. In addition, the source of the readings was questionable because there was no apparent method for delivery of the suspected chemical warfare agent—i.e., the task force was not being bombed or receiving in-coming artillery, rocket, or mortar fire.[53]

Although this Fox crew supported Task Force Ripper, it was under the direct control of the 3d Tank Battalion’s NBC officer during the breaching operations. This officer had many years of NBC experience, and should have received any report of chemical warfare agent incidents or injuries during the division’s breaching operations. The 3d Tank Battalion NBC officer also had written the NBC portion of the operation order for the breaching operations. Even though the Marines had new equipment (chemical agent monitors and the Fox), his instructions in the operations order were clear: follow the basic NBC procedures to sound the alarm, put on the mask and gloves (an increase to MOPP-4), report to regimental headquarters, and begin supplementary testing with an M256 series chemical agent detector kit.[54] In an interview, he stated that there were no NBC reports generated, no reports of casualties or injuries, nothing to suggest that an increase from MOPP level 2 was required during the breaching operations, and no indications that a chemical warfare agent incident had occurred. He also stated that, during his entire time in the Gulf, he does not recall anyone reporting any positive chemical warfare agent readings to him.[55]

The 1st MARDIV NBC officer, also experienced in NBC matters, served on the operations staff in the division headquarters. He also should have been aware of any NBC reports, any reports from other units, or any reports of chemical warfare agent casualties. When interviewed, he specifically stated that no NBC reports were generated during the breaching operations in the 1st MARDIV and that there was nothing to suggest that there were even trace detections. While many of the Marines were only in MOPP-2, there were no reports of casualties or any chemical warfare agent exposure. In his opinion, there was no chemical warfare agent incident during the 1st MARDIV breaching.[56] According to 7th Marine records, Task Force Ripper (the division’s lead maneuver element) noted no potential or actual exposure to chemical warfare agents throughout all of the breaching operations.[57]

In a written statement, the Fox driver recalled the reconnaissance of the division’s breaching lanes differently than Gunnery Sergeant Grass, "All four lanes of both mine belts were checked and nothing was detected."[58] On the other hand, in testimony before the Presidential Advisory Committee, the Fox MM-1 operator supported Gunnery Sergeant Grass's testimony. He added that the MM-1 was unable to produce a spectrum of the indications he saw on his screen.[59]

3. Analysis 

Efforts to find physical evidence of the suspected chemical warfare agent were unsuccessful because the Fox crew did not collect a sample or print a spectrum. Because there were no NBC reports issued and no reports of casualties or exposure injuries, references to this incident are absent from unit logs. The lack of a spectrum is significant, because without the printout of a spectrum, the presence of a chemical warfare agent can not be corroborated.

Gunnery Sergeant Grass testified that the MM-1 indicated that the amount of chemical warfare agent vapor in the air was not significant enough to produce any casualties. He also testified that "several Marines worked to complete the [breaching] lanes while wearing only MOPP level 2 and no gas masks while [his Fox] detected [those nerve agent] readings."[60] In his testimony, CWO3 Cottrell agreed that the reported levels were below an immediate threat to humans and below the level that would cause symptoms. These statements are quite significant in light of MM-1 detection capabilities while sampling vapors. According to experts, the MM-1 is not well suited for vapor detection. The Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects states,

Although sensitive and specific for identification of ground contamination, the mass spectrometer system on board the FOX is not optimized for sampling and alerting to generalized airborne vapors of chemical materials. When operating in the air sampling mode, the FOX is not a suitable warning device; very high concentrations of chemical agents would have to be present, such that unprotected troops in the vicinity would be adversely and acutely affected.[61]

US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command Fox experts stated that when the MM-1 is used as a vapor sampling device, it is far less sensitive than other detectors, and human symptoms would most likely appear before the Fox MM-1 would alert.[62]

The US Army conducted pre-Gulf War testing and evaluation of the MM-1. The subsequent report concluded, "The [Fox] system requires a knowledge of chemistry by the operator in order to handle situations out of the ordinary. It is much more sensitive to liquids than to vapors, and does not detect [chemical warfare agent] vapor to the danger level for humans."[63] This means that unprotected, exposed personnel would suffer exposure effects before the MM-1 could detect chemical warfare agent vapors.

Gunnery Sergeant Grass testified the MM-1 screen indicated the presence of nerve agent vapors until his Fox left the minefield, but at amounts he believed were insufficient to cause exposure symptoms. However, according to the Army’s MM-1 test report conclusions, if the MM-1 indicated the presence of nerve agent vapors, the amount of nerve agent vapor present had to be above the danger level to humans, and significant enough to result in physical effects—the unprotected, exposed personnel to whom Gunnery Sergeant Grass referred would have become casualties, and likely fatalities. (See Tab G for a discussion of the MM-1’s vapor detection capabilities and chemical warfare agent effects). Task Force Ripper noted no potential or actual exposure to chemical warfare agents throughout all of the breaching operations,[64] and while many of the Marines were only in MOPP-2, there were no reports of casualties or any chemical warfare agent exposures.[65]

As noted in Table 1, based on UNSCOM information, Iraqi ground forces could have delivered mustard agent only with 155mm artillery and nerve agent with 122mm rockets or Scud missiles. Gunnery Sergeant Grass stated that, at the time of this incident, his unit was under small arms fire, but it was not until they reached the second minefield that the 1st MARDIV encountered enemy artillery fire.[66] The command chronology of the 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, a unit collocated with Task Force Ripper, noted that the first minefield was not defended—there was no enemy fire.[67] According to the 3d Tank Battalion NBC officer, there was no chemical attack.[68]

4. Assessment of the Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents in the 1st marine Division Breaching Lanes

In post-war testimony, both Gunnery Sergeant Grass and CWO3 Cottrell reported that while in the minefield breaching lanes, the Fox’s mobile mass spectrometer detected small traces of nerve agent in the air and indicated that the amount of nerve agent vapor present was not enough to cause casualties. For this reason, the trace detections were not reported further up the chain-of-command. There were no NBC reports and no Marines went to a higher protective posture. The MM-1 operator could not perform a spectrum analysis of the suspected agent. Consequently, samples and an MM-1 tape, evidence considered most valuable in making an assessment, are not available for analysis.

We found no evidence to corroborate claims of chemical warfare agent presence. There is no evidence to indicate that Iraqi weapons delivered chemical warfare agents to the 1st MARDIV breaching lanes. According to witnesses and unit logs, these Marines were not under attack at the time. Therefore, there is no apparent delivery mechanism to account for the presence of chemical warfare agents.

In addition to the absence of a delivery mechanism, there is more convincing evidence which indicates that the MM-1 did not detect nerve agent vapors. According to the Defense Science Board Task Force report and MM-1 experts, the MM-1 is not optimized for sampling and alerting to airborne vapors—it does not detect levels of agent vapor at the danger level to humans. As a result, before the MM-1 could indicate the presence of chemical warfare agent vapor and troops could be warned, unprotected troops exposed to chemical warfare agent vapors would be casualties or fatalities. Given the accounts of the presence of trace amounts of vapor and the MM-1’s vapor detection limitations, one would expect many casualties and deaths within the vicinity of the Task Force Ripper Fox. However, there were no reports of casualties or any chemical warfare agent exposures.

Based on the evidence, we believe that the presence of chemical warfare agents in the 1st MARDIV breaching lanes is unlikely.

1. Task Organization for Breaching Operations

The 2d MARDIV breaching lanes were identified by color and number: from left to right (west to east), they were lanes Red 1, Red 2, Blue 3, Blue 4, Green 5, and Green 6. The far west flank of the 2d MARDIV's breaching area was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment (the 1/6). Company B of the 1/6 breached through the western-most lane, Red 1, while Company C breached directly to the right via lane Red 2.[74] Two return lanes—one lane to the left and one to the right of the six assault lanes—were completed, after breaching operations, to enable equipment and personnel to evacuate to the rear without interfering with the advance.[75]

Assault amphibian vehicles (AAVs - Figure 9) of the AAV battalion’s 1st Platoon, Company B, transported Company B of the 1/6 through the minefields and into battle through breaching lane Red 1. The 1st Platoon’s 11 AAVs[76] were each tightly packed with an infantry squad (15 Marines), an infantry commander, three crewmen, and all of their gear (Figure 10).[77]

Figure 9. Marine Corps assault amphibian vehicles, like the one above, transported Marines through the minefield and into battle

Figure 10. The interior of an AVV. Fifteen infantrymen and one crewman sat here, and two crewman and an infantry commander sat in forward positions

2. Breaching Lane Red 1 Chemical warfare Agent Alert

"US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2D Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm" (hereafter referred to as "2d Marine Division Monograph") recounted a chemical warfare agent alert. This document is often cited as proof of Iraq’s use of chemical warfare agents during the Gulf War. It mentions a chemical warfare agent detection by a Fox on the first day of the ground war: "… the ‘Fox’ chemical reconnaissance vehicle at lane Red 1 detected a ‘trace’ of mustard gas, originally thought to be from a chemical mine."[78] The 2d Marine Division Monograph also states that another Fox was sent to breaching lane Red 1, and confirmed the presence of a chemical warfare agent. Searching for evidence to substantiate the monograph entry, we interviewed other 2d MARDIV Fox crewmen and NBC personnel. See Tab E for the results of those interviews.

As did the 1st MARDIV, the 2d MARDIV began breaching operations outfitted in MOPP-2.[79] The morning started with a light mist, but cleared as the day progressed.[80] It was cold enough that "nobody complained"[81] about traveling in MOPP-2. Smoke from burning oil well fires obscured the sun through most of the day. In fact, the burning oil wells were close enough to lane Red 1 that when navigation hardware failed, the Company B, 1/6 commander directed his driver to align on and steer toward a burning oil well (such as those shown in Figure 11), one of which was only about 100 meters away.[82]

Figure 11.  Burning oil well heads in Kuwait

A Fox assigned in direct support joined the 1/6 on February 17, 1991, one week before the actual attack.[83] As the 1/6 Fox crossed the first minefield, its MM-1 operator observed little activity on his screen. About halfway across the minefield, the MM-1 alerted to the possible presence of chemical warfare agents, so the 1/6 Fox commander announced "gas, gas, gas" over the battalion communications network and filed an NBC-4 report[84] (Figure 12) for suspected contamination.[85]

Figure 12. The NBC-4 report received by Blue Light, the 1/6 NBC officer, at 6:34 AM, February 24, 1991

The NBC summary of the 1/6 command chronology stated, "At 0630 the Fox detects Sarin (nerve) and HQ mustard (blister) agents in the first breach [first minefield] of Red Lane 1. Battalion units in Red Lane 1 [lane Red 1] advanced to MOPP Level IV."[86]

Other vehicles proceeded through the breaching lane ahead of the Fox. The Fox commander remembered that his vehicle was about the fifth one through the breach. After combat engineers exploded a path through the minefield, tanks with track-width mine plows proofed the lane (standard procedure before the Fox or any other vehicle would enter the lane). Security personnel in three assault amphibian vehicles followed behind the tanks, followed by a command and control AAV, followed by the Fox.[87] According to the testimony of a member of Company B’s 1st platoon, and corroborated by an audio tape recorded at the time, his unit had almost reached the area between the minefields near an above-ground pipeline before the Fox sounded the warning. During their crossing, he recounted that his vehicle was open and many personnel were standing up looking out the open hatches while only in MOPP-2. No one experienced any symptoms of contact with a chemical warfare agent and none of the M9 chemical detector paper they had strapped to their arms and legs recorded any liquid chemical warfare agent contact.[88]

The 6th Marines regimental listing of significant events notes an initial report at 6:31 AM, followed at 6:35 AM with the identification of the suspected chemical warfare agents as "Sarin nerve agent and Lewisite mustard [sic] gas."[89] The commander of the 1st platoon, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, placed the time at approximately 6:30 AM, and remembered that the Fox reported traces of both non-persistent nerve agents and persistent blister agents.[90] The 1/6 NBC officer recorded the event at 6:34 AM.[91] The 2d MARDIV NBC platoon at the combat operations center recorded the report as an NBC-1, changing the reconnaissance report (NBC-4) to an attack report (NBC-1) at 6:58 AM, and at 11:50 AM, the 2d MARDIV sent NBC-1 messages to the I MEF.[92] Many units relayed this report. For example, the 7th Marine Regiment in the 1st MARDIV recorded the event at 7:14 AM,[93] and even the Army's XVIII Airborne (ABN) Corps Main, far west of the Marines, was informed of the incident by the XVIII ABN Corps Rear at 9:55 AM.[94]

Based on the warning from the 1/6 Fox, 1/6 personnel in lane Red 1 donned their chemical protective masks and gloves (MOPP-4), "but returned to MOPP Level II 500m[eters] beyond the breach."[95] Although these reports are well documented, the source of the suspected chemical warfare agent was not established. NBC officers in other breach lanes evaluated the wind (it was blowing away from their lanes, not towards them) and decided that increasing MOPP level for their personnel was not warranted.[96]

3. CAM and M9 Chemicals Detection Paper Indications

In lane Red 1 in the second minefield, mines disabled the AAV in front of the Fox, forcing it to stop. The Fox commander recalled ordering two of his crewmen into MOPP-4 and had them exit the vehicle. Once outside, the crewmen used a chemical agent monitor (CAM) to check their vehicle for residual agents but found none, despite the fact that both HQ mustard and lewisite (two of the three agents to which their MM-1 alerted) are persistent agents. However, the crewmen noticed that M9 chemical warfare agent detection paper (designed to detect only liquid chemical warfare agents) attached to the Fox had turned red in spots, indicating a possible exposure to liquid chemical warfare agents. At that time, there were many enemy prisoners of war in the immediate area, so the two crewmen assisted combat engineers in collecting the prisoners.[97]

Although the Fox commander stated that both crewmen left the vehicle in MOPP-4, the crewmen stated that they did not wear their masks (they were in MOPP-2) while outside the Fox. One crewman noted the presence of many enemy prisoners of war, and stated that none of them exhibited symptoms of chemical warfare agent exposure.[98]

During a pause in the offensive on the evening of the first day, the Fox MM-1 was sampling the air but receiving no indications of chemical warfare agent vapors. The crew left the vehicle and used a CAM to check other vehicles that had passed through lane Red 1; none showed any signs of mustard or lewisite. One shrapnel hole in an equipment pack registered a 2-bar reading[99] (out of a maximum of 8-bars) for a G-series nerve agent, indicating a possible low chemical warfare agent vapor concentration.[100] The Fox crewman who operated the CAM stated that he did not wear a protective mask while checking the vehicles and did not exhibit any symptoms of exposure.[101] The vehicle's crew was told to stay clear of the pack, and in the morning, the hole did not register anything.[102] Neither the Fox nor the assault amphibian vehicle was decontaminated.[103] The Fox commander stated that he notified the 1/6 NBC officer, but did not issue an NBC warning for the CAM detection.[104] Marines in the immediate vicinity of the vehicle did not take protective measures, and no injuries were reported.

4. Analysis of the Breaching Lane Red 1 Chemical Warfare Agent Alert 

The MM-1 can print certain information about the chemicals displayed on its screen (e.g., a list of ion masses and intensities) on a paper tape for later analysis. The MM-1 tape (Figure 13) from the 1/6 Fox shows alerts for sarin, HQ mustard, and lewisite. Responding to these alerts, the Fox crew took the correct proactive action and warned the 1/6 of the possible presence of chemical warfare agents.

Figure 13. The 1/6 MM-1 Fox tape

The first alarm occurred at 6:21 AM (February 24, 1991) when the MM-1 alerted to "Fat, Oil, Wax." A minute later, a second alert occurred for "Fat, Oil, Wax," but this time the MM-1 indicated that lewisite also might be present. Because the MM-1 makes its initial detection using a four-ion fingerprint from the entire spectrum of a chemical warfare agent, it can sound a false alarm due to similar ion patterns from interfering chemicals. A second step of the Fox confirmation process is needed to evaluate the spectrum and compare it to the library of known chemical warfare agents.

The Fox MM-1 operator did take a spectrum with the MM-1, but did not reduce the probe’s temperature to better discriminate among the substances detected, nor did the Fox stop, since it was in the middle of a combat operation.

Normally, before taking a spectrum, the operator would operate a temperature program that heats the probe from 180� C to over 200� C to clean the MM-1 of any previous contamination. After the temperature program, the operator determines whether the probe is clean by examining the ion activity on the MM-1 screen. Before taking the spectrum, the MM-1 operator should have changed the sampling method and waited approximately three minutes, allowing the probe to cool.[105]

In this case, however, the MM-1 operator performed none of these pre-spectrum steps because he did not have time to do so.[106] Stopping the Fox would have seriously disrupted the momentum of the Marines transiting through the breaching lane. Nevertheless, the spectrum taken immediately after the lewisite alert showed only "Fat, Oil, Wax," indicating that the sample was composed of, or contaminated by, hydrocarbons. More alerts followed from 6:23 AM to 6:26 AM, again primarily for "Fat, Oil, Wax," but with the possibility of sarin or HQ mustard presence. Again the MM-1 operator ran a spectrum without performing the pre-spectrum steps and again the spectrum showed only "Fat, Oil, Wax." Spectrums run at 6:27 AM and 6:32 AM showed only "Fat, Oil, Wax." From 6:35 AM to 6:37 AM, the MM-1 again alerted for HQ mustard, but the printout tape indicates that the operator did not take spectrums during these times.

We provided the tape that recorded the MM-1’s results to the US Army’s Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM) for analysis. After analyzing the MM-1 tape, CBDCOM determined that although the procedures used by the Fox crew may have been appropriate for the operational situation, these procedures were insufficient to confirm the presence of chemical warfare agents.[107] Both the Fox commander and the MM-1 operator have testified that the detections were made using the sampling wheels,[108] but according to CBDCOM, the sample was obtained using vapor sampling.[109] The letter "A" preceding the numbers (the relative intensities) on an MM-1 tape indicates that an air sample generated an alarm, not a liquid substance vaporized off a sampling wheel (see Figure 13).[110]

As a vapor-sampling device, the MM-1 is far less sensitive than other detectors.[111] As mentioned in the analysis of the 1st Marine Division Fox incident, according to the Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects, "When operating in the air sampling mode, the FOX is not a suitable warning device; very high concentrations of chemical agents would have to be present, such that unprotected troops in the vicinity would be adversely and acutely affected."[112] A US Army pre-Gulf War test and evaluation report stated, "It [the MM-1] is much more sensitive to liquids than to vapors, and does not detect [chemical warfare agent] vapor to the danger level for humans."[113]

Twice within one minute (6:23 AM), the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox MM-1 alerted the crew to the possible presence of sarin vapor. However, if sarin was present in breaching lane Red 1, and the MM-1 detected its presence, the sarin vapor would have been at levels above the danger level for humans. Marines, who passed through lane Red 1 ahead of the Fox at MOPP-2, would have been exposed to dangerous levels of sarin vapor. Despite these facts, we are aware of only two Marines who sought medical attention after breaching operations in lane Red 1. The reported symptoms of these Marines were not consistent with nerve agent exposure (a discussion of possible chemical warfare agent injuries appears later in this paper).

When the MM-1 alerted to "Fat, Oil, Wax" and a chemical warfare agent, the MM-1 tape always indicated "Fat, Oil, Wax" at higher relative intensities than the suspected chemical warfare agent, indicating that a high level of interfering hydrocarbons was present at that time. Fox experts have stated that "Fat, Oil, Wax" indicates a false alarm due to battlefield contaminants.[114] Witness reports confirm that smoke and oil from the oil well fires were indeed in the air. In its analysis, CBDCOM stated:

While it is true that the MM-1 only obtained a spectrum of the highest level intensity response, and that the spectrum was determined by the MM-1 to best match the fat, oil and wax algorithm; we know from lengthy experience with the MM-1 that under circumstances of high interferent concentrations, the MM-1 is prone to responding with incorrect initial alarms for other compounds being monitored.[115]

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) also evaluated the Fox tape. While NIST’s assessment does not definitively rule out the presence of chemical warfare agents, its experts concluded, "It is likely that the reports of lewisite, sarin and HQ mustard on the tapes are false positive results caused by interference with complex hydrocarbon mixtures at the points of measurement…. [The] high relative concentrations of ‘fat, oil, wax’ strongly suggest the presence of significant hydrocarbon background," leading to a false initial identification.[116]

Similarly, Bruker Daltonics (hereafter referred to as Bruker), a nationally renowned expert on the MM-1, analyzed the tape and concluded, "[T]he information in the tapes is consistent with the background information of driving through an area with large amounts of oil in the background."[117] To determine if chemical warfare agents were present as well as the "Fat, Oil, Wax," the MM-1 operator would have had to perform special additional spectrum analyses following the normal spectrum. However, US military personnel were not taught to perform these special spectrum techniques during their training courses.[118]

Although the MM-1 printed the alerts on the tape, it did not print the ions of the spectra. Apparently, the Fox was not operating with the "auto print" feature activated, and the operator did not depress the print button to print the ion pattern of each spectrum onto the tape. Consequently, it is not possible to determine what the MM-1 operator saw on the screen. The actual ion fragmentation pattern that could have provided details of the chemicals detected does not exist. The CBDCOM Fox experts concluded, "because of the presence of high concentrations of interferents and the short time span between these responses, we conclude that the presence of the three chemical warfare compounds is highly unlikely. On the other hand, we cannot with great certainty conclude that they were not present."[119] The National Institute of Standards and Technology also pointed out, "The detection of three quite different agents … is consistent with false indications from a high, variable, and complex background signal."[120] Bruker states the same conclusions somewhat differently: "… it is typical that as you drive through a contaminated area, the intensity of the alarm goes up, reaches a maximum, and then goes down as you leave the area. A single alarm for an agent is not consistent with driving through an area of [chemical warfare agent] contamination."[121] Due to the priorities of breaching operations, the Fox could not stop to take samples, perform M256 tests, or attempt to identify contaminated areas. The absence of these actions precludes confirmation of the presence of chemical warfare agents by other means.

