During and after the Gulf War, people reported that they had been exposed to chemical warfare agents. To investigate these incidents and to determine if chemical weapons were used, the DOD developed a methodology for investigation and validation based on work done by the United Nations and the international community (see Tab D) where the criteria include:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site.
• Physical evidence from the site such as weapons fragments, soil, water, vegetation or human/animal tissue samples.
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence.
• Testimony of eyewitnesses.
• Multiple analyses.
• Review of the evidence by experts.

Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical agent presence, nor is a single individual’s observation sufficient to validate a chemical agent presence.

By following this methodology and accumulating anecdotal, documentary, and physical evidence, and by interviewing eyewitnesses and key personnel, and analyzing the results, the investigator can assess the validity of the presence of chemical warfare agents on the battlefield. Because information from various sources may be contradictory, we have developed an assessment scale (Figure 1) ranging from "Definitely" to "Definitely Not" with intermediate assessments of "Likely," "Unlikely," and "Indeterminate." This assessment is tentative, based on facts available as of the date of the report publication; each case is reassessed over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 1. Assessment of Chemical Warfare Agent Presence

The standard for making the assessment is based on common sense: do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were or were not present? When insufficient information is available, the assessment is "Indeterminate" until more evidence can be found.

During the Persian Gulf War, U.S. Marine Corps forces reported several incidents of possible exposure to chemical warfare agents. After the war, in testimony to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans Illnesses, Marine Gunnery Sergeant (GySgt) George Grass reported three more incidents. Based on the reports of these incidents, we established four cases:

• an incident at an Iraqi ammunition supply point (ASP) southwest of Kuwait City that we call the ASP/Orchard case;
• the incidents at Al Jaber air field during the first and second days of the ground war;
• several reports of positive detections by the 11th Marine regiment and its subordinate battalions during the course of the air war and the ground war; and
• minefield breaching operations of the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions during the first day of the ground war.

The narrative that follows reports the Minefield Breaching case; narratives describing the other cases will be released separately.

The Marines had to breach the two minefields that stretched across southern Kuwait. From these breaching operations came two accounts that describe chemical detections and possible exposures at different locations on the battlefield. Both events occurred in the morning of February 24, 1991:

• The first incident occurred in Task Force Ripper of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division and was reported in testimony by GySgt George Grass, a Marine Corps Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, who had been assigned to Task Force Ripper.
• The second incident occurred in the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment (Reinforced), 2d Marine Division, and was mentioned in a Marine Corps monograph.

The first reported chemical agent incident occurred in the 1st Marine Division when the Fox reconnaissance vehicle detected what GySgt Grass identified as a "trace." He relayed his finding to the Task Force Ripper NBC officer, but not to units in the 1st Marine Division because there was insufficient evidence to confirm the presence of a chemical warfare agent. Even if it had been present, the NBC officer judged that a trace would not have been harmful to troops moving rapidly through the breaches. There was no evidence collected, and no troops reported any chemical effects despite traveling through the minefield breaches with faces and hands exposed. The assessment for this incident is that the presence of a chemical warfare agent is "Unlikely."

In the 2d Marine Division incident, the response was different; personnel were alerted to the possible presence of chemical warfare agents. Those in the area of the possible contamination took protective measures and continued their assault through the breach. The Fox reconnaissance vehicle that sounded the alarm to the possibility of chemical agents analyzed an air sample with its mass spectrometer, but did not print the results of the spectral analysis. After-action analysis of the Fox tape was limited to entries printed automatically since the spectrum (all detected ions) was not printed. Nevertheless, reviews of the Fox tape by separate agencies concluded that the alarms were "false positives." One Marine reportedly was injured by a chemical warfare agent. Individuals who saw the injury reported conflicting observations and the medical evaluation of the Marine’s complaint did not substantiate his report. He was subsequently denied a Purple Heart medal. The assessment of this incident is that the presence of a chemical warfare agent is "Unlikely."

The 1st and 2d Marine Divisions, the ground maneuver elements of the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), were positioned along the northern boundary of Saudi Arabia with the mission to attack north into Kuwait. The I MEF was tasked to breach (clear openings in) two heavily defended minefield belts,[2] advance past Ahmed Al Jaber air base taking key sites along the way, and converge on Kuwait City to liberate the capital. The areas of operations are shown in Figure 2. The 1st Marine Division eventually opened 14 lanes; the 2d Marine Division opened six.[3]

A full list of the units involved in this case is provided at Tab B. The 1st Marine Division was made up of units from the 1st Marine, 3d Marine, 7th Marine, and 11th Marine regiments (as well as units of other Marine regiments assigned to the 1st Marine Division). For the conduct of the ground war, the 1st Marine Division was further organized into Task Forces (e.g., Ripper, Papa Bear). The 2d Marine Division was comprised of units of the 6th Marines; the 8th Marines; the 10th Marines; the Army’s 1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division; and other supporting Marine units.

Final preparations and briefings took place on day G-1 (Feb. 23, 1991) as commanders reiterated to their troops the high potential for use of chemical warfare agents by the Iraqis,[4] the need for speed through the minefield breaches,[5] and, above all, to "take care of your men."[6] Lieutenant General Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., who, as a Colonel, commanded Task Force Ripper, testified[7] that

...we took this threat of chemical involvement very seriously. We had intelligence ... that the Iraqi forces had the potential, had the capability. We [had] the very best NBC equipment that the Marine Corps had in its inventory at that time. And throughout many months in Saudi Arabia, we trained very, very hard on the detection, protection, and decontamination of our forces.

Figure 2. US Marine Corps Area of Operations

Prior to leaving their assembly areas, personnel assumed Mission-Oriented Protective Posture 2 (MOPP2)[8] in which they were clothed in a chemical protective over-garment, including boots. They carried their protective masks and gloves, which could be donned in seconds should there be any indication of chemical agent attack. The 7th Marines assumed MOPP2 at 1600 hours on February 23rd.[9] These actions were consistent with Marine doctrine which defines the MOPP levels and the threat assessment process. It also advises commanders to balance the threat of exposure and the mission-degrading effects of wearing the protective overgarments against the "factors of mission, environment, and soldier."[10]

Although the I MEF officially began the assault at 0400 hours on February 24, 1991, the 1st Marine Division started moving forward through the first minefield to their defensive positions earlier in the night with infiltration Task Forces Taro and Grizzly. The 1st Marine Division breached the first minefield from positions just west and south of the "elbow" of the southern Kuwait border. The 2d Marine Division entered Kuwait between the Umm Gudair (south) and Al Manaquish oil fields about 25 kilometers northwest of the 1st Marine Division.

The Marines breached the minefields "by the book" to "locate the leading edge, breach the lane, proof[11] the lane, and mark the lane."[12] However, the specific methods and order of maneuver for each Marine division differed slightly. After locating the leading edge of the minefield, combat engineers, using mine-clearing explosive line charges, opened lanes through the minefields. The over-pressure of the line charges detonated the mines in the minefield or blew them out of position. The line charges were followed by armored equipment with plows, rakes, or rollers that cleared and proofed the lanes. A team of combat engineers followed and marked the edges and/or center of the lanes. While doing so, they cleared mines or obstacles that might have fallen back into the cleared lanes and destroyed anything too dangerous to move. Using these procedures, the Marines cleared lanes wide enough for their attacking forces to pass.

During breaching operations, all personnel were told to be alert for evidence of chemical contamination or attack, such as chemical alarms, chemical agent monitor alerts, or individuals exhibiting symptoms of chemical contact. If anyone suspected a chemical incident, they were directed to call a Fox[13] reconnaissance vehicle to check out the area. Each Marine division was allocated four Fox reconnaissance vehicles, and usually one was assigned to each maneuver regiment.

The Fox reconnaissance vehicles were designed to monitor and identify persistent liquid chemical ground contamination, however, the Fox was also used for on-the-move vapor detection. It is not optimized for this mission, nor is its alerting capability in this method of operation as good as that of other chemical detectors. To completely detect and verify the presence of a chemical agent requires the Fox to perform a spectral analysis using the Fox’s on-board MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer,[14] followed by an analysis of the spectrum printout by a qualified expert trained in the chemical analysis of ion masses.[15] It requires several minutes to obtain a good spectral readout of the agent and collect a sample to assure that initial indications are not affected by contaminants from the battlefield (e.g., smoke, diesel exhaust, oil, etc.)

After the war, GySgt George Grass, who was the commander of the Fox reconnaissance vehicle assigned in direct support of Task Force Ripper, testified to the Presidential Advisory Committee and to subcommittees of Congress, that while he was crossing the first minefield breach, his vehicle detected

... small traces of nerve agent in the air. The computer system notified us that the amount of chemical agent vapor in the air was not significant enough to produce any casualties.[18] As a result, it was impossible for the Mass Spectrometer to run a complete check on the agent except by visually observing the agent and spectrum on the screen.[19] These minute readings continued on the screen for the duration of each lane surveyed. Once my Fox vehicle departed the first minefield breach, those readings went away....[20]

He testified that the amounts were trace, but the MM-1 did not alarm so the MM-1 did not recognize the "trace" as a chemical warfare agent. He also indicated that his Fox was operating using the vapor method of detection. In his testimony to the Presidential Advisory Committee,[21] he stated that he reported the trace reading "face-to-face" (i.e., after the breaching) to both the 3rd Tank Battalion’s Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Officer and the Task Force Ripper NBC Officer. There is no record of any follow-up testing done to confirm this report.

Following our methodology, efforts were made to confirm the events and to find evidence to substantiate the presence of chemical warfare agents. In congressional testimony [22] , CWO Joseph P. Cottrell, the Task Force Ripper NBC officer, confirmed that he had been informed of the Fox’s findings, but he remembered the agents to be blister, not nerve. In answering a question, he clarified that he remembered the detection was "mustard-type blister." He also stated that the reported levels were below an immediate threat to humans and below the level that would cause symptoms. Except for the agent type, this testimony is consistent with what GySgt Grass said -- namely, that the trace amounts were not significant enough to cause casualties. It was CWO Cottrell’s assessment that crossing the breach did not pose a threat or require subsequent decontamination because the suspected agent was at a trace level and the rapidly moving Marines were in the area for only a short period of time. Given these factors, he did not send out an NBC-1[23] report. He was aware of no other detections in the 1st Marine Division breach lanes.

GySgt Grass and CWO Cottrell followed their agreed-upon procedure to evaluate a possible chemical detection before alerting the task force or higher headquarters about a possible chemical incident. They agreed that for this incident, without more proof, they would not inform the Division personnel. Also, the source of the readings was questionable because there was no apparent method for delivery of the suspected chemical agent.

Although this Fox crew was supporting Task Force Ripper, it was under the direct control of the 3d Tank Battalion’s NBC officer during the breaching operations. (The Fox crew was released back to Task Force Ripper after completing the breach.) The 3d Tank Battalion NBC officer had a 5702 Military Occupational Specialty (MOS),[24] had many years of NBC experience, and was in a position to be aware of any chemical incidents or casualties during the 1st Marine Division breaching operations. The 3d Tank NBC Officer also had personally written the NBC portion of the Operation Order for the breaching operations. And even though the Marines had new equipment (Chemical Agent Monitors and Fox reconnaissance vehicles), his instructions were clear -- follow the basic NBC procedures to sound the alarm, put on the mask and gloves (MOPP4), report to Regimental Headquarters, and begin supplementary testing with an M256 kit. He stated that there were no NBC reports generated, no reports of casualties or injuries, nothing to suggest that a higher MOPP level was required during the breaching operations or anything suggesting that a chemical incident had occurred. [25] He also stated that during his entire time in the Gulf, he does not recall anyone reporting any positive chemical warfare agent readings to him. He added that GySgt Grass had communications capability to alert the Division of a chemical detection, but he never did.[26]

The 1st Marine Division NBC Officer (also with a 5702 MOS and many years of NBC experience) served on the Operations staff in the Division Headquarters. He also would have been aware of any NBC reports, any reports from other units, or any reports of casualties. He specifically stated that no NBC reports were generated during the breaching operations in the 1st Marine Division and that there was nothing to suggest that there were even trace detections. While many of the Marines were only in MOPP2, there are no reports of casualties or any chemical exposure. His assessment of the testimony of GySgt Grass was that there was no incident during the breaching.[27]

The driver of the same Task Force Ripper Fox reconnaissance vehicle was another eyewitness to the events of the breaching operations. In a written statement, he recalled the results of the reconnaissance of the 1st Marine Division breaching lanes differently than GySgt Grass: "All four lanes of both mine belts were checked and nothing was detected."[28] On the other hand, the MM-1 operator of this Fox reconnaissance vehicle supported GySgt Grass’ testimony in his own testimony to the Presidential Advisory Committee.[29] He added that the MM-1 was unable to get a spectrum of the indications he saw on his screen.

Efforts to find physical evidence of the suspected chemical warfare agent were unsuccessful because the Fox did not collect a sample nor print a spectrum. The lack of a spectrum is significant. Only by comparing the spectrum of the chemical sample against the Fox’s library of chemical warfare agents can the Fox determine whether or not it has properly detected a chemical warfare agent. The inability of the MM-1 to match the ion pattern of a sample to its library of chemical warfare agents suggests that the sample contained none of the known threat agents.

Without the printout of the spectrum, the possible presence of chemical agent cannot be verified. A subject matter expert (who works for the program manager for the Fox vehicles) at the NBC Reconnaissance Systems, U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM), Edgewood, Maryland, stated that the Fox is not optimized for vapor detection.[30] This means that the Fox does not do well at detecting a small presence of chemical warfare agent in the air. In fact, he stated that while using the vapor detection method, human symptoms would most likely appear before the Fox reconnaissance vehicle would alert.[31] In any event, there were no casualties from chemical warfare agent contact reported although the entire Division moved through the breach lanes without wearing gloves or masks.

Based on the information available thus far in this investigation, the presence of a chemical warfare agent in this area of the minefield is judged to be "Unlikely." Although two members of the Fox crew believe that their mass spectrometer detected something, the MM-1 did not sound an alarm--indicating that the computer did not find a chemical warfare agent presence at sufficient intensities to do so. There was also no effort at the time to notify the troops to go to a higher protective posture, and no follow-up or secondary confirmation. One member of the crew stated that they found nothing during the breaching operations. Senior NBC officers said that there was no report of chemical warfare agents at the time, and that there were no injuries reported despite Marines crossing the minefields protected only to the MOPP2 level. Commanders interviewed remembered no reports of chemical detection or of chemical injuries during the time the troops crossed the minefield in the 1st Marine area of operations. No means of delivery of a chemical warfare agent has been uncovered. Finally, there is no physical evidence - no spectrum, no samples, etc.