Of the three chemical warfare agents to which the Fox MM-1 alerted (sarin, HQ mustard, and lewisite), only sarin was known to be part of Iraq’s chemical warfare agent inventory. Iraq had mustard agents, but the predominant form of mustard found in Iraq’s weapons was HD mustard—not HQ mustard.[122] HQ mustard is a mixture of 75% HD (sulfur mustard) and 25% Q (sesqui mustard). According to a chemical warfare agent expert, Iraq did not have Q.[123] Fox experts stated, "If HQ was detected, both HD and Q should have been detected, with the HD being more likely to be detected since it is more volatile than the Q component."[124] The absence of an alert to HD and Q and the absence of Q in Iraq’s inventory adds doubt to the validity of the MM-1 alert to the presence of HQ mustard.

While Iraq did have HD mustard and sarin in its chemical warfare agent inventory, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) did not list lewisite as part of this inventory—there is no other evidence to suggest anything to the contrary.[125] After examining postwar Iraqi declarations, UNSCOM inspection data, and other information, the Central Intelligence Agency compiled a list of the chemical warfare agents included in Iraq’s Gulf War chemical warfare agent arsenal; lewisite is not on that list.[126]

The commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, stated that the detection, as reported to him in the NBC report, was a trace amount, and he understood that the Fox did not get a full spectrum readout. He remembered that all personnel in the possibly affected units went to MOPP-4 when the alarm sounded and the battalion NBC officer alerted other units that lane Red 1 may have been contaminated for the first 300 meters.[127] For the next several hours, the 1/6 continued to monitor the condition of lane Red 1.[128] According to the battalion commanding officer, since there were only trace alerts for vapor, no secondary indications of chemical warfare agent attack, no reports from other nearby units, and no injuries or anything else that would substantiate a chemical warfare agent incident, he considered the event a false alarm.[129]

As noted earlier, other possible indications of the presence of chemical warfare agents existed in breaching lane Red 1. According to the Fox crewmen, the M9 tape attached to the exterior of the Fox turned red in spots, indicating the possibility that it was exposed to a liquid chemical warfare agent, for example, lewisite or mustards, primarily liquid hazards.[130] The Fox commander took particular notice because while the Marines’ faces and vehicle exteriors were covered with oil residue, only the M9 paper on one side of the Fox was spotted, while the M9 paper on the other side of the vehicle was not.[131] However, M9 detection paper may show false indications due to numerous interferents, among them heat, petroleum products, smoke, and hydraulic fluid. The breaching environment contained many of these interferents,[132] any of which could have caused the red spots. In addition, it is reasonable to conclude that the chemical agent monitor would have detected traces of a persistent chemical warfare agent on the Fox or other vehicles, had an agent been present in the breaching lane. The Fox and many other vehicles recently had transited an area suspected to be contaminated with lewisite and HQ mustard, both persistent liquid chemical warfare agents. The chemical agent monitor (CAM), however, did not detect any agents on the Fox while in the second minefield, although a persistent chemical warfare agent should have remained on at least some portion of the vehicle had an agent been present.[133] The Fox was not decontaminated at any time during or after the breaching operations.[134]

The CAM was designed to detect chemical warfare agent vapors. When the CAM indicated the 2-bar reading for nerve agent vapor mentioned earlier, it is possible the CAM detected a chemical warfare agent in the equipment pack with the shrapnel hole. However, the CAM is susceptible to alarm for reasons other than the presence of chemical warfare agents. For example, the 1st MARDIV NBC officer noted that the CAM gave a 4-bar reading, an indication of a high vapor concentration,[135] for nerve agent when sampling a Cup-o-Noodles.™[136] Military field manuals note that the CAM may give false readings when used in enclosed spaces or when sampling near strong vapor sources (see the glossary at Tab A for other CAM interferents). The field manuals recommend that the operator experiment in the environment to determine what common items will cause the CAM to respond.[137]

In this case, the CAM detector head was placed inside the pack, and displayed a reading for nerve agent vapor. None of the Marines near the unmasked Marine operating the CAM—nor that Marine himself—was affected by any agent vapor. There were no associated alerts or casualties during this phase of the operation. After the Fox alert and passage through the first minefield, the unit received mortar and artillery fire.[138] However, it is impossible to determine when the shrapnel hole was made in the pack or what the source might have been.

5. Possible Sources of a Chemical Warfare Agent in Breaching Lane Red 1

a.  Chemical Mines

The 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment logs attributed the Fox MM-1 alert in lane Red 1 to a chemical mine. Unit chronologies from the 1/6 note, "During the breach of the first minefield B Company encountered a chemical mine and went to MOPP IV."[139] In a February 1997 interview with investigators, the 1/6 Fox commander stated that because there were both nerve and blister chemical warfare agent alerts (and no in-coming artillery fire or aerial bombardment), he deduced that the agents were released by two land mines detonated by the line charges, and he reported it that way in his NBC-4 report.[140] He repeated that belief in his testimony to the Presidential Advisory Committee, in May 1997.

At the time, I was confident that there was at least two chemical mines in the minefield. Logically speaking, you would not mix all three of those chemicals [lewisite, mustard, and sarin] into one mine. I was confident and I still am confident that there was at least two chemical mines that were out there.[141]

The 1/6 operations officer, who was observing vehicle movement through the breach from a position between lanes Red 1 and 2, recalled that at the time, he believed the source of any possible contamination was from chemical mines.[142] The 1/6 command chronology reflected that belief:

We never received the "promised" chemical attack. B Co[mpany], however, did hit a chemical mine while breaching the first minefield in Red 1, requiring adoption of MOPP level IV.[143]

Additionally, intelligence information indicated that Iraq possibly had chemical mines in their chemical weapons inventory.[144]

The Fox commander said that his vehicle itself did not hit a mine; he believed that the line charges set off the chemical mines. According to him, there were no explosions or artillery attack, except for the line charge explosions set off by the combat engineers at the start of the breaching operations.[145]

Another report of a possible chemical mine came from the 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion command chronology that stated one of its unit’s vehicles hit two anti-tank mines and a chemical mine.[146] The unit's Company B commander confirmed that he lost an assault amphibian vehicle (AAV) when it ran over a land mine, but did not believe it was a chemical mine and does not remember how or why the entry was made in the command chronology. This incident occurred in lane Red 1, in the second Iraqi minefield, four to five kilometers[147] from the incident in the first minefield. The disabled AAV temporarily blocked the breaching lane. The commander and personnel in his vehicle dismounted and walked out of the minefield in MOPP-2, with no effects that would indicate exposure to chemical warfare agents.[148]

Operational reports and interviews with explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) experts disclosed that they found no chemical mines in Kuwait. In fact, no chemical mines have been recovered from this or any other minefield of the war. One EOD expert, who cleared minefields in Kuwait both during the war and after the war as a contractor for the Kuwaiti government reported that he never encountered a chemical mine and knew of no chemical mines being found in this area of operations.[149] The I MEF engineer officer stated that Marine engineers never found chemical mines or munitions in the breaching lanes or anywhere else in Kuwait—even though they were specifically looking for these types of munitions.[150] Tab F lists the types of mines the Marines found. One of the companies that cleared munitions and unexploded ordnance from the US sector of the Kuwait Theater of operations was CMS, Inc. The president of the CMS division responsible for these efforts stated that in the three years that they cleared munitions, they never found any chemical mines in Kuwait. They also met regularly with the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense and contractors clearing other areas of the Kuwait Theatre of operations. No one in any of those meetings reported discovering a chemical mine in Kuwait[151] .

US Army and US intelligence community experts on foreign mines spent considerable time after the war cataloging Iraq’s mine capabilities. In total, post-war mine-clearing operations cleared over 3.5 million mines, and no chemical mines were ever encountered.[152] Iraq has neither turned over any chemical mines for destruction nor declared having any chemical mines in its inventory to the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq.[153] In addition, UNSCOM officials have stated that they found no chemical mines in the Iraqi inventory.[154] According to the Central Intelligence Agency, although there have been allegations that Coalition troops were exposed to chemical warfare agents from land mines filled with chemical warfare agents, it is very unlikely these were in Iraq’s chemical weapons inventory.[155]

b. Artillery

The 1/6 Fox commander thought his alerts were triggered by chemical land mines. Explaining why he filed an NBC-4 report instead of an NBC-1 report, he told us, "if we found something in the minefield, we’d deliver an NBC-4 report. If we found something coming from an artillery or a mortar type attack, we’d just immediately go with an NBC-1 report like is standard."[156] In testimony before the Presidential Advisory Committee, he hypothesized,

[I]f there were no chemical mines in the mine field, the only other source that I could think of would be artillery or mortars that came in on the breach, which I did not personally witness, but I could hear over the radio that we were taking artillery and mortars during the first breach. And if that wasn’t the case—and this is all speculation now—if that was not the case, then obviously we just happened to roll over the top of chemical [warfare] agents that had been spilled and had been sitting out there for six months. But I would discount that highly due to the fact that we spiked across the spectrum, and even a persistent agent sitting out there in those conditions for six months would dissipate greatly.[157]

A 6th Marine Regiment document shows the chronology of events as they unfolded on the morning of February 24, 1991. At 6:07 AM, the 1/6 fired line charges across the first minefield in lanes Red 1 and Red 2. At 6:15 AM, the document reflects that the 1/6 received incoming fire from 82mm mortars and artillery.[158] The log entry does not mention the caliber of artillery or specify where the incoming enemy fire landed, i.e., whether Company B, 1/6 (breaching lane Red 1) or Company C, 1/6 (breaching lane Red 2), received it.

The time of this log entry (6:15 AM) is significant, since it occurred approximately seven minutes before the first Fox alert (6:22 AM). The location of the impact of the incoming fire is also important. If the incoming artillery rounds contained chemical warfare agents and landed in the immediate vicinity of the breaching lane, Marines in the area would have been affected.

According to several witnesses, there was no incoming artillery in the immediate vicinity of lane Red 1 or near the Fox. The infantry company commander and the AAV 1st platoon commander were both in the command and control AAV, which passed through lane Red 1 approximately 20 meters ahead of the Fox. Both stated that there was no incoming enemy artillery fire at the time of the first breach.[159] In addition, all three AAV section leaders, among the first to pass through the breaching lane, noted the lack of Iraqi artillery fire in the first minefield.[160] The 1/6 operations officer recalled that there was no incoming artillery fire at the time of the first breach. He was quite emphatic in his belief that any suspected chemical warfare agent contamination in lane Red 1 came from chemical mines. He suggested that the log entry at 6:15 AM was incorrectly logged and the artillery attack occurred later, between the first and second minefields.[161]

However, two Marines recalled incoming artillery fire before breaching the first minefield. The platoon sergeant of the assault battalion’s first platoon manned the machine gun position in his platoon’s last vehicle. He recalled that while waiting for the engineers to breach the minefield, he observed mortar fire and artillery rounds. He distinctly remembered two artillery rounds (there may have been as many as five) that landed 200 to 300 meters behind and to the right of his position. He described the rounds as other than high explosive, noting that they created white smoke.[162] On the other hand, the driver of his vehicle did not recall any incoming artillery or mortar fire at the first minefield but noted that his unit was under significant artillery and mortar fire at the second minefield.[163]

The NBC decontamination and chemical casualty team for the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment was positioned approximately 100 meters behind the leading edge of the minefield, and in between lanes Red 1 and 2. The staff non-commissioned officer in charge recalled that after they completed setting up, he witnessed two rounds of incoming artillery fire, which appeared to be high explosive. The rounds impacted approximately 100 to 200 meters behind his furthest vehicle, far enough away that his team did not receive any fragmentation or casualties from the rounds. He recalled that approximately 10 to 15 minutes later, the Fox sounded the gas alert over the radio network. Members of his team conducted M256 chemical warfare agent detection kit tests to determine if there was any chemical warfare agent contamination in the immediate area; the test results were negative.[164]

Figure 14 attempts to visually represent specific information obtained through interviews with Marines who participated in breaching operations in lane Red 1. In particular, it shows the approximate locations of the two witnesses who remembered incoming artillery fire, and the approximate location of the artillery impact area, based on those witnesses’ estimates of direction and distance from their positions. The positions and spacing between the vehicles, wind direction, and breach depth also are based on estimates derived from several witnesses’ interview data. Figures 15 and 16, which follow, are based on similar interview data.

Figure 14. Approximate location of incoming artillery's impact are and the two witnesses

6. Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Injuries

The 2d Marine Division Monograph states that the chemical warfare agent in lane Red 1 was "sufficiently strong to cause blistering on the exposed arms of two AAV crewmen."[165] This has been a point of particular interest and investigation. We pursued multiple leads in an effort to identify any additional Marines, particularly any with blistered arms, who might have been injured as a result of chemical warfare agent exposure. We are aware of only one Marine who claims to have been injured by chemical warfare agents during breaching operations. However, the names of two other Marines surfaced during interviews of 2d MARDIV personnel.[166] A fourth possible chemical warfare agent-related injury, possibly related to the breaching operations, surfaced in another investigation. What we learned follows.

a. Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Injury to an AAV Crewman

After the Gulf War cease-fire, an assault amphibian vehicle platoon commander recommended a Purple Heart for one of his Marines.[167] This Marine sergeant was a section leader in the first platoon, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, and rode in the machine gunner's position in his vehicle. In his written statement, the sergeant reported that immediately after the breaching line-charges were fired, he heard "gas" reported over the tactical radio network. He donned his mask but did not put on his gloves until he closed the vehicle hatches, and in doing so, exposed his ungloved hands to the outside air. He reported that he immediately felt a strong burning sensation and blisters began forming.[168] His vehicle had not yet entered the minefield breaching lane when he heard the Fox report gas. The sergeant recalled that the Fox was at least 50 meters ahead and to his right when the warning was sounded (Figure 15). He indicated that his vehicle was about tenth in line to pass through the breach, with 50 meters separation between vehicles;[169] the Fox was fifth.[170] The 1/6 company commander stated that the cleared path through the first minefield was only about 70 meters long.[171]

Figure 15. Compiled from Marine witnesses' recollections, this graphic depicts the approximate location of the sergeant's AAV at the time of the Fox vehicle alert in Lane Red I. 

When the sergeant felt the burning sensation on the back of his right hand, he removed the glove, decontaminated the back of his hand with materials from his M258 decontamination kit, and put the glove back on. Within approximately 30 minutes, just before his unit arrived at the second minefield, they were informed that they could return to MOPP-2, at which time he noticed small pencil eraser-sized blisters on both hands. Again, he decontaminated. The sergeant stated that the Fox crew checked his hand later that day, confirmed it was a blister agent, and noted had the agent been lewisite, "it would have been a lot worse" for him.[172] The Fox commander remembers looking at the man’s hands, seeing that they were red (but without blisters), and commenting that if it were a chemical warfare agent reaction, it must have been from a minute quantity. He did not interpret the condition as a chemical warfare agent injury, based on his quick viewing. He said, "I wouldn’t even really call it an injury as much as the fact that it was still red, irritated, and he had been scratching it."[173]

Other Marines’ observations differed. His platoon sergeant saw his hands a day or so after the event and remembers only redness—no blisters.[174] The company commander remembers meeting the sergeant several days after the event and seeing only one hand, the back of which was reddish with three pea-sized blisters.[175] Another witness, present at the battalion aid station about 12 hours after the event, stated that he saw what might have been something like a burn on the back of the sergeant's right hand. There were no blisters—just reddening, complicated by black charcoal powder residue from the lining of the MOPP suit. The red area was about the size of a silver dollar and it appeared to have been scratched.[176] However, the sergeant's platoon commander stated that at the end of the first day (February 24, 1991) he saw blisters on the sergeant's left hand.[177] A corpsman assigned to the sergeant's unit saw him the next morning. He stated that the sergeant's hands were bandaged, but a week later he saw what might have been signs of blisters.[178] Although the observations differ, they seem to agree that the possible injured area was limited to small areas on the back of one or both hands. The sergeant wore no gloves at the time of the possible exposure, but apparently no blisters were on the palms of his hands, fingers, or between the fingers.

The sergeant visited the battalion aid station the evening of the breaching operations. One witness remembers the corpsmen and doctors discussing the possibility that a chemical warfare agent caused the injury.[179] A corpsman who examined the sergeant's hand stated that he saw what might have been a blister the size of a quarter, but looked more like a burn.[180] The medical officer, one of two doctors assigned to the battalion aid station, who examined the sergeant remembers him well as the only Marine who complained to him of any kind of chemical warfare agent injury, but he doubted chemical warfare agents injured the hand.[181] His official evaluation was more explicit: "I found no blistering. I returned the [sergeant] to full duty without any treatment necessary…."[182]

Approximately four days later, a Marine approached the 1/6 NBC officer and claimed to have been injured by chemical warfare agents.[183] The NBC officer asked a battalion medical officer to accompany him to see this Marine, and after examining the Marine's hand, the NBC officer assessed that whatever the cause, the injury was not the result of a chemical warfare agent. He stated,

With the symptoms that blister agents present themselves, especially after four days of exposure, I determined myself that it was not a blister agent. Whether or not something dripped on his hand, it was apparent that something might have dripped on his hand, because he had some kind of a rash … There were no blisters apparent or deadening of the skin. The M.O. [medical officer] had also concurred with that fact that he believed himself that it was not any type of a chemical reaction to the skin as far as a blister agent was concerned; that it could have been some kind of a petrochemical, diesel, or something like that might have came through and dripped on his hand and caused a reaction of some sort … I don't think myself that it was a chemical [warfare] agent reaction. It could have been a petrochemical reaction of some sort; but a chemical [warfare] agent reaction, I personally don't think that that's the case.[184]

We have been unable to identify the medical officer to whom the 1/6 NBC officer referred. In an interview, the 1/6 Fox commander suggested that this medical officer might have been the 2d MARDIV surgeon.[185] Neither battalion aid station doctor recalled examining the sergeant at that time, and the 2d MARDIV surgeon knew of no chemical warfare agent casualties during the war.[186]

Two weeks after the cease fire, an NBC officer with the I MEF battle assessment team interviewed the sergeant and observed two blisters on the injured hand, which the officer described as "classic mustard/lewisite blister agent wound photos … sergeant [redacted] was clearly not severely wounded and … was fully capable of performing assigned missions…."[187] However, there is some confusion as to whether the blisters were present when the I MEF officer interviewed the sergeant. The sergeant stated in an interview that by the time he saw the 1/6 battalion aid station doctor the evening of the breaching operations (February 24, 1991), the blisters were gone; they were black scabs. When asked about the presence of blisters when he saw the I MEF battle assessment team NBC officer, the sergeant could not recall if the blisters were healed.[188] The sergeant’s platoon commander stated that the blisters were healed by day three (February 26th).[189] The commanding officer of the assault amphibian battalion, who convened a preliminary Purple Heart investigation, concluded that a medical officer did not consider the sergeant injured and in need of treatment by a medical doctor. The sergeant’s injuries, therefore, were not appropriate for a Purple Heart award.[190]

Analysis of the sergeant's injury must focus on examining the symptoms that should have been caused by the three chemical warfare agents (lewisite, HQ mustard, and sarin) to which the MM-1 alerted. We consulted a medical expert (a physician) in chemical warfare agent injuries. The physician examined the available evidence from a medical perspective to assess if the sergeant was exposed to chemical warfare agents.

Although all Marines in the sergeant’s vehicle were in MOPP-2 before the warning, no one else reported any symptoms. Immediate pain is consistent with exposure to the blister agent lewisite, but not with the blister agent HQ mustard.[191] According to the physician's report, a mild dose exposure to lewisite or mustard results in eye and airway irritation, a burning sensation in exposed skin, followed by erythema (redness of the skin), tissue necrosis (death), and blisters.[192] While the immediate pain experienced by this Marine is consistent with exposure to lewisite, neither lewisite nor HQ mustard produces immediate blisters.[193] The report stated,

Even Lewisite does not cause blisters within minutes. It takes hours for the blisters to occur and even longer for mustard blisters to appear. The burning of the exposed skin occurs almost immediately with Lewisite. The lack of any of these symptoms to the exposed eyes, airways, and skin or to the other Marines makes the potential of exposure unlikely.[194]

Lewisite exposure is more unlikely because UNSCOM did not list lewisite as part of Iraq’s inventory, and no other available evidence suggests that Iraq had lewisite in its arsenal.[195]

G-series nerve agents, (e.g., sarin) work by inhibiting the proper functioning of enzymes needed to transmit nerve impulses throughout the body. These agents affect the functions of all bodily systems, including the eyes, nose, throat, lungs, and muscles. People exposed to nerve agents may display the following symptoms: difficulty in breathing, drooling and excessive sweating, nausea, vomiting, cramps, loss of bladder/bowel control, twitching, jerking, staggering, headache, confusion, drowsiness, coma, convulsion, and ultimately death.[196] In addition to the irritation to his hands, the sergeant testified that he also experienced nausea and a severe headache.[197] After examining the relevant testimony, the physician made this assessment about the possibility of the sergeant’s exposure to sarin (GB).