A chemical agent alert was recounted in "U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991, With the Second Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," published by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, and herein referred as "Second Division Monograph." This document is often referenced as proof of chemical agent use during the war. It mentions a chemical detection by a Fox reconnaissance vehicle on the first day of the ground war: "a Fox chemical reconnaissance vehicle at lane Red 1, detected a ‘trace’ of mustard gas, originally thought to be from a chemical mine."[37]

The 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment (1/6) was one of the maneuver elements of the 2d Marine Division and was the source for this report of chemical agents encountered during breaching operations.[38] The 1/6 was reinforced by Company "C", 8th Tank Battalion and Company "B" which was attached to the 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion. The reinforced battalion was assigned the far west flank with lane Red 1[39] as its breach lane through the Iraqi minefields. Additionally, there were to be two return lanes to enable equipment and personnel to be evacuated to the rear without interfering with the advance -- one lane to the left and one to the right of the six assault lanes.

As in the 1st Marine Division, personnel in the 2d Marine Division began breaching operations outfitted in MOPP2. The morning started with a light mist but cleared as the day progressed.[40] It was cold (cold enough that "nobody complained"[41] about traveling in MOPP2). The sun was obscured through most of the day by burning oil smoke. In fact, the burning oil wells were close enough to lane Red 1 that when navigation hardware failed, the 1/6 "B" Company Commanding Officer directed the driver to align on and steer toward the burning oil well that was only about 100 meters from the exit point of the breach lane.[42]

The 1/6 had a Fox vehicle assigned in direct support. This Fox reconnaissance vehicle joined the 1/6 on February 17, 1991, just one week prior to the actual attack.[43] As the 1/6 Fox reconnaissance vehicle crossed the first minefield, its MM-1 operator was observing little activity on his screen. About halfway across the minefield, the MM-1 alerted to the possible presence of chemicals, so the Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, MSgt (then GySgt) Michael Bradford, announced "gas, gas, gas" over the battalion communications net and filed an NBC-4 report for suspected contamination. The 6th Marines Regimental listing of significant events reflects an initial report at 0631 hours followed at 0635 hours with identification of the suspected chemical agents as "Sarin nerve agent and Lewisite mustard [sic] gas."[44] The 1st Platoon Commanding Officer of "B" company, 1st Assault Amphibian Battalion placed the time at approximately 0630 hours and remembered the Fox reported traces of both non-persistent nerve agents and persistent blister agents.[45] The 1/6 NBC officer recorded the event at 0634[46] hours while the 2d Marine Division NBC platoon at the combat operations center recorded the report as an NBC-1 (thus changing the reconnaissance report to an attack report) at 0658 hours.

At 1150 hours, 2d Marine Division sent NBC-1 messages to I MEF.[47] This report was relayed by many units. For example, the 7th Marines in the 1st Marine Division recorded the event at 0714 hours[48] and even the XVIII Airborne (ABN) Corps Main far west of the Marines was informed of the incident by the XVIII ABN Corps Rear at 0955 hours.[49] Based on the warning from the 1/6 Fox vehicle, personnel of the 1/6 in lane Red 1 donned their chemical protective masks and gloves (MOPP 4). Although these reports are well-documented, the possible source of the suspected chemical agent is not established. NBC officers in other breach lanes evaluated the wind (blowing away from their breach lanes) and recommended that increasing MOPP level for their personnel was not warranted.[50]

MSgt Bradford stated that because there were both nerve and blister chemical alerts (without any enemy activity), he deduced that the agents were released by two land mines detonated by the line charges[51] and he reported it that way in his NBC-4[52] report. However, the Fox reconnaissance vehicle was not the first vehicle through breach lane Red 1. MSgt Bradford remembered that his vehicle was about the fifth one through the breach.[53] After combat engineers exploded a path through the minefield, the plows proofed the lane (standard procedure before the Fox or any other vehicle would enter the lane) and were followed by security personnel of "B" Company, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, who traversed the lane ahead of the Fox. According to testimony of a corporal of the 1st Platoon of "B" Company[54] (and corroborated by a personal audio tape recorded at the time), his unit had almost reached the area between the minefields near the above-ground pipeline before the "gas" warning was sounded. During their crossing, this corporal recounted that his vehicle was open, many personnel were standing up (only in MOPP2) looking out the open hatches, and no one experienced any symptoms of contact with a chemical agent. Also, none of the M9 chemical detector paper that they had strapped to their arms and legs recorded any contact with a liquid chemical.

MSgt Bradford said that the Fox reconnaissance vehicle itself did not hit a mine. According to him, there were no other explosions (no artillery attack) except for the explosions that occurred when the minefield was initially breached. (The Marines did receive artillery fire while breaching the second minefield which was more heavily defended, but that was hours later.) He stated that they were sampling with the chemical sampling wheels down, moving fast, and that the area was dirty with oil and residue. There were pools of oil and dirty sand all around.[55] This is significant because the Fox reconnaissance vehicle may incorrectly alert to a chemical warfare agent in an environment of heavy concentrations of petroleum-based hydrocarbons.[56]

In the evening of the first day when the offensive paused, the Fox was sampling the air but receiving no indications of chemical warfare agent vapors. The crew left the vehicle and used a Chemical Agent Monitor to check their vehicle for residual agents but found none,[57] despite the fact that both mustard and Lewisite chemical warfare agents to which their Fox alerted are persistent. The crew also checked other vehicles that had passed through their breach and none showed any signs of mustard or Lewisite. One shrapnel hole did register a 2-bar reading for a G-series nerve agent. In the morning, the hole did not register anything.

In another report of a possible chemical mine, the 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion Command Chronology states that a 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion vehicle hit two anti-tank mines and a chemical mine.[58] The Commanding Officer of Company "B", 1st Armored Assault Battalion, which was attached to the 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, confirmed that he had lost an Amtrac vehicle because of damage caused by running over a landmine, but he did not believe they were chemical mines, and he does not remember how or why the entry was made in the Command Chronology.[59] In addition, he and his personnel in the Amtrac dismounted and walked out of the minefield breach in MOPP2 with no effects that would imply contact with chemical warfare agents.

In the ensuing investigation of this incident, available operational reports and interviews with Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) experts disclosed that they found no chemical mines. In fact, no chemical mines have been recovered from this or any other minefield of the war. One EOD expert, who cleared minefields in Kuwait both during the war and after the war as a contractor for the Kuwait government, reported that he never encountered a chemical mine and that he knew of no chemical mines being found in this area of operations.[60]

Mine-clearing operations after the war cleared over 341,064[61] mines without encountering any chemical mines. The process for identifying and clearing ordnance from Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) was both rigorous and detailed, unlike the more rushed destructions at Khamisiyah. It started with subdividing the area into 36 sections of about 80 square kilometers each. Within each section, skilled EOD teams, using global positioning equipment and computers, identified the location and type of explosive ordnance. Using this inventory, disposal teams then moved through each sector, collected the ordnance into large berm-enclosed pits, and implosion-detonated the contents. These pits were reused repeatedly by EOD experts who wore no special protective clothing and who suffered no effects of contact with chemical warfare agents. Throughout these clearance operations in the U.S. sector, chemical warfare agents were never detected.[62] CMS, Inc. is one company that cleared munitions and unexploded ordnance from the U.S. sector of the KTO after the war. The president of the company’s division responsible for these efforts stated that in the 3 years that they cleared munitions, they never found any chemical mines in Kuwait. They also met regularly with the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense and the contractors clearing the other areas of the KTO. No one in any of those meetings reported discovering a chemical mine in Kuwait.[63] Finally, Iraq has not turned over any chemical mines nor declared research on chemical mines to UNSCOM.