Of all the potential agents, if GB [sarin] had been in a detonated mine, the GB would have been partially volatilized. This agent would have caused symptoms in at least some of the unprotected Marines driving through the breach in MOPP 2, before the alert was given. There would have been noticeable GB symptoms, at least pinpoint pupils, in some of the unprotected Marines. The pinpoint pupils and other noticeable GB symptoms would have lasted long enough for the exposed Marines to have complained and had the symptoms documented by others, including medical personnel…. I doubt there was GB exposure, due to the fact that there were no symptoms of exposure such as pinpoint pupils, excessive tearing, rhinorrhea, and excessive bronchosecretions, with difficulty breathing…. None of these symptoms were present in [the sergeant] or any other personnel. Marines in front of [the sergeant’s] vehicle would have suffered greater exposure since they were at MOPP-2 and not wearing their masks before the "gas" alert was given. They were all unaffected.[198]

The physician stated that something caused a reaction on the sergeant's hands, but it "was more than likely caused by other irritant substances."[199] One possible cause is the M258A1 decontamination kit, which the sergeant used immediately after he thought that he had been exposed to chemical warfare agents. The M258A1 kit contains chemicals to neutralize chemical warfare agents and cleanse affected skin. According to the Department of Defense material safety data sheet for this kit, the use of packet number one (used first after suspected exposure) may cause these following effects:

Irritating to eyes, mucous membranes, respiratory tract and/or skin. May cause central nervous system effects. May cause digestive disturbances, nervous disorders, skin eruptions [blisters or rash]. Corrosive to body tissues.[200]

A US Army NBC decontamination field manual states that packet number one can "burn" skin.[201]

The physician concluded that it is extremely unlikely that the injury to the sergeant's hands was due to chemical warfare agent exposure. He based his opinion on his medical experience with chemical warfare agent exposures, the sergeant’s accounts of his symptoms, and the findings of the 1/6 battalion aid station doctor, corpsmen, and other witnesses. Summing up, the physician stated, "Classic symptoms [of chemical warfare agent exposure] were not noted in [the sergeant] or other Marines in the potentially hazardous area."[202]

b. Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Injury to a Rifleman (lance corporal)

While investigating the injury to the assault amphibian vehicle sergeant, we learned of a possible chemical warfare agent injury to a 1/6 rifleman during the alert in lane Red 1. This lance corporal was a member of Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment. The AAV in which he rode passed through the possibly contaminated breaching lane at least two vehicles ahead of the Fox (Figure 16). By the time the alert for "gas" was sounded, his vehicle had exited the lane, while the vehicle that carried the AAV sergeant had not yet entered the lane.[203] When the call for "gas" came over the radio, personnel in the lance corporal’s vehicle were in MOPP-2, and he was seated inside the vehicle.[204] According to the vehicle’s corpsman, no one in this vehicle exhibited any symptoms consistent with exposure to chemical warfare agents. It was too crowded to get up and move around, but once masked (MOPP-4), everyone gave him the thumbs-up, indicating that all was well.[205]

Figure 16. Compiled from Marine witnesses' recollection, this graphic depicts the approximate location of the lance corporal's AAV at the time of the Fox vehicle alert in lane Red 1

A squad leader from another platoon recalled that some time towards the end of the first day of combat, the lance corporal had acquired what the squad leader first described as a dime-sized blister. However, this squad leader clarified that he never saw a blister on his cheek; he described what he saw as a cherry-colored mark on the lance corporal’s cheek.[206]

The lance corporal approached his platoon corpsman some time in the late morning or mid-afternoon, after the battalion had completed breaching the second minefield, and asked the corpsman to examine his chin. The corpsman described the affected area as a little rash with pustules, which looked as if it had been dry-shaven. The lance corporal thought that chemical warfare agents were the cause, but the corpsman did not think so. Nonetheless, the corpsman instructed the corporal to decontaminate the area with his M258A1 decontamination kit. The lance corporal did not want to go to the battalion aid station at that time. A day or two later, the corpsman saw the corporal again; the corporal said he was fine.[207]

Other Marines who saw the lance corporal's chin had similar observations. A corporal in the same vehicle saw the lance corporal roughly six hours after the lane Red 1 incident. He stated that the lance corporal’s face was not actually blistered, but reddish and irritated. He wondered whether the heat and humidity inside the vehicle caused the condition.[208] The Fox commander recalled that the lance corporal approached him, scratching the affected area, concerned that something had dripped on his cheek. In the Fox commander's opinion,

It looked like maybe it had some acne starting to build up, but that was, in my opinion, basically due to, you know, just the oil and dirt that was out in the area. So there may have been some acne up there, but I didn't see any of the reddening or blisters forming, and this was after the 24-hour mark. So I discounted, you know, an actual blister agent that he would have been exposed to.[209]

The platoon sergeant described the affected area as a combined blister and rash. He recalled that the platoon corpsman took the lance corporal to the Fox commander, but the sergeant did not think the lance corporal went to the battalion aid station.[210]

The same experienced physician who assessed the condition of the AAV sergeant also commented on the lance corporal's condition:

There were many other potential irritants in the environment that could have caused the irritation. This Marine would have sought care quickly if the pain had been from mustard or Lewisite. In addition, his lack of symptoms elsewhere, especially his eyes and airways, would lead one to believe that none of the suspected agents, GB [sarin]; mustard; or Lewisite; were involved.[211]

We attempted to contact the lance corporal on numerous occasions to discuss his possible injury. Despite telephone messages and a letter requesting that he contact us, the lance corporal did not reply.

c. Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Injury to a Rifleman (sergeant)

During this investigation, we uncovered a third possible chemical warfare agent injury to a Marine with the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, which may have occurred during breaching operations. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) from the 2d platoon, Company B, 1/6, identified a Marine sergeant in his platoon who he thought had a blister on his face, which was noticed immediately after breaching operations. The NCO did not think it was a chemical warfare agent exposure injury, and stated that a corpsman looked at it and treated it as a burn or abrasion, not a chemical warfare agent injury. The NCO concluded that the sergeant had an irritation, possibly caused by his protective (gas) mask.[212]

When interviewed, the sergeant did not recall this incident, but did recall a small wound, which had nothing to do with chemical warfare agents, on the small finger of his right hand.[213] It is possible that the NCO who reported the sergeant’s possible injury misidentified the sergeant, confusing him with the lance corporal who experienced the irritation on his chin.

d. Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Injury to a Combat Engineer

During a related inquiry, we discovered a fourth possible chemical warfare agent injury in the 2d MARDIV, though not in the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment. A doctor from the 2d Medical Battalion stated that he had seen, but not treated, what was thought to be a chemical warfare agent casualty during the ground war. As the doctor recalled, a Marine staff sergeant developed redness on his hands and around the edges of his face as he cleared the minefield with a bulldozer. The doctor observed the staff sergeant approximately 24 hours after the initial incident; there were no noticeable blisters or other symptoms of chemical warfare agent exposure.[214] When interviewed, this doctor believed that the Marine was a member of the 8th Engineer Support Battalion (8th ESB) or possibly the 2d Combat Engineer Battalion (2d CEB). The 2d Medical Battalion, the 8th ESB, and the 2d CEB command chronologies do not mention any chemical warfare agent casualties.[215] Both of these engineer units supported the breaching and main supply route operations within the 2d MARDIV's operations area. Interviews with the I MEF chief engineer, the 2d CEB executive officer, and the 8th ESB commanding officer established that these units suffered very few casualties (fewer than 10) during the war, and none could be ascribed to chemical warfare agent exposures.[216]

According to the I MEF engineer, only one bulldozer hit a mine, which was clearly a high-explosive mine (not a chemical mine). He stated that the driver was hospitalized for resulting symptoms, such as ringing in his ears and being shaken up.[217] Attempts to identify the combat engineer and the doctor who treated him have been unsuccessful.

e. Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Injuries - Additional Information

The 2d MARDIV NBC officer should have been one of the first people to become aware of any NBC injuries. In his capacity as NBC officer, he had no first-hand knowledge of any injuries. In an interview he stated that he was unaware of any injuries, medical reports, or official statements regarding any 2d MARDIV chemical warfare incidents, and no injuries were reported up to the division level. He did have second-hand knowledge of a possible injury, unrelated to breaching operations, involving another Marine. We have identified that Marine and are investigating this possible injury separately. Furthermore, the 2d MARDIV NBC officer stated that every servicemember was aware that Iraq might use chemical weapons and, therefore, was trained how to respond, continue fighting, and report. Any suspected chemical warfare agent injuries therefore should have surfaced.[218]

Personnel records of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, which include attached units, show only two Marines wounded in action from noon on February 24th to noon on February 25th, 1991—both gunshot wounds.[219] There were no chemical injuries or deaths in the Marine Corps during Operation Desert Shield or Desert Storm.[220] The 6th Marine Regiment casualty records show that of ten injuries noted on February 24, 1991, chemical warfare agents caused none.[221]

Interviews of 2d MARDIV medical personnel yielded similar results. The division surgeon, the senior medical officer for the division, would have been notified had there been any suspected chemical warfare agent casualties, yet he does not remember any reports of chemical warfare agent casualties.[222] The 6th Marine regimental surgeon told us that he heard rumors that the 1/6 had chemical warfare agent-like casualties, but he never saw any agent-related injuries, nor was he informed of any by either of the two 1/6 battalion aid station doctors.[223] Both of the battalion aid station doctors should have been aware of any chemical warfare agent casualties, but neither knew of any. One of the doctors recalled that the aid station treated only three casualties during the war—two Marines with gunshot wounds and an enemy prisoner of war. He noted that the other doctor who examined the injured AAV sergeant did not inform him of any chemical warfare agent-related casualties.[224]

Regarding any chemical warfare agent casualties, the 1/6 commanding officer stated

There were no indications from Marines that the [lane Red 1] alert was in fact positive. I aggressively pursued any potential medical problem associated with the attack and saw absolutely no evidence of any.… I feel confident that any chemical [warfare agent] attack in our sector would have surfaced. I can categorically state that no one came forward and stated/claimed any evidence of medical problems resulting from chemical and/or biological weapons.[225]

7. Assessment of the Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents in Breaching Lane Red 1

Pre-war briefings to 2d Marine Division personnel warned them to expect an Iraqi chemical attack and chemical mines. Their expectations appeared to be realized when the Fox crew assigned to the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment alerted the Marines in breaching lane Red 1 to the possible presence of three chemical warfare agents. Personnel donned full chemical protection equipment in response. These alerts were well documented and reported throughout the theater, and certainly suggest the presence of these suspected chemical warfare agents. Contemporaneous logs noted the reports of chemical warfare agent presence; 6th Marine logs identified the suspected agents by name, and also contained an entry that an assault amphibian vehicle (AAV) hit a chemical mine in lane Red 1. The 2d Marine Division Monograph noted that a blister agent injured two AAV crewmen in lane Red 1. One AAV crewman claimed that he was exposed to and injured by chemical warfare agents while waiting to enter lane Red 1. Additional evidence indicating the possible presence of chemical warfare agents in lane Red 1 includes a report of M9 tape changing color, and a low-level chemical agent monitor alert for possible nerve agent vapor. As a result, many Marines who breached the minefields through lane Red 1 were convinced of the presence of chemical warfare agents in the breaching lane.

A review of individual reports raises doubts concerning the presence of chemical warfare agents. The MM-1 alerts for the possible presence of sarin, mustard, and lewisite were interspersed with alerts for "Fat, Oil, Wax," which, according to MM-1 experts, indicates the presence of hydrocarbon interferents. MM-1 experts stated that the procedures used by the crew were insufficient to confirm the presence of chemical warfare agents, and they noted that in the mode in which the MM-1 was operating, chemical warfare agent injuries to unprotected personnel would have occurred before the MM-1 would have alerted to chemical warfare agent vapor. However, with the exception of the reports about the AAV crewman, we found no evidence of any exposure injuries.

Expert analyses of the MM-1 tape by three agencies do not completely rule out the possibility of chemical warfare agent presence. However, these MM-1 experts stated that the alerts shown on the MM-1 tape were most likely false alarms. They suggested that battlefield interferents caused these false positives. Since the Marines were moving fast, the Fox could not stop to search for the source of the alerts, to perform a proper spectrum analysis, or to take a sample of the suspected contamination. Therefore, no conclusive physical evidence of the suspected chemical warfare agents exists. The only evidence available regarding the alerts is the MM-1 tape, which had no listing of ions detected in the spectrum, and the analyses of these tapes by the MM-1 mass spectrometry experts.

As for the three suspected chemical warfare agents, the MM-1 alert for lewisite is highly questionable because intelligence and UNSCOM information indicates that Iraq did not have lewisite in its chemical warfare agent inventory. MM-1 experts stated that it was highly unlikely that the MM-1 detected HQ mustard in the absence of an alert to HD (distilled mustard), and intelligence information indicates that Iraq did not produce HQ mustard. Finally, although the MM-1 alert for sarin was possible because Iraq had sarin, there were no other indications that sarin was present (e.g., no delivery means—122mm rockets or Scud missiles, etc.)

A number of witnesses made statements that corroborate what the log entries reflect—chemical mines as the probable source of agent presence. However, we have ruled out chemical mines as a source, based on testimony from explosive ordnance disposal and mine experts who testified that during post-war clean-up efforts, no chemical mines were uncovered among the 3.5 million mines found in Kuwait. UNSCOM found no evidence that Iraq possessed chemical mines. The Central Intelligence Agency came to the same conclusion.

We ruled out artillery and rocket fire as probable sources of agent presence in breaching lane Red 1 based on testimony from multiple witnesses. Although two Marines recalled incoming Iraqi artillery and mortar before the Marines breached the first minefield, many others stated that Marines breaching lane Red 1 were not under artillery or mortar attack at the time of the MM-1 alert. The artillery described by the two witnesses impacted far from and downwind of the Fox and the Marines breaching lane Red 1, and there is no evidence to indicate that these artillery rounds contained chemical warfare agents.

Although it is possible that the low-level CAM reading for possible nerve agent vapor and the instance of M9 detection tape changing colors indicate the possible presence of chemical warfare agents, it is not likely. Experts stated that if M9 tape contacted a liquid chemical warfare agent, like mustard, which is a persistent agent, the CAM should have detected it on the Fox and other vehicles that were checked. However, the CAM detected nothing. Both M9 tape and the CAM are subject to interferents that can cause false positives, and these reports remain uncorroborated by other evidence. Therefore, when making an assessment we consider other evidence, such as the Fox tape analyses and information of Iraq’s chemical warfare arsenal more compelling than uncorroborated indications of agent presence.

We also consider evidence of chemical warfare agent injuries to be strong evidence in assessing the presence of chemical warfare agents. In this case, only one Marine claimed to have been injured by chemical warfare agents. Descriptions of his possible injury are contradictory, and therefore, we consulted a physician with expertise in chemical warfare agent injuries. According to this medical expert, the crewman’s self-reported symptoms and the onset of those symptoms are inconsistent with those expected of chemical warfare agent exposure. The expert stated that it is extremely unlikely that chemical warfare agent exposure was the cause of the crewman’s symptoms. This expert and MM-1 experts stated that, in the presence of the suspected chemical warfare agents, many more unprotected, exposed personnel would have exhibited exposure symptoms and become casualties or fatalities. In the course of this investigation, we learned of three additional possible chemical warfare agent injuries, but none proved to be caused by chemical warfare agent exposure. Other than the possible injuries examined in this narrative, we are unaware of any chemical warfare agent exposure injuries to Marines who breached the minefields through lane Red 1.

Although some evidence is contradictory, which precludes a definite assessment, much of the evidence is consistent and corroborative. There is an absence of reported symptoms or injuries consistent with exposure to the suspected chemical warfare agents, according to medical opinions. We cannot identify a chemical warfare agent source (i.e., a delivery mechanism—no mines, no incoming artillery). Two agents reported (HQ and lewisite) were not in Iraq’s inventory. An unlikely combination of agents, known interferents to the chemical warfare agent detectors in the area of the MM-1 alerts, and expert analysis of the MM-1 tapes and MM-1 detection capabilities also deny a chemical warfare agent presence. All of this evidence is mutually supportive and indicates the absence of chemical warfare agents. Therefore, we assess the presence of chemical warfare agents in breaching lane Red 1 as unlikely.

During Operation Desert Storm, there were no established procedures for collecting and archiving Fox Mobile Mass Spectrometer (MM-1) tapes. Fortunately, when the Fox MM-1 alerted in breaching lane Red 1, the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment NBC officer kept the MM-1 tape and provided it to us in 1997. Procedures for collecting and archiving Fox MM-1 tapes should be established.

In the possible presence of chemical warfare agents in breaching lane Red 1, the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox crew responded exactly as they were trained. They alerted fellow Marines to possible contamination in the minefield and moved on. Attempts to gather additional evidence of chemical warfare agent presence could have severely compromised the tempo of offensive operations. The Fox attached to the 2d Marine Division Headquarters Battalion was assigned to general support for the other Foxes. Neither this Fox nor other units were dispatched to verify the presence of chemical warfare agents because the Marines were engaged in combat with Iraqi forces. The Fox crew took steps to mitigate the effects of possible chemical warfare agent presence while continuing combat operations. It was not their task to seek confirmatory evidence of a chemical warfare attack after they had moved through the area. In future conflicts, gathering strategic and operational evidence of chemical warfare agent use by an enemy might be as important as taking proper tactical protective measures. Procedures should be established to send follow-on teams to areas suspected of chemical warfare agent contamination to either verify or disprove rumors of chemical warfare agent use by the enemy.

The sergeant possibly injured by chemical warfare agents in breaching lane Red 1 was examined the same day by a 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment surgeon. The sergeant was told that he did not have a chemical warfare agent injury. However, he and other Marines have expressed doubt regarding the accuracy of the battalion aid station doctor's diagnosis. Because the doctor did not consider the sergeant's condition a result of chemical warfare agent exposure, there is little documentation regarding the medical examination’s results. In the future, documenting all alleged chemical warfare agent injuries with a written description and photographs (when possible) of the injury, along with a second medical opinion (when possible), could reduce potential disagreements as to the nature of injuries. Prompt post-war review of any injury, with even a remote possibility that chemical warfare agent exposure was involved, should be conducted.

Although they had not actually seen the injury to the assault amphibian vehicle sergeant’s hand, many Marines we interviewed heard about the injury by word-of-mouth. Many today still believe that the sergeant was, in fact, exposed to chemical warfare agents. They were never officially informed of the outcome regarding possible chemical warfare agent exposure. Official documents, such as the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment command chronology, and the 2d Marine Division monograph, recorded the presence of chemical warfare agents in lane Red 1 as fact. The lack of effective feedback at the unit and command level allowed incomplete or erroneous reports about possible chemical warfare agent exposures to be reported as fact.

When the deployment of forces includes the possibility of enemy use of chemical warfare agents, the services should initiate procedures to gather sample evidence in order to verify or clarify reports that have been made. The services should develop a system through which servicemembers can be kept apprised of the facts and information discovered after an alleged exposure to chemical warfare agents. Through such a system, rumors of chemical warfare agent exposure could be proven true or untrue, before being recorded in official histories.

This case is still being investigated. As additional information becomes available, it will be incorporated. If you have records, photographs, recollections, or find errors in the details reported, please call 1-800-497-6261.

This TAB provides a listing of acronyms found in this report. Additionally, the Glossary section provides definitions for selected technical terms which are not found in common usage. 