The 1/6 Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, MSgt Bradford, was alerted by the MM-1 operator to the possible chemical presence in the first minefield. The printout tape[64] from this Fox’s operation documents alerts for Sarin, HQ Mustard, and Lewisite[65] chemical warfare agents. Responding to these alerts, the Fox crew took the correct proactive action and warned the 1/6 of the possible presence of chemical warfare agents. However, a detailed examination of each alert tape shows "Fat, Oil, Wax" at higher intensities than each chemical warfare agent. "Fat, Oil, Wax" is an indication of a false alarm due to battlefield contaminants. (Figure 5.)

The first alarm occurred at 0621 hours when the MM-1 alerted to "Fat, Oil, Wax." A minute later,

a second alert occurred for "Fat, Oil, Wax" but this time the MM-1 indicated that there might have been Lewisite present. Because the Fox reconnaissance vehicle makes its initial detection using only four ions of the entire spectrum of a chemical warfare agent, it can sound a false alarm due to similar ion patterns from interferring chemicals. Only the second step of the Fox two-step confirmation process can evaluate the entire spectrum and compare it to the library of known chemical warfare agents.

Following their procedures, the Fox crew took a spectrum with its MM-1, although they did not change the method of detection to a lower temperature to discriminate better among the substances detected, nor did they stop since they were in the middle of a combat operation. The spectrum showed only "Fat, Oil, Wax," which means the sample was contaminated with hydrocarbons. More alerts followed from 0623 hours to 0626 hours, again primarily for "Fat, Oil, Wax," but with the possibility of Sarin or HQ-Mustard. Again the crew ran a spectrum and again the spectrum showed only "Fat, Oil, Wax." Spectrums run at 0627 hours and 0632 hours also showed only "Fat, Oil, Wax." From 0635 hours to 0637 hours, the MM-1 printed "HQ-Mustard," but showed that no spectrum was run during these times.

The tape that recorded the Fox’s MM-1 results was provided to the US Army’s Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM) for analysis.[66] CBDCOM determined that although the procedures used by the Fox may have been appropriate for the operational situation, they were incomplete to confirm the presence of chemical warfare agents. First, the sample was obtained using vapor sampling. Although the Fox was using the wheel method, the tape clearly shows that it was an air sample that generated the alarm, not a liquid substance vaporized off a sampler wheel. Using the vapor sampling method, the MM-1 is far less sensitive than other detectors.[67]

Second, the MM-1 detected "Fat, Oil, Wax" throughout the time of the alerts and always in higher relative intensities than any suspected chemical agent. This response indicates a high level of interfering hydrocarbons was present at that time, which is consistent with eyewitness reports of smoke and oil in the air from the oilwell fires. "Under circumstances of high interferent concentrations, the MM-1 is prone to responding with incorrect initial alarms for other compounds being monitored."[68]

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) also evaluated the Fox tape and concluded that the "high relative concentrations of ‘Fat, Oil, Wax’ probably led to a false identification."[69] Similarly, Bruker Daltonics, a nationally renown expert on the Fox reconnaissance vehicle, analyzed the tape and concluded that the "information in the tapes is consistent with the background information of driving through an area with large amounts of oil in the background."[70] To determine if chemical agents were present as well as the "Fat, Oil, Wax," the MM-1 operator would have had to perform special additional spectrum analyses following the normal spectrum. However, U.S. military personnel were not taught to perform these special spectrum techniques[71] during their training courses.

Although the detections were printed to the Fox tape, the results of the spectrum were not. Apparently, the Fox was not operating with the "auto print" feature engaged and the operator did not depress the print button to print the ion pattern of the spectrum onto the Fox tape. Consequently, it is not possible to determine what the operators saw on the screen. As a result, the actual ion pattern that could have provided details of the chemicals detected does not exist. The CBDCOM Fox experts concluded that "because of the presence of high concentrations of interferents and the short time span between these responses, we conclude that the presence of the three chemical warfare compounds is highly unlikely."[72] NIST also pointed out that the "detection of three quite different agents ... is consistent with false indications from a high, variable, and complex background signal."[73] Bruker states the same conclusions somewhat differently: "it is typical that as you drive through a contaminated area, the intensity of the alarm goes up, reaches a maximum, and then goes down as you leave the area. A single alarm for an agent is not consistent with driving through an area of contamination."[74] Due to the priorities of war, the Fox did not stop to take samples, perform any M256 tests, or identify contaminated areas. The absence of these actions precludes other possible sources of confirmation of the presence of chemical warfare agents.

The commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, stated that the detection, as reported to him in the NBC report, was a trace amount, and he understood that the Fox did not get a full-spectrum readout.[75] He stated that all personnel in the possibly-affected units went to MOPP4 when the alarm sounded and the NBC officer alerted other units that lane Red 1 may have been contaminated for the first 300 meters. 2d Marine Division units were directed to continue to monitor the condition of lane Red 1 for the next several hours.[76] Since there were only trace alerts for vapor, no secondary indications of chemical attack, no reports from other nearby units, and no injuries or anything else that would substantiate a chemical incident, he considered the event a false alarm.[77]

The "Second Division Monograph" also states that "a second Fox vehicle was dispatched to the area and confirmed the presence of an agent which had probably been there a long time."[78] Although the "Second Division Monograph" is a widely referenced text, the author begins with a warning:

This history is intended to be a first effort ... and [researchers will need] to balance what is written here against those more complete records which will be available to them, and they will be able to correct any errors of fact, which may have been made.[79]

More to the point is whether a second Fox reconnaissance vehicle was sent to the site of the chemical alert and "confirmed" the presence of a chemical agent. The author credits this account of the second Fox to the 2d Marine Division NBC officer. The 2d Marine Division NBC officer was an experienced NBC specialist (5702 MOS) and was situated in the command post as the Commanding General’s staff officer for NBC operations. He was considered knowledgeable about chemical attack defenses, detection and reporting procedures, and would have been aware of the employment of the Fox reconnaissance vehicles in his division.

This 2d Marine Division NBC officer denied the report in the monograph.[80] He remembered that the Fox vehicles were dispersed throughout the I MEF, with vehicles assigned to each division. Each of the vehicles assigned to the 2d Marine Division was further assigned to support a maneuver unit passing through the minefield breaches.[81] Each vehicle maintained its pre-assigned lane within its maneuver unit and pressed on with the attack through the minefields. He stated that no other Fox reconnaissance vehicle was dispatched to lane Red 1 to "confirm" the alert. His statement is supported by the 1/6 NBC officer who reiterated that a second Fox vehicle was never sent to follow-up the initial lane Red 1 alert.[82] Also, if there had been another Fox alert at the location, there should have been another NBC report. In this case, however, there is no record of a second report of the presence or absence of the suspected agents. The I MEF NBC officer who was in a position to know of all NBC events in the Marine divisions stated that "during my whole time over there, I never knew of any confirmed NBC-1 report."[83]

There was, however, an individual who claimed that the 8th Marines picked up readings of nerve agents when they passed through the breach lanes on the second day of the ground war (G+1).[84] The 8th Marines breached through lane Red 2. However, the Command Chronology for the 8th Marines does not mention any chemical warfare agent detection in the breach lanes on G+1.[85]

The "Second Division Monograph" also says the chemical agent was "sufficiently strong to cause the blistering on the exposed arms of two AAV [Assault Amphibian Vehicle] crewmen."[86] This has been a point of particular interest and investigation, but only one Marine has claimed to have been injured by chemical warfare agents during breaching operations.[87]

The day started cool and misty and the Marines were wearing their protective over-garments (MOPP2). Consequently, it is unlikely that anyone would have had "exposed arms," but hands would have been exposed at MOPP2. The 2d Marine Division NBC Officer would have been one of the first people to become aware of any NBC injuries, and he stated no such injuries were reported up to the Division level.[88] Further, he stated that every service member was aware of the potential for Iraqi use of chemical weapons and trained how to respond, continue fighting, and report. Any suspected chemical injuries should have surfaced.