AAV assault amphibian vehicle

AOR area of operations

BW         biological warfare

CAM chemical agent monitor

CBDCOM (SBCCOM) US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command

CEB combat engineer battalion

CSTA Combat Systems Test Activity

CW          chemical warfare

CWO chief warrant officer

DOD  Department of Defense

DSB Defense Science Board

EOD explosive ordnance disposal

ESB engineer support battalion

GAO General Accounting Office

I MEF I Marine Expeditionary Force

MARCENT Marine Forces Central Command

MARDIV Marine division

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force

MLRS multiple launched rocket system

MM-1  mobile mass spectrometer

MOPP mission oriented protective posture

NBC nuclear, biological, chemical

NBCRS  nuclear, biological, chemical reconnaissance system

NCO non-commissioned officer

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology

OPORD operation order

OSAGWI Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses

SBCCOM (CBDCOM) Soldier and Biological Chemical Command

UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission on Iraq

US         United States

USMC United States Marine Corps

USMCR        United States Marine Corps Reserve

Blister Agent

A blister agent is a chemical warfare agent that produces local irritation and damage to the skin and mucous membranes, pain and injury to the eyes, reddening and blistering of the skin, and when inhaled, damage to the respiratory tract. Blister agents include mustards (HD, HN, HQ, HT, and Q), arsenicals like lewisite (L), and mustard and lewisite mixtures (HL). Blister agents are also called vesicants or vesicant agents.[226, 227]

Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM)

A CAM is a hand-held, soldier-operated device that is used to monitor chemical warfare agent contamination on soldiers and equipment. The CAM may give false readings when used in enclosed spaces or when sampling near strong vapor sources (e.g., in dense smoke). Some vapors known to give false readings are aromatic vapors (perfumes, food flavorings, some aftershaves, peppermints, cough lozenges, and menthol cigarettes when vapors are exhaled directly into the nozzle), cleaning compounds (disinfectants, methyl salicylate, menthol), smokes and fumes (exhaust from some rocket motors, fumes from some munitions), and some wood preservative treatments (polychlorinated biphenyls or PCBs).[228]

Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM)

CBDCOM is a US Army command with a mission to provide research, development, and acquisition for nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC), and obscurant equipment for the US Forces; to act as the Army NBC defense commodity command; to provide management of joint service NBC defense material; to provide US chemical stockpile management and safe storage; to provide installation management; to prepare for and respond to chemical biological emergency events/accidents; provide weapons of mass destruction (chemical or biological) domestic preparedness support; to conduct emergency remediation/restoration actions at chemical sites; to provide successful planning, management, and execution of treaty responsibilities; and to provide demilitarization support. The Chemical and Biological Defense Command merged with the Soldier Support Command to form the Soldier and Biological Chemical Command.[229]

Chemical Warfare Agent

A chemical warfare agent is a chemical substance used in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate through its physiological effects. Excluded are riot control agents, herbicides, smoke, and flame. Included are blood, nerve, blister, choking, and incapacitating agents.[230]

Cyclosarin 

A nerve agent known as GF
Chemical Name: O-Cyclohexyl-methylfluorophosphonate[231]

Detection Paper

Detection paper works because certain dyes are soluble in chemical warfare agents. Normally, two dyes and one pH indicator are mixed with cellulose fibers in a paper without special coloring (unbleached). When the paper absorbs a drop of chemical warfare agent, it dissolves one of the pigments. Mustard agent dissolves a red dye and nerve agent a yellow dye. In addition, VX nerve agent causes the indicator to turn to blue—which, together with the yellow, will become green or green-black. Detection paper can thus be used to distinguish between three different types of chemical warfare agents. A disadvantage with the papers is that many other substances can also dissolve the pigments. Consequently, detection papers should not be located in places where drops of solvent, fat, oil, or fuel can fall on them. Drops of water cause no reaction.[232]

Distilled Mustard

A blister agent known as HD
Chemical name: Bis-(2-chloroethyl) sulfide[233]

Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)

The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance. It may also include removal of explosive ordnance that has become hazardous by damage or deterioration.[234]

False Negative

A false negative occurs when a chemical warfare agent detector falsely indicates that a chemical warfare agent is not present, even though the agent is present at a casualty producing concentration level.[235]

False Positive 

A false positive occurs when a chemical warfare agent detector falsely indicates the presence of a chemical warfare agent.[236]

Fox Nuclear, Biological Chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance Vehicle 

The Fox is a six-wheeled, light armored vehicle designed primarily for reconnaissance of liquid chemical warfare agent hazards. On-board chemical warfare agent detection capabilities include the MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer, which is the primary detection device, the M43A1 chemical agent detector, which is an integral component of the M8 alarm system, and the M256A1 chemical agent detector kit. The Fox is also equipped with two radiation detectors. The Fox does not provide any biological warfare agent detection capability, but it does protect the crew from biological hazards, and it allows the crew to mark areas of potential hazard and safely take samples for laboratories to analyze for biological hazards.[237]

Fragmentary Order

An abbreviated form of an operation order, usually issued on a day-to-day basis, which eliminates the need for restating information contained in a basic operation order. A fragmentary order may be issued in sections.[238]

GB

A G-series nerve agent known as sarin
Chemical name: Isopropyl methyl phosphonofluoridate[239]

GF

A G-series nerve agent known as cyclosarin
Chemical Name: O-Cyclohexyl-methylfluorophosphonate[240]

G-series nerve agents

G-series nerve agents are lethal chemical warfare agents that work by inhibiting the proper functioning of the cholinesterase enzymes needed for the transmission of nerve impulses throughout the body. These agents affect the functioning of all bodily systems, including the eyes, nose, throat, lungs, and muscles. The G-series nerve agents include tabun (GA), sarin (GB), soman (GD), and cyclosarin (GF). The normal sequence of symptoms is a running nose, tightness of the chest, dimness of vision and pinpointing of the eye pupils, difficulty breathing, drooling and excessive sweating, nausea, vomiting, cramps, involuntary defecation and urination, twitching, jerking and staggering, headache, confusion, drowsiness, and coma. Cessation of breathing and death follow.[241]

GulfLINK

A World Wide Web site maintained by the Office of the Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses (www.gulflink.health.mil).

HD

A blister agent known as distilled mustard
Chemical name: Bis-(2-chloroethyl) sulfide[242]

HL

A blister agent that is a mustard-lewisite mixture
Chemical names: HD: Bis-(2-chloroethyl) sulfide
L: Dichloro-(2-chlorovinyl)arsine[243]

HN (-1, -2, -3)

A blister agent known as nitrogen mustard
Chemical names: HN-1: Bis-(2-chloroethyl) ethylamine
HN-2: Bis-(2-chloroethyl)methylamine
HN-3: Tris-(2-chloroethyl) amine[244]

HQ

A blister agent known as sulfur-mustard/sesqui-mustard Chemical names: HD: Bis-(2-chloroethyl) sulfide
Q: 1,2-Bis (2-chloroethylthio) ethane[245]

H-series blister agents

A series of persistent blister agents that includes levinstein (sulfur) mustards (H), distilled mustard (HD), nitrogen mustards (HN), a mustard-lewisite mixture (HL), a mustard T mixture (HT), a sulfur-mustard/sesqui-mustard mixture (HQ), and sesqui-mustard (Q).[246,247]

HT

A blister agent known as mustard-t mixture
Chemical name: HD: Bis-(2-chloroethyl) sulfide
T: Bis [2(2-chloroethylthio) ethyl] ether[248]

Hydrocarbon

A hydrocarbon is an organic compound containing only carbon and hydrogen and often occurring in petroleum, natural gas, coal, and bitumens.[249]

Incapacitating agent

An incapacitating agent is a chemical warfare agent that produces a temporary disabling condition (physiological or psychological) that persists for hours to days after exposure has ceased.[250]

Interferent 

An interferent is a substance that, when present with a chemical warfare agent at or above the minimum detectable level, causes a false negative when otherwise a true positive would have resulted.[251]

L 

A blister agent known as lewisite
Chemical Name: Dichloro-(2-chlorovinyl)arsine[252]

M17 'Sanator,' lightweight decontaminating system 

The M17 lightweight decontaminating system consists of a pumper and heating unit, an accessory kit, and a water storage tank. This equipment is designed to draw water from 30 feet away and nine feet below pump level and deliver it at controlled temperatures. The rubberized-fabric self-supporting tank has a fill capability of 1,580 gallons, is independent of outside power, and provides a showering capability for up to 12 people at a time.[253]

M256 chemical warfare agent detector kit 

In the field, the M256-series chemical warfare agent detector kit is simply referred to as the M256 kit. The M256 kit is a portable, expendable item capable of detecting and identifying hazardous concentrations of blister, blood, and nerve agents. The M256 kit is used after a chemical warfare agent warning to test for and confirm the presence and type of chemical warfare agent, and to determine if it is safe to unmask. The M256A1 kit has replaced the M256 kit. The only difference between the two kits is that the M256A1 kit will detect lower levels of nerve agent. US forces used both the M256 kit and the M256A1 kit during the Gulf War.

Some smokes, high temperatures, standard US decontamination solution number two (DS2), and petroleum products may cause false readings. Results may be inaccurate when sampling is performed in smoke from burning debris.[254]

M258A1 Individual Decontamination Kit 

The M258A1 kit’s primary function is to decontaminate the skin when contaminated by liquid chemical warfare agents. The kit contains six packets. Three packets are marked DECON 1 WIPE. Each contains a gauze pad soaked with a decontamination solution. The other three packets are marked DECON 2 WIPE. Each contains a gauze pad and glass ampoules filled with decontamination solution. The decontamination solutions in decon wipe 1 and decon wipe 2 react with chemical warfare agents to neutralize them.[255]

M9 chemical warfare agent detector paper 

M9 chemical warfare agent detector paper is used to detect the presence of liquid chemical warfare agents. Battlefield uses include applying M9 paper to vehicles, chemical protective clothing, and other mission essential equipment. When a liquid chemical warfare agent comes in contact with the paper, the dye in the paper reacts with the chemical warfare agent to form pink, red, red-brown, or red-purple spots or streaks.

M9 paper responds to some common battlefield interferents. Among them are petroleum products, brake fluid, aircraft cleaning compound, insect repellent, sand color camouflage stick, smoke, defoliant, ethylene glycol (antifreeze), and scuffs of dirt or mud. The M9 paper will not respond to chemical warfare agents when wet and will give false positive indications when abraded against a rough surface. Heat may cause M9 paper to turn red and cause false positive readings.[256]

Median Lethal Dosage 

Median Lethal Dosage (LCt50) is the dosage of nerve agent vapor that is lethal to 50 percent of exposed, unprotected personnel.[257]

Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP)

Mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) is a flexible system used to direct the wearing of chemical protective garments and mask—a system that balances mission requirements with the chemical warfare agent threat. Wearing chemical protective garments and mask provides soldiers protection against most known chemical warfare agents, biological agents, and toxins.

At MOPP Level 0 soldiers carry their protective mask while their remaining MOPP gear must be readily available (e.g., within the work area, fighting position, living space, etc.) At MOPP Level 1, soldiers wear their overgarment and carry the rest of their MOPP gear. At MOPP Level 2, soldiers wear their overgarment and overboots while carrying the mask with hood and gloves. At MOPP Level 3, soldiers wear their overgarment, overboots, and mask with hood, but not the gloves. At MOPP Level 4, soldiers wear all their MOPP gear.[258] Commanders can raise or lower the amount of protection through five levels of MOPP. In addition, commanders, under certain situations, can exercise a mask-only option.[259]

MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer 

The MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer is the primary chemical warfare agent detector in the Fox reconnaissance vehicle. During Operation Desert Storm, the MM-1 monitored against a target list of approximately ten selected chemical warfare agents most likely to be present, based on intelligence reports of the suspected chemical warfare agent threat. To speed the initial search, the sampling probe operates at 180� C and the MM-1 looks for only four ion peaks of each detected chemical warfare agent and attempts to match the target list of chemicals against the pattern and ratio of these peaks. If an initial match is made with these four ion peaks at a pre-determined intensity and relationship, the MM-1 sounds an alarm. However, this first alarm does not confirm the presence of a chemical warfare agent, since there are many chemicals that have similar ion peaks and many combinations of chemicals that may yield ion patterns similar to those in the target list. Consequently, the MM-1 can falsely indicate the presence of dangerous chemical warfare agents. To more conclusively determine what chemical is present, the operator must lower the sampling probe temperature to 120� C, re-acquire a sample of the suspected substance, and run a spectrum analysis with the MM-1 against all the detection algorithms stored in the MM-1 chemical library. For more detailed analysis later, the complete ion spectrum of the suspected sample can be printed on a paper tape.[260]

NBC Reports 

NBC Reports are formatted messages designed to rapidly disseminate key information on NBC threats. Included are the following:

NBC-1 

An NBC-1 report is used by the observing units to give basic initial and follow-up data about an NBC-attack. Battalion and higher elements consolidate reports and decide which to forward.

NBC-2

An NBC-2 report is based on two or more NBC-1 reports. It is used to pass evaluated data to units, usually by division level or higher elements.

NBC-3 

An NBC-3 report is used to disseminate information on predicted downwind hazard areas based on the analysis of NBC-1 reports. Each unit evaluates the NBC-3 report, determines which of its subordinate units may be affected, and further disseminates the report as required.

NBC-4 

An NBC-4 report is used to report possible detection of NBC-hazards determined by monitoring equipment, survey or reconnaissance.

NBC-5 

Information from NBC-4 reports is plotted on maps and an NBC-5 report is generated showing areas of contamination. This report is usually disseminated as a map overlay by division level elements.

NBC-6 

This report summarizes information concerning a chemical or biological attack(s) and is prepared at battalion level, but only if requested by higher headquarters. It is primarily used as an intelligence tool to help determine future enemy intentions.[261]

Nerve agents

 Nerve agents are the most toxic of the chemical warfare agents. Nerve agents enter the body through breathing, by injection, or absorption through the skin. They affect the nervous and the respiratory systems and various body functions. They include the G-series and V-series chemical warfare agents.[262]

Non-persistent agent

 A chemical warfare agent that disperses or vaporizes rapidly after release and presents an immediate to short duration hazard. These agents are generally released as aerosols, gases, vapors, liquids, or solids.[263]

Operation order 

A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.[264]

Persistent agent 

A chemical warfare agent that continues to present a hazard for considerable periods after delivery by remaining as a contact hazard and/or by vaporizing very slowly to produce a hazard by inhalation. Generally may be in a solid or liquid state.[265]

Q

A blister agent, known as sesqui-mustard, Q is a more effective chemical warfare vesicant than sulfur mustard (H). It produces symptoms consistent with blister type agents, with about five times stronger skin activity than distilled mustard (HD). The fact that it is in solid form at room temperature with a very low vapor pressure hinders its effective use as a chemical warfare agent. Combining sesqui-mustard (Q) with distilled mustard (HD) to form sulfur-mustard/sesqui-mustard (HQ) helped to eliminate this problem.

Chemical name: Ethylene bis (Z-Chloroethyl) sulfide, or
1,2-Bis (2-chloroethylthio) ethane[266]

Sarin

 A nerve agent known as GB
Chemical name: Isoproyl methylphosphonofluoridate[267]

Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) 

Headquartered at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, SBCCOM has a broad research, development and acquisition mission to ensure the decisive edge and maximum protection for the United States. SBCCOM develops, acquires, and sustains soldier, soldier support, and nuclear, biological, and chemical defense technology, systems, and services. SBCCOM also provides for safe storage, treaty compliance, and destruction of chemical materiel.[268]

Task force

A temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed to carry out a specific operation or mission; a semi-permanent organization of units, under one commander, formed to carry out a continuing specific task.[269]

Headquarters Battalion
1st Marine Regiment	1st Battalion, 1st Marines 3d Battalion, 9th Marines 1st Tank Battalion
3d Marine Regiment	1st Battalion, 3d Marines  2d Battalion, 3d Marines  3d Battalion, 3d Marines
4th Marine Regiment	2d Battalion, 7th Marines 3d Battalion, 7th Marines  1st Battalion, 25th Marines
7th Marine Regiment	1st Battalion, 7th Marines  1st Battalion, 5th Marines  3d Tank Battalion
11th Marine Regiment	1st Battalion, 11th Marines  2d Battalion, 11th Marines 3d Battalion, 11th Marines  5th Battalion, 11th Marines  1st Battalion, 12th Marines  3d Battalion, 12th Marines
1st Combat Engineer Battalion
1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion
1st Reconnaissance Battalion
3d Assault Amphibian Battalion

Headquarters Battalion
6th Marine Regiment	1st Battalion, 6th Marines  Company C, 8th Tank Battalion Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion 2d Battalion, 2d Marines Company A, 8th Tank Battalion Company B, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion 3d Battalion, 6th Marines  8th Tank Battalion
8th Marine Regiment	1st Battalion, 8th Marines  Company B, 4th Tank Battalion Company C, 2d Combat Engineer Battalion Company D, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion 2d Battalion, 4th Marines  Company C, 4th Tank Battalion  Company B, 4th Assault Amphibian Battalion  3d Battalion, 23d Marines
1st Brigade, (Tiger Brigade), 2nd Armored Division	1st Battalion, 67th Armor  3rd Battalion, 67th Armor 3rd Battalion, 41st Infantry (Mechanized) 1st Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery  502nd Support Battalion 142nd Signal Battalion Battery A, 92nd Field Artillery (MLRS) Company A, 17th Engineers Company B, 4th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery
10th Marine Regiment	2d Battalion, 10th Marines 2d Battalion, 12th Marines  3d Battalion, 10th Marines  5th Battalion, 10th Marines
Task Force Breach Alpha	Company B, 2d Combat Engineer Battalion Company D, 4th Combat Engineer Battalion Provisional General Support Company, 4th Assault Amphibian Battalion Detachment, 4th Tank Battalion
Task Force Vega	Company D, 4th Reconnaissance Battalion Detachment, Antitank Company, 4th Tank Battalion Detachment, 2d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion

1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January - 28 February 1991."

1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January to 28 February 1991."

1st Combat Engineer Battalion, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91," March 15, 1991.

2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, "Command Chronology for the Period of 1 February to 28 February 1991," March 14, 1991.

2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, "2d AA Bn Operation Order 2-91," February 21, 1991.

2d Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 Feb to 28 Feb 1991."

2d Combat Engineer Battalion, "Command Chronology for the Period 16 Jan 1991 to 28 Feb 1991," March 16, 1991.

2d Marine Division, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 Jan to 13 Apr 91."

2d Marine Division Operation Plan.

2d Medical Battalion, "Command Chronology for the Period 01 Jan-13 Mar 91," March 13, 1991.

6th Marine Regiment (-)(Reinforced), "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January-28 February 1991."

6th Marine Regiment, "Personnel Status Report, 1200 24 February to 1200 25 February 1991."

7th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January to 28 February 1991," April 25, 1991.

7th Marine Regiment," 7th Marine Regiment Log for February 24, 1991."

8th Engineer Support Battalion, "Command Chronology for the Period 8 December 1990 Through 5 March 1991," March 12, 1991.

8th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 February to 28 February 1991, (U)" March 14, 1991.

8th Tank Battalion, "Command Chronology for the Period 26 November 1990 to 31 March 1991," April 12, 1991.

"Anniston, Tooele, Pine Bluff, and Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility Stockpiles," US Army program manager for Chemical Demilitarization web site www.pmcd.apgea.army.mil/graphical/CSDP/SL/index.html (as of July 2, 1999).

"Appendix 2 (NBC Defense) to Annex C (Operations) to FragO 11-91," 6th Marine Regiment, February 22, 1991.

"Appendix 2 (NBC Defense) to Annex C (Operations) to 6th MARDIV OPORD 1-91," 6th Marine Regiment, February 18, 1991.

"Breaching Operations, 7th Marine Regiment Log," February 24, 1991.

"Breaching Operations in Southwest Asia," Marine Corps Research Center Paper #92-0004, July 1991.

Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995.

Bruker-Franzen Analytik, GMBH, "MM-1 User Manual," February 1987.

CBDCOM Fox expert, e-mail message, Subject: "Response to Action 3---From CPT [redacted], OSD, December 2, 1993," December 7, 1993 @ 4:59 PM.

Central Intelligence Agency, "Factbook on Intelligence," 1997, web site www.odci.gov/cia/publications/facttell/intcomm.htm (as of July 2, 1999).

Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997.

"Chemical Warfare Agent Detectors Probe the Fogs of War," Chemical and Engineering News, August 1, 1994.

"Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997.

Cureton, Charles H., "US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1993.

CW Procedural Text for Chemical CORPS Field Laboratories, Book 1, Part I, Chemistry of CW Agents, Chemical Corps, Chemical and Radiological Laboratories, Army Chemical Center, MD, January 7, 1954.

Department of Defense Intelligence Information Report 2-340-0458-91, Subject: "Chemical Mines (U)," 1991.

Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Report, Subject: "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait," June 2, 1997.

Department of Defense Final Report to Congress, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April 1992, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office.

Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," March 23, 1994, web site www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/ (as of September 2, 1999).

Department of Defense Material Safety Data Sheet, DoD 6050.5-LR, "Decontaminating Kit, Skin M258A1," DoD Hazardous Information System, April 1996.

Eddington, Patrick, Gassed in the Gulf, Washington, DC, Insignia Publishing, 1997.

"Evaluation of Airborne Exposure Limits for G-Agents: Occupational and General Population Exposure Criteria," Edgewood Research, Development, and Engineering Center, Technical Report #489, April 1998.

Facsimile from program manager, NBC Defense Systems, Subject: "Interferents," December 7, 1998.

I Marine Expeditionary Force battle assessment team NBC officer, e-mail message, Subject: "Memorandum for the Record," January 15, 1997.

Handbook for the Investigation Of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, Department of External Affairs, Department of National Defence, Health and Welfare Canada, and Agriculture Canada, November 1985.

The History of Captured Enemy Toxic Munitions in the American Zone European Theater, May 1945 to June 1947, Office of the Chemical Corps, US European Command.

"International Materiel Evaluation (IME) of the German NBC Reconnaissance System," US Army Test and Evaluation Command Test Report, April 1989.

Interview of 1st platoon commander, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, May 8, 1997.

Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander, by I Marine Expeditionary Force battle assessment team NBC officer, March 20, 1991.

Interview of AAV sergeant, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1997.

Interview of AAV sergeant by I Marine Expeditionary Force battle assessment team NBC officer, March 19, 1991.

Interview of commander, 3d platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, May 8, 1997.

Interview of commander, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1997.

Interview of commander, Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, May 8, 1997.

Interview of Fox vehicle commander, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 19, 1997.

Interview of Fox vehicle commander, Task Force Ripper, February 20, 1997.

Interview of I Marine Expeditionary Force NBC officer, February 19, 1997.

Interview of NBC officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 19, 1997

Interview of 3d platoon commander, Company B, 1st Battalion 6th Marine Regiment, May 8, 1997.

Interview of platoon sergeant, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1997.

Interview of 1st squad leader, 1st platoon, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, May 8, 1997.

Interview of staff NCOIC, NBC decontamination and chemical casualty team, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 20, 1997.

Journal, 2d Marine Division NBC platoon, February 24, 1991.

Lead Sheet #577, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander, December 19, 1996; Statements of commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, June 13, 1994, & April 4, 1996; Interviews of 2d Marine Division NBC officer, March 7, 1996 and March 11, 1996.

Lead Sheet #735, Interview of 3d Tank Battalion NBC officer, April 26, 1996, and Interview of 1st Marine Division NBC officer, June 21, 1996.

Lead Sheet #748, Interview of CBDCOM Fox expert, April 30, 1996.

Lead Sheet #762, Interview of USMC EOD expert, May 17, 1996.

Lead Sheet #764, Interview of CBDCOM Fox expert, May 28, 1996.

Lead Sheet #767, Interview of 3d Tank Battalion NBC officer, May 21, 1996.

Lead Sheet #1211, Interview of weapons team corporal, 1st platoon, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, January 9, 1997.

Lead Sheet #1288, Interview of CMS, Inc. division president, February 11-12, 1997.

Lead Sheet #3858, Interview of CBDCOM MM-1 subject matter expert, April 17, 1997.

Lead Sheet #3859, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment hospital corpsman, April 2, 1997.

Lead Sheet #3860, Interviews of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment medical officer, March 26, and April 29, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5614, Interview of 1st Marine Division (Forward) NBC officer, June 17, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5651, Interview of Tiger Brigade Fox driver, August 5. 1997, p. 1.