Personnel records of 1/6, including the supporting reinforcements, show only two wounded in action for 24-25 February 1991--both gunshot wounds.[89] Additionally, Marine Corps casualty records show no chemical wounds were reported. There were no chemical-related deaths and no purple hearts awarded by the Marine Corps during Operation Desert Shield or Desert Storm for any chemical injuries.[90]

In a written statement, the 1/6 Commanding Officer said,

There were no indications from Marines that the alert was in fact positive. I aggressively pursued any potential medical problems associated with the attack and saw absolutely no evidence of any.... I feel confident that any chemical attack in our sector would have surfaced. I can categorically state that no one came forward and stated/claimed any evidence of medical problems resulting from chemical and /or biological weapons.[91]

After hearing rumors of the injury, the 1/6 Battalion Commanding Officer tried to find a member of his battalion who showed any signs of chemical injury. He searched throughout his battalion, including those reinforcements that were assigned to him for the breaching operation and units that remained with him for a month after the cease-fire in Kuwait. He found no one.[92]

However, a platoon Commanding Officer did recommend a Purple Heart for a Marine after the cease-fire. This Marine was a member of the 1st Platoon, Company B, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, attached to the 2d Amphibian Assault Battalion. He was in a vehicle that followed the Fox vehicle through the lane Red 1 breach. In a written statement, the Marine reported that immediately after the breaching charge, the tactical network reported "gas," so he put on his mask (but not his gloves), closed up the vehicle, and in doing so, exposed his hands to the outside air. He reported that immediately he felt a strong burning sensation and blisters began forming.[93] Immediate pain is consistent with contact with the blister agent Lewisite, but no evidence of Lewisite was ever found in the KTO, nor has any significant evidence surfaced that the Iraqis had Lewisite in their inventory. Neither Lewisite or HQ Mustard would produce immediate blisters.[94] UNSCOM does not list Lewisite or HQ Mustard as part of Iraq’s inventory even after 6 years of investigations.

Although all Marines in the vehicle were in MOPP2 before the warning, no one else reported any of these symptoms. Also, this Marine was in an Amtrac that was following the Fox reconnaissance vehicle. His vehicle had not yet entered the minefield breach lanes when he heard the Fox report gas. The injured Marine indicated that his vehicle was about tenth in line to pass through the breach with 50 meters of separation between vehicles;[95] the Fox was fifth, and the 1/6 Company Commander stated the breach was only about 70 meters deep.[96]

In an earlier interview,[97] this Marine stated that after closing up the vehicle, he felt a burning sensation on the back of his right hand under his glove. He removed the glove, decontaminated the back of his hand with materials from his M258 kit, and put the glove back on. When his unit arrived at the end of the first breach lane, they were informed that they could return to MOPP2, at which time he noticed small eraser-sized blisters on both hands. Again, he decontaminated. He stated that later the Fox Commander checked his hands and attributed the blisters to a low-level blister agent, but it was not Lewisite. The Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander remembers looking at the man’s hands, seeing that they were red, but without blisters, and commenting that if it were a chemical reaction, it must have been from a minute quantity,[98] but he did not interpret the condition as a chemical injury on the basis of his quick viewing.

Other Marines who saw the Marine’s injuries gave differing observations. His platoon sergeant saw his hands a day or so after the event and remembers only redness, no blisters.[99] The company Commanding Officer remembers meeting the Marine several days after the event and seeing only one hand, the back of which was reddish with three small pea-sized blisters.[100] Another eyewitness who accompanied the Marine to the battalion aid station about 12 hours after the event, stated that he saw what may have been a burn-like area on the back of the individual’s right hand. There were no blisters, just reddening, complicated by black charcoal powder from the MOPP suit. The red area was about the size of a silver dollar and it appeared to have been scratched.[101] The Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, who checked the Marine’s injury, said "I wouldn’t even really call it an injury as much as the fact that it was still red, irritated, and he had been scratching it."[102] However, the injured Marine’s platoon Commanding Officer stated that at the end of the day, he saw blisters on the Marine’s left hand.[103] The senior corpsman of the 1/6 saw the Marine the next morning but he could not examine the Marine’s hands because they were bandaged, although he reported that he saw what may have been the "signs of blisters" a week later.[104] Although the observations differ, they seem to agree that the possible injured area was limited to small areas on the backs of the hands. He wore no gloves, but there were apparently no blisters on the palms of his hands, on the fingers, or between the fingers.

The Marine did visit the battalion aid station in the evening after the completion of the breaching operations. One eyewitness remembers the corpsmen and the doctors discussing the possibilities of the cause of the visit to be chemical contamination. One corpsman who examined the Marine’s hand stated that he saw an area about the size of a quarter that appeared to be blistered, but it didn’t appear to be a chemical injury.[105] The medical officer who examined the Marine remembers him well as the only person who complained of any kind of a chemical injury,[106] but he doubted the hand was injured by chemical warfare agents. His official evaluation was more explicit:

I found no blistering. I returned the [individual] to full duty without any treatment necessary....[107]

Two weeks after the cease fire, an I MEF Battle Assessment Team NBC Officer interviewed the Marine and observed two blisters on the injured hand,[108] which he described as "classic mustard/Lewisite blister agent wounds," but this officer never reported a chemical injury. Finally, the Assault Amphibian Battalion Commanding Officer who convened a preliminary Purple Heart investigation, concluded that the injuries were not considered appropriate for a Purple Heart award[109] because the injury did not require treatment by a medical officer. Due to the conflicting observations, this investigation is still pursuing expert medical evaluations of the injury to the Marine.

This investigation is not complete, but based on the information available so far, the presence of a chemical warfare agent in the 2d Marine Division’s area of the minefield is judged to be "Unlikely." The alert to the possible contamination was certain, well-documented, and reported throughout the theater. The Marines in the Fox reconnaissance vehicle followed established operating procedures to get the word out to members of the 1/6 quickly, so they could change to MOPP4 for maximum protection in case the chemical detection was valid. The review of the tape produced by the Fox shows that nerve agent, and mustard and Lewisite blister agents were reported by the MM-1 during the initial scan, but in combination with "Fat, Oil, Wax"--which indicates an interferent. In fact, the area through which the Fox was traveling was thick with oil and smoke, which are known interferents to the Fox’s spectrometer. Expert analyses of the tape by three independent agencies state that the Fox presented false indications. Also, despite the persistent nature of mustard and Lewisite, neither was present on any equipment or vehicles when the Marines paused after passing through the breaches. Because the troops were moving fast, the Fox reconnaissance vehicle did not stop to take a sample of the suspected contamination, so no physical evidence other than the tape exists.

The investigation has not been able to find a delivery mechanism for the suspected chemical contamination. There was no artillery or mortar fire and the assumption of chemical mines is not proven. No chemical mines were ever found during or after the war in the Kuwait theater of operations, which casts doubt on the report of chemical mines as the source. Even the commander in the Amtrac that hit a mine reported that he and his men left the vehicle in MOPP2 and none suffered from encountering a chemical warfare agent.

Several vehicles carrying Marines in MOPP2 passed through the 2d Marine Division minefields ahead of the Fox reconnaissance vehicle. Although their hands and faces were exposed, none reported any chemical injuries. The only possible chemical injury was reported by a Marine in a vehicle the followed the Fox. The eyewitnesses who saw this Marine over the next several days reported contradictory observations, with many reporting that he had a couple of blisters, but several stating they saw no such injuries. No one has been able to confirm that these possible blisters were caused by chemical agents rather than many other possible causes for blisters. The doctor who saw him the first night stated that there were no blisters and no treatment was required. This investigation is still pursuing expert medical evaluations of the Marine’s injury.

This case is still being investigated. As additional information becomes available, it will be incorporated. If you have records, photographs, recollections, or find errors in the details reported, please contact the DOD Persian Gulf Task Force Hot Line at: 1-800-472-6719

1/6 1st Battalion, 6th Marines

1/7 1st Battalion, 7th Marines

AAV Assault Amphibian Vehicle

AOR Area of Operations

ASP Ammunition Supply Point

CBDCOM Chemical and Biological Defense Command

CSTA Combat Systems Test Activity

CW Chemical Warfare

CWO Chief Warrant Officer

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD Department of Defense

EOD explosive ordinance disposal

FragO Fragmentary Order

GySgt gunnery sergeant

IAD Investigation and Analysis Directorate

I MEF First Marine Expeditionary Force

KTO         Kuwait Theater of Operations

LtGen Lieutenant General

MARCENT Marine Forces Central Command

MARDIV Marine Division 

MEF         Marine Expeditionary Force

MLRS Multi-Launched Rocket System

MM-1 Mobile Mass Spectrometer

MOPP Mission-Oriented Protective Posture

MOS Military Occupational Specialty

NBC Nuclear, Biological, Chemical

NCOIC Non-commissioned Officer-in-Charge

NIST National Institute of Standard and Technology

OPORD Operations Order

OpPlan Operations Plan

OSAGWI Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses

Sgt Sergeant

UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission on Iraq

M256 Kit Chemical

Agent Detector Kit: A portable, expendable item capable of detecting and identifying both liquid and vapor chemical agents (e.g, blister, blood, and nerve). Used to identify the types of agent present and to determine if it is safe to unmask after a suspected or known chemical attack. Ref: Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, p. 430.

M9 Chemical Agent

Detector Paper: Expendable paper used to detect liquid chemical agents. M9 paper is chemically treated on one side to react to liquid chemical aget by turning red or reddish brown, and has an adhesive back to adhere to protective garments or equipment.

1st Marine Division

2d Marine Division

1/6 Command Chronology, NBC section .

2d Assault Amphibian Battalion Operations Order 2-91, 211800C Feb 1991.

2d Marine Division OpPlan.

6th Marine Regiment Appendix 2 (NBC) to Annex C (Operations) to FragO 11-91, 221200C Feb 91.

6th Marine Regiment (-)(Rein) Sequential Listing of Significant Events - Operation Desert Storm, February 23, 1991.

"7th Marines Log" for February 24, 1991.

Appendix 2, NBC Defense, to Annex C to 6th MARDIV OPORD 1 91, 18 Feb 1991.

"Breaching Operations in Southwest Asia", Marine Corps Research Center Research Paper #92-0004.

"Breaching Operations, 7th Marines Log", February 24, 1991.

"Chemical Warfare Agent Detectors Probe the Fogs of War," Chemical and Engineering News, August 1, 1994.

"Command Chronology for Period of 1 February to 28 February 1991," 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion.

"Command Chronology for Period 1 January to 28 February 1991," 7th Marines.

"Command Chronology for 1 February to 28 February 1991", 8th Marines, 2d Marine Division, March 14, 1991.

"Command Chronology for the 1st Combat Engineering Battalion, 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91," March 15, 1991.

DIA Intelligence Information Report, June 2, 1997, Subject: "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait."

E-mail Statement, I MEF Battle Assessment Team NBC Officer, January 15, 1997.

Final Report to Congress, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April, 1992.

"Fox Reconnaissance Vehicle," Information Paper, July 31, 1997.

Interview, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines Fox Reconnaissance Vehicle Commander, February 19, 1997.

Interview, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines NBC Officer, February 19, 1997.

Interview, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, Task Force Ripper, Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, February 20, 1997.

Interview, 2d Marine Division NBC Platoon Commander, by I MEF Battle Assessment Team NBC Officer, March 20, 1991.

Interview, 2d Marine Division NBC Officer, by I MEF Battle Assessment Team NBC Officer, March 19, 1991.

Interview, Commanding Officer, "B" Company, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1997.

Interview, Commanding Officer, "B" Company, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, May 8, 1997.

Interview, Injured Marine, by I MEF Battle Assessment Team NBC Officer, March 19, 1991.

Interview, Injured Marine, February 19, 1997.

Interview, I MEF NBC Officer, February 19, 1997.

Interview, Platoon Sergeant, "B" Company, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1997.

Interview, Staff NCOIC, NBC Decon and Chemical Casualty Team, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine, February 20, 1997.

Journal, 2d Marine Division, February 24, 1991.

Lead Sheet 577, Interview, 1/6 Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, December 19, 1996.

Lead Sheet 577, Interview with 2d Marine Division NBC Officer, March 12, 1996.

Lead Sheet 577, p. 5, Statement of 1/6 Commanding Officer, June 13, 1994.

Lead Sheet 577, pp. 6-7, Interview of 1/6 Commanding Officer, April 4, 1996.

Lead Sheet 577, p. 7, Interview with 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, Commanding Officer, April 4, 1996.

Lead Sheet 577, p. 17, Interview, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, December 19, 1996.

Lead Sheet 735, p. 6, Interview of 3d Tank Battalion NBC Officer, April 26, 1996.

Lead Sheet 735, p. 7, Interview of 1st Marine Division NBC Officer, June 21, 1996.

Lead Sheet 748, Interview with CBDCOM Subject Matter expert, April 30, 1996.

Lead Sheet 762, Interview with EOD expert, May 17, 1996.

Lead Sheet 764, Interview with Fox expert, CBDCOM, May 20, 1996.

Lead sheet 1211, Interview with a corporal of the weapons team of 1st Platoon, "B" Company, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, January 9, 1997.

Lead Sheet 1288, Interview with CMS, Inc. Division President, February 11 and 12, 1997.

Lead Sheet 3858, MM-1 Subject Area Expert, Joe Colonna, April 17, 1997.

Lead Sheet 3859, Interview of Corpsman, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, April 2, 1997.

Lead Sheet 3860, Interview of Medical Officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, March 26, 1997.

Letter from 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, 2d Marine Division, Commanding Officer, Subject: "Injuries Sustained in Combat Operations During Operation Desert Storm; Case of [Name Redacted]," April 23, 1992.