Lead Sheet #6330, Interview of 11th Marine Regiment NBC officer, October 6, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6690, Interview of I Marine Expeditionary Force NBC officer, October 31, 1997.

Lead Sheet #7311, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander, January 14, 1999; Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander, June 10, 1999.

Lead Sheet #14252, Interview of National Ground Intelligence Center mine warfare analyst, January 26, 1998.

Lead Sheet #15501, Interview of 2d Marine Division operations officer, March 18, 1998.

Lead Sheet #16153, Interview of 8th Marine Regiment Fox commander, March 19, 1998.

Lead Sheet #16618, Interview of 8th Marine Regiment Fox MM-1 operator, May 15, 1998.

Lead Sheet #17781, Interview of Fox commander, 2d Marine Division Headquarters Battalion, May 15, 1998.

Lead Sheet #18148, Interview of Fox MM-1 operator, 2d Marine Division Headquarters Battalion, July 20, 1998.

Lead Sheet #18496, Interview of Tiger Brigade chemical officer, August 7, 1998.

Lead Sheet #18948, Interviews of rifleman, Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, August 28, 1998 and September 2, 1998.

Lead Sheet #18974, Interviews of hospital corpsman, Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, September 3, 1998 and September 28, 1998.

Lead Sheet #20077, Interview of Tiger Brigade Fox commander, November 9, 1998.

Lead Sheet #20527, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox MM-1 operator, June 2, 1999.

Lead Sheet #21120, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander, January 14, 1999.

Lead Sheet #21124, Interview of 2d Marine Division surgeon, January 19, 1999.

Lead Sheet #21150, Interview of 202nd Military Intelligence Battalion NBC NCO, June 22, 1999.

Lead Sheet #21201, Interview of I Marine Expeditionary Force battle assessment team NBC officer, January 22, 1999.

Lead Sheet #21612, Interview of platoon sergeant, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 9, 1999.

Lead Sheet #21659, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment operations officer, February 16, 1999.

Lead Sheet #21663, Interview of AAV section leader, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 15, 1999.

Lead Sheet #21688, Interview of 6th Marine Regiment surgeon, February 19, 1999.

Lead Sheet #21916, Interview of rifleman, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 24, 1999.

Lead Sheet #22111, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment medical doctor, March 10, 1999.

Lead Sheet #22228, Interview of Tiger Brigade Fox MM-1 operator, March 11, 1999.

Lead Sheet #22248, Interview of Marine, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, March 18, 1999.

Lead Sheet #22558, Interview of rifleman, Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, April 2, 1999.

Lead Sheet #22563, Interview of staff NCOIC, 1st platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, April 5, 1998.

Lead Sheet #22707, Interview of 2d Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment commanding officer, April 23, 1999.

Lead Sheet #22931, Interview of I Marine Expeditionary Force engineer officer, April 7, 1999.

Lead Sheet #23181, Meetings with Fox subject matter experts, March 1, May 6, July 13, and August 26, 1999.

Lead Sheet #23344, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox crewman, May 12, 1999.

Lead Sheet #23476, Interview of commander, Company F, 2d Medical Battalion, April 15, 1999.

Lead Sheet #23540, Interview of 2d Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment operations officer, May 21, 1999.

Lead Sheet #23544, Interview of commander, Company C, 8th Tank Battalion, May 21, 1999.

Lead Sheet #23580, Interview of commander, Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment, May 21, 1999.

Lead Sheet #23630, Interview of 8th Tank Battalion tank crewman, December 16, 1998.

Lead Sheet #23631, Interview of AAV section leader, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1999.

Lead Sheet #23698, Interview of 8th Tank Battalion commander, May 28, 1999.

Lead Sheet #23704, Interview of staff NCO, Company C, 8th Tank Battalion, June 1, 1999.

Lead Sheet #23723, Interview of 8th Engineer Support Battalion commanding officer, June 1, 1999.

Lead Sheet #23724, Interview of 2d Combat Engineer Battalion executive officer, June 1, 1999.

Lead Sheet #23761, Interview of commander, 1st platoon, Company C, 8th Tank Battalion, June 4, 1999.

Lead Sheet #23762, Interview of commander, 3d platoon, Company C, 8th Tank Battalion, June 4, 1999.

Lead Sheet #25196, Interview of chemical warfare expert, October 29, 1999.

Lead Sheet #25641, Interview of Central Intelligence Agency analyst, December 1, 1999.

Lead Sheet #25995, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander, February 4, 2000.

Lead Sheet #26230, CBDCOM Fox expert e-mail message, Subject: "PSOB Questions," April 13, 1999.

Letter from commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, Subject: "Operation Desert Storm 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Maneuver Synopsis," March 14, 1991.

Letter from commanding officer, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, Subject: "Injuries Sustained in Combat Operations During Operation Desert Storm; Case of sergeant [Redacted]," April 23, 1992.

Letter statement of Task Force Ripper Fox driver, "Possible Chemical Weapons Use During Desert Storm," December 22, 1993.

Letter from the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Fox Vehicle Tape Analysis, June 16, 1997.

Letter from Bruker Daltonics, Subject: "Analysis of MM-1 Data," July 15, 1997.

Manley, Thomas F., "Marine Corps NBC Defense in Southwest Asia," Marine Corps Research Center Paper #92-0009, July 1991.

Manual for the Tactical Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Official Special Manual No. 469.

Marine note known as a "yellow canary," 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 24, 1991.

Marine note known as a "yellow canary," 10th Marine Regiment, February 24, 1991.

Memorandum from 1st platoon commander, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, to commander, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, April 2, 1991.

Memorandum from 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander, Subject: "Statement of Chemical Threat during Persian Gulf War," April 6, 1994.

Memorandum from 2d Marine Division NBC officer, Subject: "Reports of Chemical Agent Detection during Operation Desert Storm," May 25, 1994.

Memorandum, Marine Corps Casualty Section, Subject: "Chemical Casualties During Desert Shield/Desert Storm," March 11, 1996.

Memorandum from NBC defense program manager, Subject: "Analysis of Fox MM-1 Tapes," March 3, 1997.

Memorandum from NBC defense program manager, Subject: "Results of the Combat Systems Test Activity (CSTA) MM-1 Excursion Test," July 14, 1993.

Memorandum from [Redacted], Subject: [Redacted], May 1, 1999.

Mroczkowski, Dennis P., "US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2D Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1993.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "Detection of Chemical Weapons: An overview of methods for the detection of chemical warfare agents," , web site www.opcw.nl/chemhaz/detect.htm (as of October 12, 1999).

Physician’s Statement of Review, Subject: "Medical Review of Chemical Agent Exposure in Desert Storm- SSgt [Redacted]," March 1999.

"Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release," Standalone Version of Chapter 11, Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Committee Report (draft), Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DoD (U), June 9, 1997.

Quilter, Charles J., "US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1993.

"Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects," June 1994, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/dsbrpt/warfare.html (as of July 2, 1999).

Soldier Biological and Chemical Command (SBCCOM) Fact Sheet for the improved chemical agent monitor (ICAM) web site www.cbdcom.apgea.army.mil/RDA/pmnbc/icam (as of May 3, 1999.)

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Cement Factory" (Case Narrative), April 15, 1999, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/cement_factory.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit" (Information Paper), July 23, 1999, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/m256/.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection" (Information Paper), October 30, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/mopp/.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Reported Detection Of Chemical Agent, Camp Monterey, Kuwait" (Case Narrative), January 13, 2000, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/camp_mont2/.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 31, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "US Marine Corps Minefield Breaching Operations" (Case Narrative), July 31, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/marine/.

Statement of AAV sergeant, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, January 14, 1992.

Statement of Chief Warrant Officer, NBC platoon, 2d Marine Division, Subject: "Statement of Chemical Threat during Persian Gulf War," April 6, 1994.

Statement of hospital corpsman, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, Subject: "Suspected Chemical Injury to Sgt [Redacted]," December 18, 1991.

Statement of medical officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, Subject: "Suspected Wound/Resulting from Chemical Exposure on 24 February 1991, ICO [In the Case of]: Sgt [Redacted], USMC, [serial number redacted]," March 4, 1992.

Statement of 1st platoon commander, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, April 2, 1991.

Testimony of CWO3 Joseph P. Cottrell, Task Force Ripper NBC officer, at the hearing before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, November 18, 1993.

Testimony of GySgt George J. Grass, Task Force Ripper Fox commander, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 1, 1996.

Testimony of CWO5 Robert James, I Marine Expeditionary Force NBC officer, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.

Testimony of LtGen Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., before the Armed Services Committee, US Senate, February 27, 1997.

Testimony of LCpl John Laymon, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox MM-1 operator, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.

Testimony of MSgt Michael Bradford, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.

Testimony of Mr. James Kenny, Task Force Ripper Fox MM-1 operator, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.

Testimony of Mr. Richard Vigus, CBDCOM Fox subject matter expert, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.

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Testimony of UNSCOM inspector before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses, July 29, 1997.

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The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume IX, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996," United Nations, Department of Public Information, New York, 1996.

US Army Chemical School Student Guide 3-122, "Chemical Officers Advance Course Guide," May 1984.

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US Army Field Manual 3-7, "NBC Field Handbook," September 29, 1994.

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US Army Field Manual 3-101, "Chemical Staffs and Units," Washington, DC, November 19, 1993.

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US Army Test and Evaluation Command, Test Operations Procedure number 8-2-555, "Chemical Agent Detector Kits," Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, UT, April 28, 1989.

US General Accounting Office, Report to the Committee on Veterans Affairs, House of Representatives, "Gulf War Illnesses; Procedural and Reporting Improvements Are Needed in DOD’s Investigative Processes," February 1999.

US Navy Ships Technical Manual, "Shipboard BW/CW Defense and Countermeasures," Chapter 470, Change 4, September 1991.

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The Department of Defense requires a common framework for our investigations and assessments of chemical warfare agent reports, so we turned to the United Nations and the international community, which had chemical weapons experience (e.g., the United Nations’ investigation of the chemical weapons used during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war). Because the modern battlefield is complex, the international community developed investigation and validation protocols[270] to provide objective procedures for possible chemical weapons incidents. The methodology we are using is based on these international protocols and guidelines. The methodology includes:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site;
• Physical evidence from the site such as weapons fragments, soil, water, vegetation, or human or animal tissue samples;
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence;
• The testimony of witnesses;
• Multiple analyses; and
• A review of the evidence by an expert panel.

While the methodology used to investigate chemical incidents (Figure 17) is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence often was not collected at the time of an event. Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents, and each investigation must be tailored to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our methodology to provide a thorough, investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and determine what happened. The major efforts in our methodology are:

• To substantiate the incident;
• To document available medical reports related to the incident;
• To interview appropriate people;
• To obtain information available to external organizations; and
• To assess the results.

A case usually starts with a report of a possible chemical warfare agent incident, often from a veteran. To substantiate the circumstances surrounding an incident, the investigator searches for documentation from operational, intelligence, and environmental logs. This focuses the investigation on a specific time, date, and location, clarifies the conditions under which the incident occurred, and determines whether there is "hard," as well as anecdotal, evidence.

Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical warfare agent presence, nor is a single observation sufficient to validate a chemical warfare agent presence. The investigator looks for physical evidence collected at the time of the incident that might indicate that chemical agents were present in the vicinity of the incident. Such evidence might include tissue samples, body fluid samples, clothing, environmental samples of soil or vegetation, weapons parts, and Fox MM-1 tapes with properly documented spectrums.

Figure 17. Chemical warfare incident investigation methodology

The investigator searches available medical records to determine if anyone was injured by the incident. Deaths, injuries, sicknesses, etc., near the time and location of an incident are noted and considered. Medical experts are asked to provide information about any alleged chemical warfare agent casualties.

Interviews of those involved in or near the incident (participants or witnesses) are conducted. First-hand witnesses provide valuable insight into the conditions surrounding the incident and the mind-set of those involved, and are particularly important if physical evidence is lacking. Nuclear, biological, and chemical officers or specialists trained in chemical testing, confirmation, and reporting are interviewed to identify the unit’s response, the tests that were run, the injuries sustained, and the reports submitted. Commanders are contacted to ascertain what they knew, what decisions they made concerning the events surrounding the incident, and their assessment of the incident. Where appropriate, subject matter experts also provide opinions on the capabilities, limitations, and operation of technical equipment, and submit their evaluations of selected topics of interest.

Additionally, the investigator contacts agencies and organizations that may be able to provide additional clarifying information about the case. These would include, but not be limited to:

• Intelligence agencies that might be able to provide insight into events leading to the event, imagery of the area of the incident, and assessments of factors affecting the case;
• The clinical registries of the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs which may provide data about the medical condition of those involved in the incident; and
• Agencies capable of computer modeling meteorological and source characterization data in cases where airborne dispersion of agent is suspected.

Once the investigation is complete, the investigator evaluates the available evidence in order to make a subjective assessment. The available evidence is often incomplete or contradictory and thus must be looked at in the total context of what is known about the incident being investigated. Physical evidence collected at the time of the incident, for example, can be of tremendous value to an investigation. Properly documented physical evidence would generally be given the greatest weight in any assessment. The testimony of witnesses and contemporaneous operational documentation is also significant when making an assessment. Testimony from witnesses who also happen to be subject matter experts is usually more meaningful than testimony from untrained observers. Typically, secondhand accounts are given less weight than witness testimony. When investigators are presented with conflicting witness testimony, they look for other pieces of information supporting the statements of the witnesses. Investigators evaluate the supporting information to determine how it corroborates any of the conflicting positions. Generally, such supporting information will fit into a pattern corroborating one of the conflicting accounts of the incident over the others. Where the bulk of corroborating evidence supports one witness more than another, that person's information would be considered more compelling.

Our assessments rely on the investigators’ evaluation of the available information for each investigation. Because we do not expect to always have conclusive evidence, we have developed an assessment scale (Figure 18) ranging from Definitely Not to Definitely, with intermediate assessments of Unlikely, Indeterminate, and Likely. The investigator will use this scale to make a tentative assessment based on facts available as of the date of the report publication. Each case is reassessed over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 18. Assessment of chemical warfare agent presence

The standard for making the assessment is based on common sense: Do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were or were not present? When insufficient information is available, the assessment is Indeterminate until more evidence can be found.

A. Did Another Fox Confirm the Lane Red 1 Alert?

The 2d Marine Division Monograph states that "a second Fox vehicle was dispatched to the area and confirmed the presence of an agent which had probably been there a long time."[271] Although this document is a widely referenced text, the author begins with a warning:

This history is intended to be a first effort … and [researchers will need] to balance what is written here against those more complete records which will be available to them, and they will be able to correct any errors of fact which may have been made.[272]

More to the point is whether a second Fox went to the site of the chemical warfare agent alert and confirmed the presence of a chemical warfare agent. The author credits this account of the second Fox to the 2d MARDIV NBC officer. The 2d MARDIV NBC officer was an experienced NBC specialist and was situated in the command post as the commanding general’s staff officer for NBC operations. Considered knowledgeable about chemical attack defenses, as well as detection and reporting procedures, he would have been aware of the employment of the Fox vehicles in his division. This NBC officer disagrees with the account that appeared in the monograph.[273] He remembered that the Fox vehicles were dispersed throughout the I MEF, with a Fox assigned to each division. Each Fox assigned to the 2d MARDIV was further assigned to support a maneuver unit passing through the minefield breaches. Each Fox passed through its pre-assigned lane within its maneuver unit and pressed on with the attack through the minefields.[274] According to the 2d MARDIV NBC officer, another Fox in another breaching lane picked up trace amounts of a chemical warfare agent. However, according to this NBC officer and the 1/6 NBC officer, no other Fox was dispatched to lane Red 1 to confirm the alert.[275]

In addition, if there had been a confirmation by a second Fox in lane Red 1, there should have been another NBC report. In this case, however, there is no record of a second report of the presence or absence of any chemical warfare agents in lane Red 1. The I MEF NBC officer, who was in the best position to know of all NBC events in the 1st and 2d MARDIVs stated, "During my whole time over there I never knew of any confirmed NBC-1 report."[276] The 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (who worked for the division NBC officer) stated that as far as he knew, a second Fox was not dispatched to confirm the 1/6 Fox readings in lane Red 1. He added that it was possible that the author of the 2d Marine Division monograph may have confused the breaching incident with March 12, 1991, Fox operations at the cement factory.[277] In that case, a second Fox went to the area to perform additional tests.

B. Other 2d Marine Division Fox Operations

In a March 1991 interview, the 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander noted that the 2d MARDIV's Headquarters Battalion Fox and the 8th Marine Regiment Fox picked up readings of nerve agents when they passed through the breach lanes on the second and third days of the ground war.[278] We contacted personnel from the 2d MARDIV Fox crews to inquire about any possible Fox detections during minefield breaching operations.

Three of the four Foxes assigned to the 2d MARDIV were assigned to maneuver units, such as the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. The Fox assigned to 2d MARDIV headquarters was assigned general support,[279] and passed through the minefield breaches with the Division command post on day three (February 26, 1991) of the ground war. The Fox commander recalled that his Fox detected what he described as light readings while breaching, but at levels insufficient to cause the MM-1 to alarm for agent presence.[280] The MM-1 operator believed that the Fox alarmed for minute quantities of nerve agent at the second minefield, not the first minefield where the 1/6 Fox alert occurred two days earlier. He added that his unit went to MOPP-3 or MOPP-4 for a short time.[281] The division NBC platoon commander, on the other hand, stated that the division headquarters unit did not increase MOPP level while passing through the minefields.[282] The 2d MARDIV command chronology does not mention any chemical warfare agent detection in the breach lanes on those days.[283]

The 8th Marine Regiment command chronology notes that at 2:00 PM on February 26, 1991, the Fox "picked up traces of chemical agents."[284] Despite this log entry and the NBC platoon commander's recollection that the 8th Marine Regiment Fox detected nerve agents when it passed through the minefields in either breaching lanes Green 5 or 6[285] (farthest away from lane Red 1), the 8th Marine Regiment Fox commander stated that his Fox did not detect chemical warfare agents during breaching operations.[286] The MM-1 operator, however, recalled that his MM-1 might have detected phosgene (see the glossary) during breaching operations.[287]

The Fox assigned to support the Army's Tiger Brigade traveled with the tactical operations center, and breached via lane Green 5 on February 24th. According to the commander and MM-1 operator, this Fox did not detect any chemical warfare agents in that breaching lane.[288] The brigade's chemical officer confirmed that he did not recall anyone advising him of any Fox detections.[289] However, the 1/6 Fox commander told us that according to the Tiger Brigade Fox driver, this Fox traveled through all of the breaching lanes.[290] The Tiger Brigade Fox driver told us his Fox alerted to a chemical warfare agent during breaching operations, but could provide no additional details.[291] His statement contradicts those of the Tiger Brigade Fox commander and MM-1 operator.[292]

Therefore, despite the 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander’s recollection that other 2d MARDIV Foxes detected the possible presence of chemical warfare agents, we found no corroborating evidence. No other Fox produced MM-1 tapes, and we are unaware of reports of any other chemical warfare agent injuries.

C. Report of Decontamination Operations in the 2d Marine Division

During the course of this investigation, a veteran reported that chemical warfare agent decontamination was performed on vehicles and personnel of the 8th Tank Battalion. This veteran served as an M60A1 main gun loader with Company C, 8th Tank Battalion. He stated that after going through the breach, and spending upwards of eight hours in MOPP-4, a US Army unit decontaminated his unit.[293]

During the breaching operations, elements of the 8th Tank Battalion supported Marine infantry formations in the 2d MARDIV. Company C of the 8th Tank Battalion supported the 1/6. A platoon consisting of approximately four M60A1 main battle tanks supported each of the three rifle companies from the 1/6.[294]

Decontamination is a time-consuming, resource-intensive process, requiring spraying large amounts of water on vehicles with a high-pressure delivery system known as the M-17 lightweight decontamination system,[295] commonly known as a Sanator™ (Figure 19). Personnel would also be expected to perform personal decontamination and MOPP gear exchange (exchanging contaminated or decontaminated protective garments for non-contaminated protective clothing). No one else interviewed, other than the main gun loader, recalls this incident. Two of the three platoon leaders from Company C, the company commander, and the 8th Tank Battalion commanding officer do not recall any decontamination of vehicles or personnel from his unit.[296] A Marine staff non-commissioned officer with Company C, who would have been called upon to support any decontamination mission, also does not remember this event.[297] Although the veteran remembered that a US Army unit performed the decontamination, the 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander, who would have known about any decontamination performed on 2d MARDIV equipment, did not recall any vehicles being decontaminated during the conflict.[298] After hostilities ceased, however, some Marines used Sanators™ for personal hygiene (as showers).[299] In addition, Army units used Sanators™ to clean vehicles of the residue deposited on them by the oil well fires.[300] However, we could find no evidence that Marines used Sanators™ for chemical warfare agent decontamination in the 2d MARDIV area of responsibility during the war.

Figure 19. Soldiers in training use a Sanator TM to decontaminate a vehicle.

Reports of Chemical Warfare Agent Contamination on 2d Marine Division Vehicles

During the breaching operations in lanes Red 1 and 2, the 2d Battalion of the 12th Marine Regiment (2/12) served as the 6th Marines direct support artillery battalion. At 3:30 PM on the first day of the ground war (February 24, 1991), the 2d Battalion of the 10th Marine Regiment (2/10) took over the direct support artillery mission of the 6th Marines. The 2/12 passed through the minefields using both lanes Red 1 and 2. This took approximately an hour and was done in MOPP-2.[301]

After passing through both minefields, the NBC NCO reported to the 2/12 leadership that he had found a small quantity of chemical warfare agent on one or several of the vehicles. The commanding officer, the operations officer, the assistant operations officer, and the survey officer of the 2/12 recalled this contamination report.[302] However, it is unknown what type of detector the NBC NCO used and what actions were taken in response. It does not appear that the 2/12 performed any decontamination; the Marine in charge of the 1/6 decontamination team stated that, to his knowledge, no vehicles required decontamination.[303] Attempts to locate the 2/12 NBC NCO have so far been unsuccessful.