Letter statement of Task Force Ripper Fox crew member, "Possible Chemical Weapons Use During Desert Storm," December 22, 1993.

Letter, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, Subject: Operation Desert Storm 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Maneuver Synopsis, March 14, 1991.

Letter, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Fox Vehicle Tape Analysis, June 16, 1997, CMAT Control # 1997168-0000-303.

"Marine Corps NBC Defense in Southwest Asia," Marine Corps Research Center Research Paper #92-0009, Captain T. F. Manley, July 1991.

Memo from 1st Platoon Commanding Officer, "B" Company 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion to "B" Company Commanding Officer 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, April 2, 1991.

Memorandum from Marine Corps Casualty Section, Subject: "Chemical Casualties During Desert Shield/Desert Storm," March 11, 1996.

NBC Defense Program Manager Memorandum, Subject: "Analysis of Fox MM-1 Tapes," March 3, 1997.

NBC Defense Program Manager Memorandum: Subject: "Results of the Combat Systems Test Activity (CSTA) MM-1 Excursion Test," July 14, 1993.

Personnel Status Report, 6th Marine Regiment, 1200 24 February to 1200 25 February 1991.

Statement, Injured Marine, January 14, 1992.

Statement, 1st Platoon Commanding Officer, "B" Company, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, April 2, 1991.

Statement, Corpsman, Subject: "Suspected Chemical Injury to Sgt. [Name Redacted]," December 18, 1991.

Statement, Medical Officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, Subject: "Suspected Wound/Resulting from Chemical Exposure on 24 February 1991 ICO: Sgt [Name Redacted], USMC, [Serial Number Redacted]," March 4, 1992.

Task Force Ripper (1st Battalion, 7th Marines) Command Chronology for the Period 1 January to 28 February 1991.

Testimony of CWO Joseph P. Cottrell, USMC, at the Hearing before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, November 18, 1993.

Testimony of Fox Subject Matter Expert, Mr. Richard Vigus, CBDCOM, before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, November 18, 1993.

Testimony of GySgt George J. Grass, Task Force Ripper Fox Vehicle Commander, May 1, 1996, to the Presidential Advisory Committee.

Testimony of Mr. James Kenny, Task Force Ripper Fox MM-1 Operator, to the Presidential Advisory Committee, May 7, 1997.

Testimony of Lt. Gen. Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., before the Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, February 27, 1997.

Testimony of MSgt Michael S. Bradford, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines Fox Vehicle Commander, to Presidential Advisory Committee, May 7, 1997.

U.S. Army/Marine Corps FM 3-4/FMFM 11-9, "NBC Protection."

U.S. Army FM 3-9 U.S. Navy NAVFAC Publication P-467 U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990.

U.S. Army, FM 3-100, "NBC Operations,"

U.S. Army FM 3-101-2, "NBC Reconnaissance Squad/Platoon (FOX) Operations - Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures," August 10, 1994.

U.S. Army, Message Form, Subject: MARCENT Report, 240955C Feb 91.

U. S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C., 1993.

U. S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C., 1993.

U.S. Navy Ships Technical Manual Chapter 470 Change 4, September 91, "Shipboard BW/CW Defense and Countermeasures."

Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995.

Yellow Canary, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, February 24, 1991.

The DOD requires a common framework for our investigations and assessments of chemical warfare agent incident reports, so we turned to the United Nations and the international community which had experience concerning chemical weapons. Because the modern battlefield is complex, the international community developed investigation and validation protocols[110] to provide objective procedures for possible chemical weapons incidents. The standard that we are using is based on these protocols that include:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site.
• Physical evidence from the site such as weapons fragments, soil, water, vegetation, or human or animal tissue samples.
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence.
• Testimony of eyewitnesses.
• Multiple analyses.
• Review of the evidence by an expert panel.

While the DOD methodology for investigating chemical incidents (Figure 6) is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence was often not collected at the time of an event. Accordingly, the methodology is designed to provide a thorough, investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and determine what happened. The major efforts in this methodology are:

• Substantiate the incident.
• Document the medical reports related to the incident.
• Interview appropriate people.
• Obtain information available to external organizations.
• Assess the results.

Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical agent presence, nor is a single individual’s observation sufficient to validate a chemical agent presence.

To substantiate the circumstances surrounding an incident, the investigator searches for documentation from operational, intelligence, and environmental logs. This focuses the investigation on a specific time, date, and location, clarifies the conditions under which the incident occurred, and determines whether there is "hard" as well as anecdotal evidence. Additionally, the investigator looks for physical evidence that might indicate that chemical agents were present in the vicinity of the incident, including samples (or the results of analyses of samples) collected at the time of the incident.

The investigator searches the medical records to determine if personnel were injured as a result of the incident. Deaths, injuries, sicknesses, etc. near the time and location of an incident may be telling. Medical experts should provide information about alleged chemical casualties.

Figure 6. Chemical Incident Investigation Methodology

Interviews of incident victims (or direct observers) are conducted. First-hand witnesses provide valuable insight into the conditions surrounding the incident and the mind-set of the personnel involved, and are particularly important if physical evidence is lacking. NBC officers or personnel trained in chemical and biological testing, confirmation, and reporting are interviewed to identify the unit’s response, the tests that were run, the injuries sustained, and the reports submitted. Commanders are contacted to ascertain what they knew, what decisions they made concerning the events surrounding the incident, and their assessment of the incident. Where appropriate, subject matter experts also provide opinions on the capabilities, limitations, and operation of technical equipment, and submit their evaluations of selected topics of interest.

Additionally, the investigator contacts agencies and organizations that may be able to provide additional clarifying information about the case. These would include, but not be limited to:

• Intelligence agencies that might be able to provide insight into events leading to the event, imagery of the area of the incident, and assessments of factors affecting the case.
• The DOD and Veterans’ clinical registries, which may provide data about the medical condition of personnel involved in the incident.