E. Report of a Possible Chemical Attack

A draft study done at the request of the assistant to the secretary of defense for intelligence oversight contained a chapter that discussed reports of Iraqi chemical weapons use. The declassified version of the chapter discussed aspects of classified messages (dated February 24, 1991) available to US forces on the first day of the ground war. The report noted one particular message, portions of which have since been declassified, suggesting that the message might be a report of Iraqi chemical warfare agent use:

… on 24 February an unidentified, non-Iraqi unit reported the end of a chemical attack. There is no further evidence to suggest that a chemical attack actually occurred prior to this time. The identity and nationality of the unit which issued the report cannot be determined.[304]

In their report, "Gulf War Illnesses; Procedural and Reporting Improvements Are Needed in DOD’s Investigative Processes," the General Accounting Office (GAO) stated that a classified document (referring to the message) in the Special Assistant for Gulf War illnesses (OSAGWI) files "could support the possibility of an Iraqi chemical attack."[305] In the report, the GAO suggested that the document, "when combined with the other information we have cited … provides additional cause for further investigation by OSAGWI, regardless of its potential for association with this [the Marine breaching] case."[306]

We sought additional information regarding the document referred to by the GAO from the appropriate intelligence agency. The response, however, provided no additional information that might further clarify the contents of this document.[307] There is little in the document that links it to breaching operations, except that it was received on the same day. The document, originated hours after the reported lane Red 1 minefield breaching incident, contains no location, mentions no units, and implicates no Iraqi forces in this attack. The document states that there is "no further evidence to suggest that a chemical attack actually occurred…."[308] We, therefore, do not believe that the document is related to the minefield breaching incident in lane Red 1.

Before the Gulf War, the Defense Intelligence Agency assessed that Iraqi ground forces possibly had chemical mines.[309] This assessment was based on two events. In the first, a Canadian soldier assigned to a UN peacekeeping force after the Iran-Iraq War thought he identified a mine that Iraq had filled with chemical warfare agent. The mine was in an Iraqi conventional minefield along the Iran-Iraq border. It was recovered, however, and positively identified as a conventional mine.[310] The second circumstance that caused concern in the US intelligence community began with an explosives shortage in Italy in the mid-1980s that led to production of mine bodies, which were left unfilled. There were concerns in the US that these mine bodies would be filled with chemical warfare agents by nations such as Iraq, since Iraqi forces used many Italian-produced mines. So far, this has proved to be unfounded, as post-war inspection and destruction of chemical weapons by UNSCOM revealed no Iraqi chemical mines.[311, 312]

After the war, over 3.5 million mines were collected inside Kuwait and destroyed. None were found to be chemical.[313] See Table 2 for a list of the mines found in the Iraqi minefields. Additionally, many Iraqi documents were captured and translated. Except for theoretical discussions, none addressed chemical mines.[314] One captured Iraqi engineering publication discusses clearing an area of enemy chemical mines, using a US M21 chemical mine as an example.[315]

Iraqi engineers strictly implemented their doctrine for mine laying operations. A US expert on foreign mines stated that he felt very safe in an Iraqi minefield due to the discipline of Iraqi engineers in following doctrine. Minefield density was consistent and followed the pattern shown in Figure 20 (also see Figures 21 and 22).

Figure 20. Representative Iraqi minefield layout

Figure 21. A captured Iraqi minefield schematic. The dark black dots represent anti-tank mines, which are surrounded by three anti-personnel mines. 

Figure 22. Iraqi mines in Kuwait. The large center mine is an anti-tank mine, surrounded by three anti-personnel mines.

Three anti-personnel mines are placed one meter from an anti-tank mine, facing the enemy. Each anti-tank mine is separated by four to five meters. The Iraqis consistently followed this doctrine during the Gulf War across the entire 400 kilometers of minefields. After traveling 300 kilometers of this front, the US expert, looking for signs of booby traps or chemical mines, found none. According to this expert, the Iraqis followed their doctrine explicitly, and any inclusion of chemical mines would be inconsistent with that doctrine. There would not be unique events of a few chemical mines interspersed among the 3.5 million conventional mines.[316]

Lastly, it was his expert opinion, and that of one of his colleagues, that chemical mines are "a dumb way to disperse chemicals."[317]

Table 2. Ordnance (landmine) employment by Iraqi forces [318]

A. Origin	B. Nomenclature/Type	C. Fuzing Type
Belgium	PRB M409/(anti-personnel)	Simple Pressure
United Kingdom	Bar Mine (anti-tank)	L89 Single impulse
China	Type 69 (plastic)/(anti-personnel) Type 72 (plastic)/(anti-personnel) Type 76 (plastic)/(anti-personnel) PMN (anti-personnel)	Blast Resistant Simple Pressure Simple Pressure Simple Pressure
Czechoslovakia	PT-MI-BA-III/(anti-tank)	Simple Pressure
France	MI AC HPD F-2/(anti-tank)	Magnetic
Italy	Valmara VS 1.6/(anti-personnel) Valmara VS 2.2 (anti-personnel) Valmara VS 50/ (anti-personnel) Egyptian/Spanish Valmara 59/ (anti-personnel) (Daisy-Chained) Valmara 69 (anti-personnel) (Daisy-Chained) P-40 (anti-personnel) VAR/IG Illumination Mine VS-T Illumination Mine	Blast Resistant Blast Resistant Blast Resistant                                Simple Pressure/Trip Wire             Simple Pressure/Trip Wire            Trip Wire Trip Wire/Pressure Trip Wire/Pressure
Iraq	P-25/(anti-personnel)	Trip Wire
Jordan	PRB-05/(anti-tank)	Single Impulse
USSR	TM 46 (anti-tank) TM 57 (anti-tank) TM 62M (anti-tank)	Simple Pressure Blast Resistant  Blast Resistant

In the Air/Hi method, the MM-1 can detect chemical warfare agent vapors, but according to US Army experts, it is not optimized for this purpose. In fact, the MM-1 is approximately 500 times less sensitive to nerve agent vapors than the M43A1.[319] In 1988 MM-1 tests, the US Army found that it took a high concentration of sarin (62 mg/m3) to cause the MM-1 to indicate chemical warfare agent presence while operating in this method.[320] In 1994, the Defense Science Board Task Force Report on Persian Gulf War Health Effects stated, "when operating in the air sampling mode, the FOX is not a suitable warning device; very high concentrations of chemical agents would have to be present, such that unprotected troops in the vicinity would be adversely and acutely affected."[321] A table in the Board’s report[322] illustrates this point by showing detector characteristics for nerve agents in vapor form; data from that table is shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Vapor nerve agent detector characteristics

Detector	Agents	Sensitivity  (vapor concentration)	Response Times
M256A1 Kit	G-series	0.005 mg/m3	15 min
M43A1 Vapor detector	G-series	0.1-0.2 mg/m3	<=2 min
Chemical Agent Monitor	GB [sarin]	<= 0.1 mg/m3	<=1 min
Mobile mass spectrometer	GB [sarin]	62 mg/m3	<=45 sec

The "sensitivity" column of Table 3 lists each detector’s sensitivity to G-series nerve agents such as sarin. This sensitivity is the minimum amount of nerve agent vapor required for the equipment to detect nerve agent presence. These minimum amounts, or concentrations, can be used to calculate whether the vapor would physically affect unprotected, exposed people. Concentration is expressed as milligrams per cubic meter of air (mg/m3). The effect a nerve agent vapor has on a person depends on the cumulative dose received through breathing or absorption.[323] The term dosage represents a cumulative exposure over a period of time and is calculated by multiplying the amount of nerve agent present by the time of exposure (mg•min/m3).[324]

At specific dosages, specific physical symptoms are expected. Studies conducted by the military determined specific dosages at which a person will exhibit symptoms of exposure to sarin nerve agent. At dosages of 0.5 mg•min/m3, personnel experience first noticeable physical effects, such as miosis (contraction of the pupils accompanied by pain in and behind the eyes). The earliest effects on the respiratory tract are a runny nose, tightness in the chest, and occasionally, prolonged wheezing.[325] The larger the dose, the more severe the effects. According to the toxicity data for sarin, a dosage of 35 mg•min/m3 is lethal to 50 percent of exposed, unprotected people.[326]

Based on the concentration required to be present (noted by the Army and the Defense Science Board) for the MM-1 to indicate sarin presence (62 mg/m3), the following dosages can be calculated for such an environment.

• To obtain the dosage for one second in an environment with 62mg/m3, divide the concentration (62 mg/m3) by 1 minute (60 seconds), which results in a per/second dosage of 1.03 milligram minutes per cubic meter of air (1.03 mg•min/m3). Since this is more than double the dosage that would yield first noticeable effects, it is probable that some unprotected personnel (e.g., those in the Marine breaching lanes) would show first noticeable effects.
• Continued exposure for 10 seconds in this environment (multiply the per/second dosage of 1.03 mg•min/m3 by 10, which yields 10.3 mg•min/m3) would result in unprotected personnel showing more severe effects.
• Similarly, an exposure time of 35 seconds results in a dosage of 36 mg•min/m3, which exceeds the dosage that causes fatalities to half of unprotected personnel.

Table 4 summarizes the effects on personnel at these dosages.

Table 4. Calculated dosages and their effects (sarin vapor concentration of 62 mg/m3)

Exposure Times	Dosage	Results [327]	Effects on Personnel [328]
1 second	1.03 mg•min/m3	First Noticeable Effects (reached at 0.5 mg•min/m3)	Exposed personnel manifest physical symptoms of nerve agent exposure
10 seconds	10.3 mg•min/m3	20 times the First Noticeable Effects dosage	Exposed personnel manifest more severe physical symptoms of nerve agent exposure
35 seconds	36 mg•min/m3	Median Lethal Dosage (reached at 35 mg•min/m3)	50% of unprotected, exposed personnel are fatalities

Another example shows that although an MM-1 would not indicate the presence of sarin vapor, a specific amount of sarin vapor would still be harmful to unprotected, exposed people. In an environment in which 35 mg/m3 sarin is present, the MM-1 would not indicate the presence of sarin, yet after 1 minute in this environment, unprotected, exposed people would have received a dosage of 35 mg•min/m3, exceeding the dosage that causes fatalities to half of unprotected, exposed people.

These examples support the conclusion that "the FOX is not a suitable warning device; very high concentrations of chemical agents would have to be present, such that unprotected troops in the vicinity would be adversely and acutely affected."[329] This means that battlefield casualties and fatalities to unprotected, exposed personnel would occur before the MM-1 could detect sarin. The Army MM-1 test and evaluation report made this point more concisely; "The MM-1 does not detect chemical warfare agent vapor at the danger level to humans."[330]

1. GAO - Iraqi Artillery Fire in the First Minefield Breach

"OSAGWI concluded that the Marines had encountered no Iraqi artillery fire as they moved through the first row of Iraqi minefields…. However, our review of OSAGWI files disclosed a Marine Corps unit log entry indicating that Iraqi artillery and mortar fire was present during the first minefield breach…. We also interviewed Marines who told us that Iraqi artillery and mortar fire was present as they passed through the first minefield. Consequently, we believe a delivery mechanism for chemical warfare agent may have been present."[331]

2. Our Investigation

This revised case narrative makes clear that our discussion of artillery fire is related to the first Iraqi minefield, specifically to lane Red one, the lane in which the Fox vehicle of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment (1/6) alerted to the possible presence of chemical warfare agents.

The 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment command chronology noted that the unit never received a chemical attack. The battalion operations officer suggested that the log entry at 6:15 AM was incorrectly logged and the artillery attack occurred later, between the first and second minefields.

The majority of Marines we interviewed told us that there was no Iraqi artillery fire present in breaching lane Red one at the first minefield. The Fox commander told us, and testified before the Presidential Advisory Committee, that he witnessed no incoming artillery fire. Others who told us there was no incoming artillery or mortars included company commanders of the infantry unit and the Assault Amphibian Battalion that breached lane Red 1, the 1/6 NBC officer, and all three assault amphibian vehicle section leaders who commanded the first vehicles to enter the breaching lane and those that immediately followed the Fox vehicle. Additionally, the Marine reportedly injured by chemical warfare agents when the Fox alerted and an infantry platoon commander positioned in a hatch not five feet away from that Marine agreed that they received no artillery while breaching the first minefield in lane Red 1.

Two Marines recalled the presence of Iraqi artillery fire. Both place the time of the incoming artillery before the Fox vehicle alert. In addition, they recalled the artillery landed far to the rear of their positions and the position of the Fox vehicle when it alerted to the possible presence of chemical warfare agents. One of these witnesses recalled mortar fire at the first breach. Another Marine, driving that vehicle, stated there was no mortar fire present at the first minefield. The 1/6 NBC officer also recalled sporadic mortar fire.

Despite the 1/6 log entry and two Marines’ recollections of Iraqi artillery and mortar fire, there is no evidence to suggest that the artillery or mortar rounds described by the two witnesses contained chemical warfare agents. Based on the multitude of factors we analyzed, we do not believe that this artillery or mortar fire was a causal factor in the Fox vehicle alert in breaching lane Red one.

For additional information concerning the unit log entry and the artillery issue, see section III.G.5.b.

1.  GAO - Chemical Agent Detector Paper Indications

"We also learned that the Commander of the 2nd Division’s Fox vehicle told OSAGWI investigators that chemical detection paper taped to the outside of the Fox vehicle was noted to have changed colors after passing through the first minefield (indicating possible contact with a chemical agent). However, this information was not reported in OSAGWI’s narrative."[332]

2.  Our Investigation

M9 Chemical Detection Paper is designed to indicate contact with liquid chemical warfare agents. The Fox vehicle in breaching lane Red one alerted to the possible presence of three chemical warfare agents. Chemical warfare agent experts stated that if M9 tape contacted liquid chemical warfare agents, traces of these agents should have remained on the Fox vehicle had it passed through an area contaminated with liquid agents. However, when the Fox vehicle was checked with another chemical detector a short time later, no agents were detected on the vehicle. Furthermore, the US intelligence community does not believe that Iraq possessed the agents suspected to have caused the M9 paper reaction.

It is more likely that the M9 paper reacted to interferents, among them oil from the sabotaged oil wells in the immediate area, fluids from the vehicle, or a number of other interferents present in the breaching environment—interferents that can cause M9 paper to falsely indicate the presence of liquid chemical warfare agents.

See section III.G.3 and III.G.4 for additional information.

1.  GAO - Review of the Fox Vehicle Printout

"As mentioned in the case narrative, three different laboratories had reviewed the Fox vehicle printout and concluded that the detections were probably false alarms. The narrative did not point out, however, that one of the three laboratories had also said that it could not rule out the possibility of the presence of a chemical warfare agent."[333]

2.  Our Investigation

We provided the tape that recorded the Fox mobile mass spectrometer’s (MM-1) results to the US Army’s Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and Bruker Daltonics (a nationally renowned expert on the MM-1) for analysis. This narrative more completely reports the findings of all three laboratories.

CBDCOM determined that the procedures used by the Fox crew were insufficient to confirm the presence of chemical warfare agents. The CBDCOM Fox experts concluded the presence of high concentrations of interferents and the short time span between these responses meant the presence of the three chemical warfare agents was highly unlikely. However, they could not with great certainty conclude that such agents were not present.

NIST did not caveat its response, indicating the results were false detections caused by interference with complex hydrocarbon mixtures.

Bruker Daltronics, the expert on the mobile mass spectrometer in the Fox vehicle told us the results were consistent with driving through an area with large amounts of oil in the background. According to their analysis, interferents were the most likely candidates for the Fox alerts.

See section III.G.4 for the analysis of the Fox vehicle tapes.

1. GAO - Intelligence Evidence Not Included

"…A classified document in OSAGWI’s files contained intelligence evidence not included in the narrative that could support the possibility of an Iraqi chemical attack. This information, some of which has since been declassified, refers to a report indicating the end of a chemical attack on February 24, 1991, the same date as this incident."[334]

2. Our Investigation

We sought additional information regarding the document referred to by the GAO from a US intelligence agency. Their response did not further clarify the contents of this document. Although the document is dated the day of the breaching operations (February 24, 1991), there is little that links it to breaching operations. The document originated hours after the reported lane Red 1 minefield breaching incident, contains no location, mentions no units, and implicates no Iraqi forces in this attack. Furthermore, the message indicates that there was no evidence that a chemical attack actually occurred

See Tab E, section E for a discussion.

1.  GAO - Assessment Subject to Question

"We believe that OSAGWI’s assessment of "unlikely" in this case is subject to question. While the information we found does not conclusively prove that chemical warfare agents were present, it does increase the potential that some might have been present. In our opinion, the weaknesses we found in this case narrative are sufficient to warrant OSAGWI’s reconsideration of its assessment."[335]

2. Our Investigation

We have reassessed the findings of this investigation as requested by the GAO. Our examination of the events and related facts strengthened our confidence in our interim case narrative assessments of unlikely. The assessments in this revised case narrative are well supported by the available evidence.

See section III.F.4 for the assessment of the incident in the 1st Marine Division and section III.G.7 for the assessment of the incident in lane Red 1.

Following publication of the US Marine Corps Minefield Breaching Operations interim narrative in July 1997, we received comments from veterans concerning the report—including comments from the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines Regiment Fox commander, and from the General Accounting Office in their report entitled, "Gulf War Illnesses, Procedural and Reporting Improvements Are Needed in DOD’s Investigative Processes." This updated narrative has been rewritten and includes information based on additional research, interviews with veterans, consultation with subject matter experts, and new information that we have obtained since publication of the interim narrative. This information includes:

• An analysis and assessment of the reported chemical warfare agent-related injury to an assault amphibian vehicle crewman in breaching lane Red 1, by a medical expert (a physician) in the field of chemical warfare agent injuries;
  Information regarding three other possible chemical warfare agent-related injuries to Marines in the 2d Marine Division during breaching operations;
• An examination of a chemical agent monitor (CAM) alert following minefield breaching operations, by the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines Regiment Fox crew; and an examination of the possibility that M9 chemical warfare agent detection paper attached to the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines Regiment Fox came in contact with chemical warfare agents during breaching operations in breaching lane Red 1;
• An analysis of possible delivery means for chemical warfare agents in breaching lane Red 1 during breaching operations; specifically, whether chemical land mines or Iraqi artillery delivered chemical warfare agents to breaching lane Red 1, and caused the Fox vehicle’s mobile mass spectrometer to alert to the possible presence of three chemical warfare agents;
  Other 2d Marine Division Fox operations during breaching operations, to address an allegation that another Fox corroborated the Fox alert in breaching lane Red 1; and other 2d Marine Division events, such as the possible detection of chemical warfare agents on 2d Marine Division unit vehicles, and reported decontamination of another unit’s vehicles by a US Army decontamination team;
• An examination of a message that GAO believes may support an assumption of chemical warfare agent use on the first day of the ground war (February 24, 1991) by Iraqi forces; and
• Tab F, which answers, "Did Iraq have chemical mines?" and Tab G, which presents additional information on Fox vapor detection capabilities in the Air/Hi method of operation.

1. An acronym and abbreviation listing is provided at Tab A.
2. Manley, Thomas F., "Marine Corps NBC Defense in Southwest Asia," Marine Corps Research Center Paper #92-0009, July 1991, p. 11.
3. Manley, Thomas F., "Marine Corps NBC Defense in Southwest Asia," Marine Corps Research Center Paper #92-0009, July 1991, p. 11.
4. Manley, Thomas F., "Marine Corps NBC Defense in Southwest Asia," Marine Corps Research Center Paper #92-0009, July 1991, p. 48.
5. Testimony of GySgt George J. Grass, Task Force Ripper Fox commander, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 1, 1996; Testimony of CWO3 Joseph P. Cottrell, Task Force Ripper NBC officer, at the hearing before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, November 18, 1993, p. 10; Memorandum from 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander, Subject: "Statement of Chemical Threat during Persian Gulf War," April 6, 1994; Memorandum from 2d Marine Division NBC officer, Subject: "Reports of Chemical Agent Detection During Operation Desert Storm," May 25, 1994, p. 1-2; Testimony of CWO5 Robert James, I Marine Expeditionary Force NBC officer, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997;
6. Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release," Standalone Version of Chapter 11, Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Committee Report (draft), Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DoD (U), June 9, 1997, p. 15-16.
7. Eddington, Patrick, Gassed in the Gulf, Washington, DC, Insignia Publishing, 1997, p. 37, 38, 42, 130.
8. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "US Marine Corps Minefield Breaching Operations" (Case Narrative), July 29, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/marine/.
9. US General Accounting Office, Report to the Committee on Veterans Affairs, House of Representatives, "Gulf War Illnesses; Procedural and Reporting Improvements Are Needed in DOD's Investigative Processes," February 1999, p. 30.
10. Two minefield belts (sometimes called obstacle belts in unit logs) extended from the Persian Gulf, generally across south central Kuwait below the Al Burqan oil fields and north of the Al Wafrah oil fields. "Minefield depth varied from 60 to 150 meters and each belt was enclosed on all four sides with concertina wire or ... barbed wire ... reinforced with engineer stakes." "Breaching Operations in Southwest Asia," Marine Corps Research Center Paper #92-0004, July 1991, p. 3-4.
11. Department of Defense Final Report to Congress, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April 1992, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, p. 265.
12. For example, the "Iraqis Artillery will use maximum chemical rounds until neutralized...." 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, "2d AA Bn Operation Order 2-91," February 21, 1991, p. 1.
13. For example: "Commanders Intent. I intend to pass as quickly as possible from our Breach Assembly Areas to the far side of the breach and into a defensive position...." 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, "2d AA Bn Operation Order 2-91," February 21, 1991, p. 3.
14. Letter from commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, Subject: "Operation Desert Storm 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Maneuver Synopsis," March 14, 1991.
15. Testimony of LtGen Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., before the Armed Services Committee, US Senate, February 27, 1997, p. 18.
16. The intelligence community is comprised of the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Department of State), National Security Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, military services' intelligence staffs and centers, and several other organizations within the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Justice, and Energy. Intelligence related to military efforts includes information at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Central Intelligence Agency, "Factbook on Intelligence," 1997, web site www.odci.gov/cia/publications/facttell/intcomm.htm (as of July 2, 1999).
17. Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997, p. 1.
18. Although there were unconfirmed reports of mustard-filled mortar rounds, UNSCOM found none in their post-war investigations. The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume IX, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996," Document 141, "Fourth report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM," United Nations, Department of Public Information, New York, 1996, p. 502.
19. Watts, Barry D. and Dr. Thomas A. Kearny, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume II, Operations and Effects and Effectiveness, US Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 109.
20. The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume IX, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996," Document 141, "Fourth Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM," United Nations, Department of Public Information, New York, 1996, p. 502.
21. The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume IX, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996," Document 141, "Fourth Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM," United Nations, Department of Public Information, New York, 1996, p. 502.
22. For additional Fox information, see the glossary found at Tab A and Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 29, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/.
23. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 29, 1997, p. 3, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/.
24. Memorandum from 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander, Subject: "Statement of Chemical Threat during Persian Gulf War," April 6, 1994, p . 1; Lead Sheet #19846, Interview of I Marine Expeditionary Force NBC reconnaissance platoon NCO, October 29, 1998, p. 1.
25. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 29, 1997, p. 2-7, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/.
26. Lead Sheet #23181, Meeting with Fox subject matter experts, August 26, 1999, p. 3, 4.
27. US Army Technical Manual 3-6665-342-10, "Operator's Manual, Nuclear-Biological-Chemical Reconnaissance System (NBCRS) Fox XM93," Change 2, April 21, 1995, Chapter 1, p. 34.
28. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 29, 1997, p. 8, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/.
29. Testimony of Mr. Richard Vigus, CBDCOM Fox subject matter expert, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.
30. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 29, 1997, p. 2, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/; US Army Field Manual 3-101-2, "NBC Reconnaissance Squad/Platoon (FOX) Operations - Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures," August 10, 1994, p. 5-2, 5-3; Lead Sheet #23181, Meetings with Fox subject matter experts, March 1, 1999, p. 1, August 26, 1999, p. 3.
31. Lead Sheet #23181, Meeting with Fox subject matter experts, March 1, 1999, p. 2.
32. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 29, 1997, p. 9, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/.
33. Lead Sheet #23181, Meeting with Fox subject matter experts, August 26, 1999, p. 4.
34. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 29, 1997, p. 10, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/.
35. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Reported Detection Of Chemical Agent, Camp Monterey, Kuwait" (Case Narrative), December 8, 1999, p. 2, 4, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/camp_mont2/.
36. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 29, 1997, p. 15, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/.
37. Facsimile from program manager, NBC Defense Systems, Subject: "Interferents," December 7, 1998.
38. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects," June 1994, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/dsbrpt/warfare.html (as of June 28, 1999); Lead Sheet #764, Interview of CBDCOM Fox expert, May 28, 1996, p. 1-2. The Fox expert works at the NBC Reconnaissance Systems, US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command (now known as the US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command- SBCCOM), Edgewood, Maryland. The air volume drawn through the sampling tube is approximately 300 times LESS than in other detectors, such as the M43A1, designed specifically for vapor detection.
39. The authoritative guidance on balancing the appropriate MOPP level to the mission is the US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-09, "NBC Protection," May 29, 1992.. For more information on MOPP, see Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection" (Information Paper), October 30, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/mopp/
40. 7th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January to 28 February 1991," April 25, 1991, p. 2-2.
41.  US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-09, "NBC Protection," May 29, 1992, Chapter 2, p. 2-16.
42. Quilter, Charles J., "US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1993, p. 75.
43. Quilter, Charles J., "US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1993, p. 78.
44.  "Breaching Operations in Southwest Asia," Marine Corps Research Center Paper #92-0004, July 1991, p. 5. Proofing the lane requires specially equipped armored vehicles to pass through the opening made by the explosive breaching charges to prove that no mines remain that would cause damage or injury.
45.  Cureton, Charles H., "US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1993, p. 75.
46. Cureton, Charles H., "US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1993, p. 128-136.
47. Quilter, Charles J., "US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1993, p. 77.
48. 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91," March 15, 1991.
49. Testimony of GySgt George J. Grass, Task Force Ripper Fox commander, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 1, 1996; Statement of GySgt George J. Grass, Task Force Ripper Fox commander, before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee of the House Government Operations and Oversight Committee, December 10, 1996.
50. Testimony of GySgt George J. Grass, Task Force Ripper Fox commander, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 1, 1996.
51.  An NBC-1 report is used by the observing unit to provide initial and follow-up data concerning a chemical or biological warfare attack. US Army Field Manual 3-3, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-17, "Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance," September 29, 1994, Change 1, Chapter 2, p. 2-1 - 2-3. See the glossary for descriptions of other NBC reports.
52. Testimony of CWO3 Joseph P. Cottrell, Task Force Ripper NBC officer, at the hearing before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, November 18, 1993, p. 9-13.
53. Interview of Fox vehicle commander, Task Force Ripper, February 20, 1997, p. 9.
54. Lead Sheet #735, Interview of 3d Tank Battalion NBC officer, April 26, 1996, p. 4. For more information on the M256 kit, see the glossary or Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit" (Information Paper), July 23, 1999, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/m256/.
55. Lead Sheet #735, Interview of 3d Tank Battalion NBC officer, April 26, 1996, p. 4, 5.
56. Lead Sheet #735, Interview of 1st Marine Division NBC officer, June 21, 1996, p. 5.
57. No Task Force Ripper or 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment log records a reference to the 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment or Task Force Ripper encountering a chemical warfare agent during breaching operations. 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January to 28 February 1991;" 7th Marine Regiment, "7th Marine Regiment Log for February 24, 1991;" 7th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January to 28 February 1991," April 25, 1991.
58. Letter statement of Task Force Ripper Fox driver, "Possible Chemical Weapons Use During Desert Storm," December 22, 1993.
59. Testimony of Mr. James Kenny, Task Force Ripper Fox MM-1 operator, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.
60. Testimony of GySgt George J. Grass, Task Force Ripper Fox commander, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 1, 1996.
61. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects," June 1994, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/dsbrpt/warfare.html (as of July 2, 1999).
62. Lead Sheet #3858, Interview of CBDCOM MM-1 subject matter expert, April 17, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #748, Interview of CBDCOM Fox expert, April 30, 1996, p. 1. The reference to the Fox as a vapor-sampling device refers to the MM-1 operating in what is known as the Air/Hi Method of the Air Monitor Mode. For a discussion of MM-1 operating modes and methods see Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 31, 1997, p. 6, 7, 8, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/.
63. "International Materiel Evaluation (IME) of the German NBC Reconnaissance System," US Army Test and Evaluation Command Test Report, April 1989, abstract.
64. 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January to 28 February 1991;" 7th Marine Regiment, "7th Marine Regiment Log for February 24, 1991;" 7th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January to 28 February 1991," April 25, 1991.
65. Lead Sheet #735, Interview of 3d Tank Battalion NBC officer, April 26, 1996, p. 4, 5; Interview of 1st Marine Division NBC officer, June 21, 1996, p. 5.
66. Interview of Fox vehicle commander, Task Force Ripper, February 20, 1997, p. 9.
67. 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91," March 11, 1991.
68.  Lead Sheet #735, Interview of 3d Tank Battalion NBC officer, April 26, 1996, p. 5.
69.  A full list of the units involved in this case is provided at Tab B. Mroczkowski, Dennis P., "US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2D Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1993, p. 91-92.
70. "Appendix 2 (NBC Defense) to Annex C (Operations) to 6th MARDIV OPORD 1-91," 6th Marine Regiment, February 18, 1991, p. C-2-3.
71.  Testimony of MSgt Michael Bradford, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.
72. "Appendix 2 (NBC Defense) to Annex C (Operations) to FragO 11-91," 6th Marine Regiment, February 22, 1991, p. C-2-1.
73. Interview of commander, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1997, p. 31.
74. Lead Sheet #21659, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment operations officer, February 16, 1999, p. 1.
75. "Breaching Operations in Southwest Asia," Marine Corps Research Center Paper #92-0004, July 1991, p. 8.
76.  Lead Sheet #23631, Interview of AAV section leader, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1999, p. 1.
77. Interview of 1st platoon commander, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, May 8, 1997, p. 6-7; Interview of commander, 3d platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, May 8, 1997, p. 4-5.
78. Mroczkowski, Dennis P., "US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2D Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1993, p. 45. The monograph does not mention that this Fox also alerted to the possible presence of the nerve agent sarin and the blister agent lewisite.
79. Quilter, Charles J., "US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1993, p. 86.
80.  Interview of staff NCOIC, NBC decontamination and chemical casualty team, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 20, 1997, p. 35.
81. Lead Sheet #1211, Interview of weapons team corporal, 1st platoon, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, January 9, 1997, p. 2.
82. Interview of commander, Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, May 8, 1997, p. 10-11.
83. 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January - 28 February 1991," Narrative Summary, NBC section (provided by the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander).
84. Actual contamination is reported using an NBC-4 report. US Army Field Manual 3-3, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-17, "Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance," Change 1, September 29, 1994, Chapter 2, p. 2-3. The glossary describes other NBC reports.
85. Interview of Fox vehicle commander, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 19, 1997, p. 5-6.
86. 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January - 28 February 1991," Narrative Summary, NBC section (provided by the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander). The Marines referred to the lanes by color, then number. Although the NBC-4 report noted lewisite, the NBC log did not.
87. Lead Sheet #577, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander, December 19, 1996, p. 12, 13; For breaching doctrine, see "Breaching Operations in Southwest Asia," Marine Corps Research Center Paper #92-0004, July 1991, p. 5.
88. Lead Sheet #1211, Interview of weapons team corporal, 1st platoon, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, January 9, 1997, p. 3.
89. 6th Marine Regiment (-)(Reinforced), "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January-28 February 1991," Sequential Listing of Significant Events - Operation Desert Storm, February 24, 1991.
90. Memorandum from 1st platoon commander, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, to commander, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, April 2, 1991.
91. Marine note known as a "yellow canary," 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 24, 1991.
92. Journal, 2d Marine Division NBC platoon, February 24, 1991.
93. 7th Marine Regiment, "7th Marine Regiment Log for February 24, 1991."
94. US Army message form, Subject: "MARCENT Report," February 24, 1991, @ 9:55 AM.
95. 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January - 28 February 1991," Narrative Summary, NBC section (provided by the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander).
96. Interview of NBC officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 19, 1997, p. 22, 24-25.
97. Testimony of MSgt Michael Bradford, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.
98. Lead Sheet #23344, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox crewman, May 12, 1999, p. 2; Lead Sheet #20527, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox MM-1 operator, June 2, 1999, p. 4.
99. Testimony of MSgt Michael Bradford, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.
100.  US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-09, "NBC Protection," May 29, 1992, Chapter 1, p. 1-14.
101. Lead Sheet #23344, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox crewman, May 12, 1999, p. 2.
102. Testimony of MSgt Michael Bradford, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.
103. Interview of staff NCOIC, NBC decontamination and chemical casualty team, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 20, 1997, p. 48-49.
104. Interview of Fox vehicle commander, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 19, 1997, p. 33.
105. US Army Technical Manual 3-6665-342-10, "Operator's Manual, Nuclear-Biological-Chemical Reconnaissance System (NBCRS) Fox XM93," Change 2, April 21, 1995, Chapter 2, p. 272, 276-278.
106. The MM-1 operator did not recall running a temperature program or changing sampling methods. These steps would have taken time, and an examination of the times printed on the MM-1 tape indicates that these steps did not occur. Lead Sheet #20527, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox MM-1 operator, June 2, 1999, p. 4; Lead Sheet #23181, e-mail from Fox subject matter experts, October 13, 1999, p. 4, 5.
107. Memorandum from NBC defense program manager, Subject: "Analysis of Fox MM-1 Tapes," March 3, 1997.
108. Lead Sheet #577, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander, December 19, 1996, p. 13; Testimony of LCpl John Laymon, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox MM-1 operator, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.
109. Memorandum from NBC defense program manager, Subject: "Analysis of Fox MM-1 Tapes," March 3, 1997. CBDCOM is now known as The United States Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM).
110. Bruker-Franzen Analytik, GMBH, "MM-1 User Manual," February 1987, Chapter 5, p. 8; Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 29, 1997, p. 11, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/.
111. Lead Sheet #3858, Interview of CBDCOM MM-1 subject matter expert, April 17, 1997, p. 2.
112. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects," June 1994, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/dsbrpt/warfare.html (as of July 2, 1999).
113.  "International Materiel Evaluation (IME) of the German NBC Reconnaissance System," US Army Test and Evaluation Command Test Report, April 1989, abstract.
114.  Lead Sheet #23181, Meeting with Fox subject matter experts, August 26, 1999, p. 4.
115.  Memorandum from NBC defense program manager, Subject: "Analysis of Fox MM-1 Tapes," March 3, 1997.
116. Letter from the National Institute of Standards and Technology, June 16, 1997.
117. Letter from Bruker Daltonics, Subject: "Analysis of MM-1 Data," July 15, 1997.
     
     
118. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 29, 1997, p. 6, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/.
     
     
119.  Memorandum from NBC defense program manager, Subject: "Analysis of Fox MM-1 Tapes," March 3, 1997.
     
     
120. Letter from the National Institute of Standards and Technology, June 16, 1997.
     
     
121.  Letter from Bruker Daltonics, Subject: "Analysis of MM-1 Data," July 15, 1997.
122. Lead Sheet #25196, Interview of chemical warfare expert, October 29, 1999, p. 1.
123. Lead Sheet #25641, Interview of Central Intelligence Agency analyst, December 1, 1999, p. 2.
124.  CBDCOM Fox expert, e-mail message, Subject: "Response to Action 3---From CPT [Redacted], OSD, December 2, 1993," December 7, 1993, @ 4:59 PM.
125.  US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Intelligence Information Report 2-201-0022-92, Subject: "Inspection of Chemical Warfare Facilities (U)," October 1991.
126.  Lead Sheet #25641, Interview of Central Intelligence Agency analyst, December 1, 1999, p. 1.
127.  Lead Sheet #577, Statement of commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, June 13, 1994, p. 4-6; Marine note known as a "yellow canary," 10th Marine Regiment February 24, 1991.
128. 6th Marine Regiment (-)(Reinforced), "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January-28 February 1991," Sequential Listing of Significant Events - Operation Desert Storm, February 24, 1991.
129. Lead Sheet #577, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment commanding officer, April 4, 1996, p. 5-6.
130. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 17, 19-21, 30-32, 37-38. Sarin is normally a vapor rather than liquid hazard.
131.  Lead Sheet #25995, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander, February 4, 2000, p. 3.
132. Quilter, Charles J., "US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1993, p. 77; Lead Sheet #577, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander, December 19, 1996, p. 13; Lead Sheet #577, Statement of commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, June 13, 1994, p. 5.
133.  Lead Sheet #26230, CBDCOM Fox expert, e-mail message, Subject: "PSOB Questions," April 13, 1999, p. 1.
134. Interview of Fox vehicle commander, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 19, 1997, p. 31.
135. US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-09, "NBC Protection," May 29, 1992, Chapter 1, p. 1-14.
136. Lead Sheet #5614, Interview of 1st Marine Division (Forward) NBC officer, June 17, 1997, p. 2.
137. US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-09, "NBC Protection," May 29, 1992, Chapter 1, p. 1-13, 114; Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 391.
138. Testimony of MSgt Michael Bradford, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997; Lead Sheet #21659, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment operations officer, February 16, 1999, p. 1-2.
139.  1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January - 28 February 1991," Narrative Summary, NBC section (provided by the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander).
140.  Interview of Fox vehicle commander, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 19, 1997, p. 7, 12, 13. The Fox commander chose an NBC-4 report instead of an NBC-1 report, because the Marines were not under attack, so the report was more accurately an observation of a possibly contaminated area.
141.  Testimony of MSgt Michael Bradford, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.
142.  Lead Sheet #21659, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment operations officer, February 16, 1999, p. 1.
143.  1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January - 28 February 1991," Narrative Summary, NBC section (provided by the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander).
144. Department of Defense Intelligence Information Report 2-340-0458-91, Subject: "Chemical Mines (U)," 1991.
145. Lead Sheet #577, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander, December 19, 1996, p. 13.
146. 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, "Command Chronology for the Period of 1 February to 28 February 1991," March 14, 1991, p. 4.
147. Lead Sheet #21659, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment operations officer, February 16, 1999, p. 1-2.
148.  Interview of commander, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1997, p. 34.
149.  Lead Sheet #762, Interview of USMC EOD expert, May 17, 1996, p. 2.
150.  Lead Sheet #22931, Interview of I Marine Expeditionary Force engineer officer, April 7, 1999, p. 3.
151.  Lead Sheet #1288, Interview of CMS, Inc. division president, February 11-12, 1997, p. 2.
152.  Lead Sheet #14252, Interview of National Ground Intelligence Center mine warfare analyst, January 26, 1998, p. 1, 2.
153.  The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume IX, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996," Document 189, "Seventh Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM," United Nations, Department of Public Information, New York, 1996, p. 656-657. This table lists all munitions destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. There are no mines listed.
154. Testimony of UNSCOM inspector before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, July 29, 1997.
155.  Lead Sheet #25641, Interview of Central Intelligence Agency analyst, December 1, 1999, p. 1.
156. Interview of Fox vehicle commander, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 19, 1997, p. 6-7.
157. Testimony of MSgt Michael Bradford, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.
158. 6th Marine Regiment (-)(Reinforced), "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January-28 February 1991," Sequential Listing of Significant Events - Operation Desert Storm, February 24, 1991, p. 4. A hand-written 6th Marines forward command post journal recorded, "1/6 reports incoming 82mm & arty." The 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment command chronology recorded, "1/6 receives incoming from 82mm mortars and artillery."
159. Interview of commander, Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, May 8, 1997, p. 35; Interview of 1st platoon commander, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, May 8, 1997, p. 13.
160. Interview of AAV sergeant, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1997, p. 81; Lead Sheet #23631, Interview of AAV section leader, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1999, p. 2; Lead Sheet #21663, Interview of AAV section leader, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 15, 1999, p. 1; Interview of 3d platoon commander, Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, May 8, 1997, p. 6.
161. Lead Sheet #21659, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment operations officer, February 16, 1999, p. 1.
162. Lead Sheet #21612, Interview of platoon sergeant, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 9, 1999, p. 2.
163. Lead Sheet #22248, Interview of Marine, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, March 18, 1999, p. 2.
164. Interview of staff NCOIC, NBC decontamination and chemical casualty team, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 20, 1997, p. 9.
165. Mroczkowski, Dennis P., "US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2D Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1993, p. 45.
166. The Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses also received information on one of the potential injuries on the 1-800 Incident Reporting Hotline.
167. Letter from commanding officer, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, Subject: "Injuries Sustained in Combat Operations During Operation Desert Storm; Case of Sergeant [Redacted]," April 23, 1992.
168. Statement of AAV sergeant, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, January 14, 1992.
169. Interview of AAV sergeant, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1997, p. 12-13.
170. Lead Sheet #577, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander, December 19, 1996, p. 12-13.
171. Interview of commander, Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, May 8, 1997, p. 13.
172. Interview of AAV sergeant by I Marine Expeditionary Force battle assessment team NBC officer, March 19, 1991, p. 1; Statement of AAV sergeant, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, January 14, 1992. In this 1992 statement (which was part of a package of documentation for a Purple Heart medal) this Marine stated that when he noticed the burning sensation on his hands, he immediately took out a decontamination kit. As he was applying the decontamination solution, the blisters broke on light contact and new ones started forming.
173. Interview of Fox vehicle commander, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 19, 1997, p. 22.
174. Interview of platoon sergeant, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1997, p. 8, 9.
175. Interview of commander, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1997, p. 14, 15, 21.
176. Interview of staff NCOIC, NBC decontamination and chemical casualty team, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 20, 1997, p. 16-17, 20-21, 23-27.
177. Statement of 1st platoon commander, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, April 2, 1991. Also see Interview of 1st platoon commander, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, May 8, 1997, p. 18. In this 1997 interview, the platoon commander noted that the sergeant had blisters on both hands.
178. Statement of hospital corpsman, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, Subject: "Suspected Chemical Injury to Sgt [Redacted]," December 18, 1991.
179. Interview of staff NCOIC, NBC decontamination and chemical casualty team, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 20, 1997, p. 29-31.
180. Lead Sheet #3859, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment hospital corpsman, April 2, 1997, p. 1.
181. Lead Sheet #3860, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment medical officer, April 29, 1997, p. 1.
     
     
182. Statement of medical officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, Subject: "Suspected Wound/Resulting from Chemical Exposure on 24 February 1991, ICO [In the Case of]: Sgt [Redacted], USMC, [serial number redacted]," March 4, 1992.
183. The circumstances of this incident and the NBC officer's description of the Marine's hand led us to believe that this unidentified Marine is the sergeant identified as the AAV crewman.
184. Interview of NBC officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 19, 1997, p. 7-8, 53.
185. Lead Sheet #25995, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander, February 4, 2000, p. 2.
186. Lead Sheet #3860, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment medical officer, April 29, 1997, p. 1; Lead Sheet #22111, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment medical doctor, March 10, 1999, p. 1; Lead Sheet #21124, Interview of 2d Marine Division surgeon, January 19, 1999, p. 1.
187. This NBC officer noted that many had heard about the injury, and the Marine was brought to him. He did not agree with the 1/6 doctor's opinion that there was no injury. He described the blisters as "classic mustard/lewisite blister agent wounds," without any graduated skin coloration between the blisters; I Marine Expeditionary Force battle assessment team NBC officer, e-mail message, Subject: "Memorandum for the Record," January 15, 1997; Lead Sheet #21201, Interview of I Marine Expeditionary Force battle assessment team NBC officer, January 22, 1999, p. 1.
188. Interview of AAV sergeant, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1997, p. 61-62, 68.
189. Interview of commander, 1st platoon, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, May 8, 1997, p. 34-35.
190. Letter from commanding officer, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, Subject: "Injuries Sustained in Combat Operations During Operation Desert Storm; Case of Sergeant [Redacted]," April 23, 1992.
191. For more information on mustard and lewisite, see The Textbook of Military Medicine, Warfare, Weaponry, and the Casualty; Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Chapter 7, "Vesicants," Office of the Surgeon General, United States Army, 1997, p. 200.
192. Physician's Statement of Review, Subject: "Medical Review of Chemical Agent Exposure in Desert Storm- SSgt [Redacted]," March 1999, p. 7.
193. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 38-41.
194. Physician's Statement of Review, Subject: "Medical Review of Chemical Agent Exposure in Desert Storm- SSgt [Redacted]," March 1999, p. 5.
     
     
195. US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Intelligence Information Report 2-201-0022-92, Subject: "Inspection of Chemical Warfare Facilities (U)," October 1991.
196. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 17-18.
197. Interview of AAV sergeant by I Marine Expeditionary Force battle assessment team NBC officer, March 19, 1991, p. 1-2.
198. Physician's Statement of Review, Subject: "Medical Review of Chemical Agent Exposure in Desert Storm- SSgt [Redacted]," March 1999, p. 3, 4, 8.
199. Physician's Statement of Review, Subject: "Medical Review of Chemical Agent Exposure in Desert Storm- SSgt [Redacted]," March 1999, p. 6.
200. Department of Defense Material Safety Data Sheet, DoD 6050.5-LR, "Decontaminating Kit, Skin M258A1," DoD Hazardous Information System, April 1996.
201.  US Army Field Manual 3-5, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-10, "NBC Decontamination," November 17, 1993, Chapter 2, p. 1.
202.  Physician's Statement of Review, Subject: "Medical Review of Chemical Agent Exposure in Desert Storm- SSgt [Redacted]," March 1999, p. 8.
203.  The 1st platoon of Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, was attached to the first section of the AAV platoon. The three AAVs of section 1 were among the first vehicles to pass through lane Red 1 (ahead of the Fox). See Interview of commander, 1st platoon, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, May 8, 1997, p. 6-8.
204.  Lead Sheet #18948, Interview of rifleman, Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, August 28, 1998, p. 2. Also see Interview of 1st squad leader, 1st platoon, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, May 8, 1997, p. 10.
205. Lead Sheet #18974, Interview of hospital corpsman, Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, September 3, 1998, p. 2.
206. Interview of 1st squad leader, 1st platoon, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, May 8, 1997, p. 9, 17, 18. The lance corporal was a member of the 2d squad. We have been unable to locate and interview the 2d squad leader.
207. Lead Sheet #18974, Interview of hospital corpsman, Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, September 28, 1998, p. 2-3.
208. Lead Sheet #18948, Interview of rifleman, Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, September 2, 1998, p. 2-3.
209. Interview of Fox vehicle commander, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 19, 1997, p. 35.
210. Lead Sheet #22563, Interview of staff NCOIC, 1st platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, April 5, 1998, p. 1.
211. Physician's Statement of Review, Subject: "Medical Review of Chemical Agent Exposure in Desert Storm- SSgt [Redacted]," March 1999, p. 4.
     
     
212. Lead Sheet #21916, Interview of rifleman, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 24, 1999, p. 1.
     
     
213. Lead Sheet #22558, Interview of rifleman, Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, April 2, 1999, p. 1.
214. Lead Sheet #23476, Interview of commander, Company F, 2d Medical Battalion, April 15, 1999, p. 1, 2, 3.
215. 2d Medical Battalion, "Command Chronology for the Period 01 Jan-13 Mar 91," March 13, 1991; 2d Combat Engineer Battalion, "Command Chronology for the Period 16 Jan 1991 to 28 Feb 1991," March 16, 1991; 8th Engineer Support Battalion, "Command Chronology for the Period 8 December 1990 Through 5 March 1991," March 12, 1991.
216. Lead Sheet #23724, Interview of 2d Combat Engineer Battalion executive officer, June 1, 1999, p. 1; Lead Sheet #23723, Interview of 8th Engineer Support Battalion commanding officer, June 1, 1999, p. 1; Lead Sheet #22931, Interview of I Marine Expeditionary Force engineer officer, April 7, 1999, p. 3.
217. Lead Sheet #22931, Interview of I Marine Expeditionary Force engineer officer, April 7, 1999, p. 3.
     
     
218. Lead Sheet #577, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC officer, March 7, 1996, p. 8-9.
219. 6th Marine Regiment, "Personnel Status Report, 1200 24 February to 1200 25 February 1991." A 1/6 battalion aid station doctor noted the two gunshot wounds; See Lead Sheet #22111, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment medical doctor, March 10, 1999, p. 1.
220.  Memorandum, Marine Corps Casualty Section, Subject: "Chemical Casualties During Desert Shield/Desert Storm," March 11, 1996.
     
     
221. 6th Marine Regiment (-)(Reinforced), "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January-28 February 1991," Tab H to Supporting Documents, "Summary of Friendly Casualties."
     
     
222. Lead Sheet #21124, Interview of 2d Marine Division surgeon, January 19, 1999, p. 1.
     
     
223.  Lead Sheet #21688, Interview of 6th Marine Regiment surgeon, February 19, 1999, p. 1.
224.  Lead Sheet #22111, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment medical doctor, March 10, 1999, p. 1.
225.  Lead Sheet #577, Statement of commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, June 13, 1994, p. 4, 5.
     
     
226.  US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 4-5, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999).
227. US Army Material Safety Data Sheet on HQ Mustard, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, June 30, 1995.
     
     
228. US Army Material Safety Data Sheet, "Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM)," December 2, 1999.
     
     
229. Taken from the CBDCOM mission statement, web site www.sbccom.army.mil/hooah/pubs/cbdcom98.pdf (as of September 2, 1999).
     
     
230. US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 6, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999).
231.  US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 22-23.
232. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "Detection of Chemical Weapons: An overview of methods for the detection of chemical warfare agents," p. 4, web site www.opcw.nl/chemhaz/detect.htm (as of October 12, 1999).
233. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 31.
234. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," April 6, 1999, p. 162, web site www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/e/02287.html (as of September 2, 1999).
235. US Army Test and Evaluation Command, Test Operations Procedure number 8-2-555, "Chemical Agent Detector Kits," Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, UT, April 28, 1989, p. 37.
236. US Army Test and Evaluation Command, Test Operations Procedure number 8-2-555, "Chemical Agent Detector Kits," Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, UT, April 28, 1989, p. 37.
237. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 29, 1997, p. 3-4, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/.
238. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," March 23, 1994, p. 181, web site www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/f/02573.html (as of September 2, 1999).
239. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 19.
240. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 22, 23.
     
     
241. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual No 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 17-18; US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Chapter 2, p. 1, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999).
242.  US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 31.
243. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 40-41, 31, 39.
244.  US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 30, 32-36.
245.  US Army Material Safety Data Sheet on HQ Mustard, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, June 30, 1995.
     
     
246. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 30.
     
     
247. US Army Material Safety Data Sheet on HQ Mustard, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, June 30, 1995.
     
     
248. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 37-38.
     
     
249. WWWebster Dictionary copyright (c) 1998 by Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, web site www.m-w.com/dictionary (as of May 3, 1999).
     
     
250. US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 11, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999).
     
     
251. US Army Test and Evaluation Command, Test Operations Procedure number 8-2-555, "Chemical Agent Detector Kits," Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, UT, April 28, 1989, p. 37.
     
     
252. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 39.
     
     
253. US Army Field Manual 3-101, "Chemical Staffs and Units," Washington, DC, November 19, 1993, p A-III-1.
     
     
254. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 430-431. Copies of the Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook may be purchased from the CBIAC. To order, please contact the CBIAC Administrator, via phone (410-676-9030), fax (410-676-9703), e-mail (cbiac@battelle.org), or use the interactive request form on the CBIAC web site www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil (as of October 19, 1999). See also Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit" (Information Paper), July 23, 1999, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/m256/.
     
     
255. US Army Technical Manual 43-0001-26-1, "Army Equipment Data Sheets, Chemical Defense Equipment," September 30, 1991, change 4, p. 4-11.
     
     
256. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 418-419.
     
     
257. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 1, p. 8.
258. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection" (Information Paper), October 30, 1997, p. 4, 5, 8, 9, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/mopp/.
259. US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-09, "NBC Protection," May 29, 1992, Chapter 2, p. 4.
260. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 29, 1997, p. 2, 8, 9, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/.
261. US Army Field Manual 3-3, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-17, "Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance," Change 1, September 29, 1994, Chapter 2, p. 2-1 - 2-4.
262. US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 14, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999).
     
     
263. US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 14, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999). See also US Army Field Manual 3-5, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-10, "NBC Decontamination," November 17, 1993, p. V.
264. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," March 23, 1994, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/o/04539.html (as of September 2, 1999).
     
     
265. US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 15, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999).
     
     
266. CW Procedural Text for Chemical CORPS Field Laboratories, Book 1, Part I, Chemistry of CW Agents, Chemical Corps, Chemical and Radiological Laboratories, Army Chemical Center, MD, January 7, 1954, p. 294; US Army Material Safety Data Sheet on HQ Mustard, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, June 30, 1995.
267.  US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 19.
268. Taken from the SBCCOM mission statement web site www.sbccom.army.mil/about/mission.htm (as of September 2, 1999).
269. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," April 6, 1999, web site www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/t/06258.html (as of September 2, 1999).
270. "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This chemical weapons convention was opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. It has been signed by 165 states and ratified or acceded to by 106 states as of February 1998. It was signed by the United States on January 13, 1993, and ratified on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. Other protocols and guidelines were found in Methodology and Instrumentation for Sampling and Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki, Finland, 1985; Verification Methods, Handling, and Assessment Of Unusual Events In Relation To Allegations of the Use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents, Consultant University of Saskatchewan in conjunction with the Verification Research Unit of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 1990; and Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, Department of External Affairs, Department of National Defence, Health and Welfare Canada, and Agriculture Canada, November 1985. US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-9, "NBC Protection," May 1992; US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication 5041, US Air Force Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11 (adopted as NATO Field Manual 8-285), "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995; US Army Field Manual 19-20, "Law Enforcement Investigations," November 25, 1985; and other DoD investigational procedures contributed ideas for developing this methodology.
271. Mroczkowski, Dennis P., "US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2D Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1993, p. 45.
272. Mroczkowski, Dennis P., "US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2D Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1993, Preface.
273. Lead Sheet #577, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC officer, March 11, 1996, p. 9.
274. The four Fox vehicles in the 2d Marine Division were assigned to the 6th Marine Regiment, 8th Marine Regiment, the US Army's Tiger Brigade (supporting the 2d Marine Division), and division headquarters; Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander, by I Marine Expeditionary Force battle assessment team NBC officer, March 20, 1991, p. 1.
275. Lead Sheet #577, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC officer, March 11, 1996, p. 9; Interview of NBC officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 19, 1997, p. 19.
276. Interview of I Marine Expeditionary Force NBC officer, February 19, 1997, p. 7.
277. Lead Sheet #21120, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander, January 14, 1999, p. 3. See Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Cement Factory" (Case Narrative), April 7, 1999, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/cement_factory.
278. The second and third days of the ground war were February 25 and 26, 1991 (also known as G+1 and G+2 days). Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander, by I Marine Expeditionary Force battle assessment team NBC officer, March 20, 1991, p. 1-2.
279. Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander, by I Marine Expeditionary Force battle assessment team NBC officer, March 20, 1991, p. 1.
280. Lead Sheet #17781, Interview of Fox commander, 2d Marine Division Headquarters Battalion, May 15, 1998, p. 1.
281. Lead Sheet #18148, Interview of Fox MM-1 operator, 2d Marine Division Headquarters Battalion, July 20, 1998, p. 1.
282. Lead Sheet #7311, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander, June 22, 1999, p. 3.
283. 2d Marine Division, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 Jan to 13 Apr 91."
284. 8th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 February to 28 February 1991 (U)," March 14, 1991.
285. Lead Sheet #15501, Interview of 2d Marine Division operations officer, March 18, 1998, p. 1
286. Lead Sheet #16153, Interview of 8th Marine Regiment Fox commander, March 19, 1998, p. 1.
     
     
287. Lead Sheet #16618, Interview of 8th Marine Regiment Fox MM-1 operator, May 15, 1998, p. 1, 2.
288. Lead Sheet #20077, Interview Tiger Brigade Fox commander, November 9, 1998, p. 1. When discussing the 1/6 Fox alert with us, the Tiger Brigade Fox MM-1 operator expressed doubt that the three agents detected (sarin, lewisite, and HQ mustard) would all have been present at the same time; Lead Sheet #22228, Interview of Tiger Brigade Fox MM-1 operator, March 11, 1999, p. 2.
289. Lead Sheet #18496, Interview of Tiger Brigade chemical officer, August 7, 1998, p. 2.
290. Lead Sheet #25995, Interview of 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Fox commander, February 4, 2000, p. 2.
291. Lead Sheet #5651, Interview of Tiger Brigade Fox driver, August 5. 1997, p. 1.
292. Lead Sheet #22228, Interview of Tiger Brigade Fox MM-1 operator, March 11, 1999, p. 2.
293. Lead Sheet #23630, Interview of 8th Tank Battalion tank crewman,, December 16, 1998, p. 1, 2. According to unit records, the 8th Tank Battalion breached the minefields through lanes Red 1 and 2. See 8th Tank Battalion, "Command Chronology for the Period 26 November 1990 to 31 March 1991," April 12, 1991, p. 9.
294.  Lead Sheet #23761, Interview of commander, 1st platoon, Company C, 8th Tank Battalion, June 4, 1999, p. 1.
295.  US Army Field Manual 3-5, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-10, "NBC Decontamination," November 17, 1993, Chapter 10, p. 6.
296.  Lead Sheet #23761, Interview of commander, 1st platoon, Company C, 8th Tank Battalion, June 4, 1999, p. 1; Lead Sheet #23762, Interview of commander, 3d platoon, Company C, 8th Tank Battalion, June 4, 1999, p. 1; Lead Sheet #23544, Interview of commander, Company C, 8th Tank Battalion, May 21, 1999, p. 1; Lead Sheet #23698, Interview of 8th Tank Battalion commander, May 28, 1999, p. 1.
297.  Lead Sheet #23704, Interview of staff NCO, Company C, 8th Tank Battalion, June 1, 1999, p. 1.
298.  Lead Sheet #7311, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander June 22, 1999, p. 4.
299.  Lead Sheet #23762, Interview of commander, 3d platoon, Company C, 8th Tank Battalion, June 4, 1999, p. 1.
300.  Lead Sheet #21150, Interview of 202nd Military Intelligence Battalion NBC NCO, June 22, 1999, p. 2.
301.  2d Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 Feb to 28 Feb 1991," p. 27.
302. Lead Sheet #22707, Interview of 2d Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment commanding officer,  April 23, 1999, p. 1; Lead Sheet #23540, Interview of 2d Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment operations officer, May 21, 1999, p. 1; 2d Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 Feb to 28 Feb 1991," p. 27. The command chronology notes that "small amounts of a chemical agent were detected on several of the vehicles." An assistant operations officer (Lead Sheet #23540) recalled that only one vehicle had agent on it.
303.  Lead Sheet #23580, Interview of commander, Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment, May 21, 1999, p. 1; Interview of staff NCOIC, NBC decontamination and chemical casualty team, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, February 20, 1997, p. 48-49.
304. "Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release," Standalone Version of Chapter 11, Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Committee Report (draft), Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DoD (U), June 9, 1997, p. 7.
305. US General Accounting Office, Report to the Committee on Veterans Affairs, House of Representatives, "Gulf War Illnesses; Procedural and Reporting Improvements Are Needed in DOD's Investigative Processes," February 1999, p. 30.
306. US General Accounting Office, Report to the Committee on Veterans Affairs, House of Representatives, "Gulf War Illnesses; Procedural and Reporting Improvements Are Needed in DOD's Investigative Processes," February 1999, p. 30. GAO's reference to other information includes M9 chemical warfare agent detection tape attached to the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment's Fox, a possible chemical warfare agent monitor (CAM) alert by the crew of the 1/6 Fox, and the possibility that Iraqi artillery was responsible for delivering chemical warfare agents to breaching lane Red 1 in the 2d Marine Division's area of responsibility.
307.  Memorandum from [Redacted], Subject: [Redacted], May 1, 1999. This response remains classified.
308.  "Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release," Standalone Version of Chapter 11, Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Committee Report (draft), Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DoD (U), June 9, 1997, p. 7.
309.  Department of Defense Intelligence Information Report 2-340-0458-91, Subject: "Chemical Mines (U)," 1991.
310.  Lead Sheet #14252, Interview of National Ground Intelligence Center mine warfare analyst, January 15, 1998, p. 1.
311.  Lead Sheet #14252, Interview of National Ground Intelligence Center mine warfare analyst, January 15, 1998, p. 1.
312.  The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume IX, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996," Document 189, "Seventh Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM," United Nations, Department of Public Information, New York, 1996, p. 656-657. In the list of all of the munitions destroyed by UNSCOM, there are no mines listed.
313. Lead Sheet #14252, Interview of National Ground Intelligence Center mine warfare analyst, January 26, 1998, p. 1, 2.
314. Lead Sheet #14252, Interview of National Ground Intelligence Center mine warfare analyst, January 15, 1998, p. 2; In the Iraqi Armed Forces Manual for the Tactical Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Official Special Manual No. 469 (Appendix 2 to Annex C), there is a discussion of chemical mines and employment: "Description of a chemical mine (theory): The description of a chemical mine is a theory only for the purpose of study and discussion. However, it is the description of a real mine."
315. Lead Sheet #14252, Interview of National Ground Intelligence Center mine warfare analyst, January 15, 1998, p. 2.
316.  Lead Sheet #14252, Interview of National Ground Intelligence Center mine warfare analyst, January 15, 1998, p. 2.
317.  Lead Sheet #14252, Interview of National Ground Intelligence Center mine warfare analyst, January 15, 1998, p. 1, 2.
318.  "Breaching Operations in Southwest Asia," Marine Corps Research Center Paper #92-0004, July 1991, p. 3.
319.  Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 29, 1997, p. 6, 7, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/.
320.  "International Materiel Evaluation (IME) of the German NBC Reconnaissance System," US Army Test and Evaluation Command Test Report, April 1989, p. 19, 21.
321.  "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects," June 1994, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/dsbrpt/warfare.html (as of July 2, 1999).
322.  "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects," Table 18, June 1994, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/dsbrpt/table18.gif (as of July 28, 1999).
323.  US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, p. 108.
324.  US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, p. 108.
325.  "Evaluation of Airborne Exposure Limits for G-Agents: Occupational and General Population Exposure Criteria," Edgewood Research, Development, and Engineering Center, Technical Report #489, April 1998, p. 21; US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Chapter 2, p. 2-8, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I.htm (as of July 2, 1999).
326.  "Evaluation of Airborne Exposure Limits for G-Agents: Occupational and General Population Exposure Criteria," Edgewood Research, Development, and Engineering Center, Technical Report #489, April 1998, p. 21.
327.  "Evaluation of Airborne Exposure Limits for G-Agents: Occupational and General Population Exposure Criteria," Edgewood Research, Development, and Engineering Center, Technical Report #489, April 1998, p. 21.
328.  For the onset of symptoms over time see US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I (as of July 2, 1999).
329.  "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects," June 1994, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/dsbrpt/warfare.html (as of July 2, 1999).
330. "International Materiel Evaluation (IME) of the German NBC Reconnaissance System," US Army Test and Evaluation Command Test Report, April 1989, abstract.
331.  US General Accounting Office, Report to the Committee on Veterans Affairs, House of Representatives, "Gulf War Illnesses; Procedural and Reporting Improvements Are Needed in DOD's Investigative Processes," February 1999, p. 29.
332. US General Accounting Office, Report to the Committee on Veterans Affairs, House of Representatives, "Gulf War Illnesses; Procedural and Reporting Improvements Are Needed in DOD's Investigative Processes," February 1999, p. 30.
333. US General Accounting Office, Report to the Committee on Veterans Affairs, House of Representatives, "Gulf War Illnesses; Procedural and Reporting Improvements Are Needed in DOD's Investigative Processes," February 1999, p. 30.
334. US General Accounting Office, Report to the Committee on Veterans Affairs, House of Representatives, "Gulf War Illnesses; Procedural and Reporting Improvements Are Needed in DOD's Investigative Processes," February 1999, p. 30.
335. US General Accounting Office, Report to the Committee on Veterans Affairs, House of Representatives, "Gulf War Illnesses; Procedural and Reporting Improvements Are Needed in DOD's Investigative Processes," February 1999, p. 30.