1. An acronym listing is provided at Tab A.
2. Two minefield belts (sometimes called obstacle belts in unit logs) extended from the Persian Gulf, generally across south-central Kuwait below the Al Bourquan oil fields and north of the Al Wafrah oil fields. "Minefield depth varied from 60 to 150 meters and each belt was enclosed on all four sides with concertina wire or ... barbed wire ... reinforced with engineer stakes." "Breaching Operations in Southwest Asia", Marine Corps Research Center Research Paper #92-0004, pp. 3-4.
3. Final Report to Congress, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April 1992, p. 265.
4. For example, the "Iraqis artillery will use maximum chemical rounds until neutralized," 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion Operations Order 2-91, 211800C Feb 1991, p. 1.
5. For example, "Commanding Officer's intent: I intend to pass as quickly as possible from assembly point to the far side of the breach," 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion Operations Order 2-91, 211800C Feb 1991, p. 3.
6. Letter, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, Subject: Operation Desert Storm 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Maneuver Synopsis, March 14, 1991.
7. Testimony of Lt. Gen. Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., before the Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, February 27, 1997.
8. The authoritative guidance on balancing the appropriate MOPP level to the mission is the U.S. Army/Marine Corps FM 3-4/FMFM 11-9, "NBC Protection," January 1, 1991. The Navy had a different configuration for MOPP2 (ref: U.S. Navy Ships Technical Manual Chapter 470 Change 4, September 91, "Shipboard BW/CW Defense and Countermeasures"), but the Marine and Army personnel followed FM 3-4/FMFM 11-9.
9. "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January to 28 February 1991," 7th Marine Regiment, April 25, 1991, p. 2-2.
10. U. S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual FM 3-4/FMFM 11-9, "NBC Protection," January 1, 1991, pp. 2-16.
11. Proofing the lane requires specially equipped armored vehicles to pass through the opening made by the explosive charges to show proof that no mines remain that would cause damage or injury.
12. "Breaching Operations in Southwest Asia", Marine Corps Research Center Research Paper #92-0004, July 1991, p. 5.
13. During Operations Desert Shield, Germany provided the United States with 60 FUCHS chemical reconnaissance vehicles, which came to be called "Fox" reconnaissance vehicles. Ten of these vehicles went to the Marines, with four assigned to each Division.
14. U.S. Army FM 3-101-2, "NBC Reconnaissance Squad/Platoon (FOX) Operations - Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures," August 10, 1994, pp. 5-2, 5-3.
15. Each chemical warfare agent is comprised of a unique combination of ions, called a spectrum, and the Spectrometer has the capability of evaluating the ion pattern of any detected chemical against a library of ion spectrums of chemical warfare agents.
16. "Command Chronology for the 1st Combat Engineering Battalion, 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91," March 15, 1991.
17. Neither the Task Force Ripper (1st Battalion, 7th Marines) Command Chronology for the Period 1 January to 28 February 1991, the "7th Marines Log" for February 24, 1991, nor the 7th Marines "Command Chronology for Period 1 January to 28 February 1991" records a reference to the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines or Task Force Ripper encountering a chemical agent during breaching operations.
18. The Fox provides relative readings of possible presence based upon the intensity level of the ions present in the sample, but makes no determination of a level to "produce casualties."
19. A Fox can take and print a spectrum at any time, but is more accurate if the MM1 is operating at a lower temperature. If the spectrum is visible on the screen, it can be printed by depressing the "Print" button.
20. Testimony to the President's Advisory Committee, GySgt George J. Grass, Task Force Ripper Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, May 1, 1996.
21. Testimony to the President's Advisory Committee, GySgt George J. Grass, Task Force Ripper Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, May 1, 1996. [HTML to PAC testimony page]
22. Testimony of CWO Joseph P. Cottrell, USMC, at the Hearing before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, November 18, 1993.
23. An NBC-1 is the initial report of potential observation. The NBC-2 report is a corroboration from a second or more observers following an initial NBC-1 report. The NBC-3 report issues an immediate warning of expected contamination. NBC-4 reports the results of reconnaissance, monitoring, and surveying of the suspected attack or contamination. NBC-5 identifies the actual areas of contamination, and NBC-6 provides a detailed report on chemical-biological attacks. U.S. Army, FM 3-100, "NBC Operations," p. 2-10.
24. The 5702 Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) is awarded to Marine Corps personnel trained in NBC operations.
25. Lead Sheet 735, p. 6, Interview of 3d Tank Battalion NBC Officer, April 26, 1996.
26. Lead Sheet 767, p. 1, Interview of 3d Tank Battalion NBC Officer, May 21, 1996.
27. Lead Sheet 735, p. 7, Interview of 1st Marine Division NBC Officer, June 21, 1996.
28. Letter statement of Task Force Ripper Fox crew member, "Possible Chemical Weapons Use During Desert Storm," December 22, 1993.
29. Testimony of Mr. James Kenny, Task Force Ripper Fox MM-1 Operator, to the Presidential Advisory Committee, May 7, 1997.
30. Lead Sheet 764, Interview with Fox expert, CBDCOM, May 20, 1996. This is because the air volume drawn through the sampling tube is approximately 300 times LESS than in other detectors, such as the M8A1 designed specifically for vapor detection.
31. Lead Sheet 748, Interview with CBDCOM Subject Matter Expert, April 30, 1996.
32. "U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C., 1993, pp. 30-31.
33. Appendix 2, NBC Defense, to Annex C to 6th MARDIV OPORD 1 91, 18 Feb 1991, pp. C-2-3 - C-2-5.
34. Testimony, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines Fox Vehicle Commander to President's Advisory Committee, May 7, 1997.
35. 6th Marine Regiment Appendix 2 (NBC) to Annex C (Operations) to FragO 11-91, 221200C Feb 91.
36. Interview, Commanding Officer, Company "B", 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1997, p. 29.
37. "U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C., 1993, p. 45.
38. Interview, 1/6 Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, February 19, 1997, p. 6.
39. Breaching lanes for the 2d Marine Division were assigned with names like the Marines would use during beaching operations -- left to right (west to east), lanes Red 1, Red 2, Blue 3, Blue 4, Green 5, and Green 6.
40. Interview NCOIC, NBC Decon and Chemical Casualty Team, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, February 20, 1997, p. 35.
41. Lead Sheet 1211, Interview with corporal of weapons team of 1st Platoon, "B" Company, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, January 9, 1997.
42. Interview, Commanding Officer, Company "B," 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, pp. 10-11.
43. 1/6 Command Chronology, NBC section.
44. 6th Marine Regiment (-)(Rein) Sequential Listing of Significant Events - Operation Desert Storm, February 23, 1991.
45. Memo from 1st Platoon Commanding Officer, "B" Company 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion to "B" Company Commanding Officer 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, April 2, 1991.
46. Marine Note as a Yellow Canary, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, February 24, 1991.
47. Journal, 2d Marine Division, February 24, 1991.
48. "Breaching Operations, 7th Marines Log", February 24, 1991.
49. U.S. Army, Message Form, Subject: MARCENT Report, 240955C Feb 91.
50. Interview, 1/6 NBC Officer, February 19, 1997, pp. 24, 25.
51. Interview, MSgt Bradford, 1/6 Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, February 19, 1997, p. 13.
52. He chose an NBC-4 report instead of an NBC-1 report because they were not under attack, so the report was more accurately an observation of a possibly contaminated area. Interview, MSgt Bradford, 1/6 Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, February 19, 1997, pp. 6-7.
53. Lead Sheet 577, pp. 17-18, Interview, MSgt Bradford, 1/6 Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, December 19, 1996.
54. Lead sheet 1211, Interview with a corporal of the weapons team of 1st Platoon, "B" Company, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, January 9, 1997.
55. Lead Sheet 577, Interview, MSgt Bradford, 1/6 Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, December 19, 1996.
56. Testimony, Fox Subject Matter Expert, Mr. Richard Vigus, CBDCOM, before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, November 18, 1993, p. 41, and Fox Paper.
57. Interview, 1/6 Fox Reconnaissance Vehicle Commander, February 19, 1997, pp. 31-32.
58. "Command Chronology for Period of 1 February to 28 February 1991," 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, p. 4.
59. Interview, Commanding Officer of Company "B", 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1997, p. 34.
60. Lead Sheet 762, Interview with EOD expert, May 17, 1996.
61. DIA Intelligence Information Report, June 2, 1997, Subject: "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait".
62. DIA Intelligence Information Report, June 2, 1997, Subject: "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait".
63. Lead Sheet 1288, Interview with CMS, Inc. Division President, February 11 and 12, 1997.
64. The Fox has the capability to print a list of ion masses and intensities that represent what is shown on the MM1 operator's screen to a tape for later analysis.
65. In the operational evaluation of the Fox, it was shown to false alarm with a Lewisite alert due to chemicals given off by its silicon wheels. NBC Defense Program Manager Memorandum, Subject: "Results of the Combat Systems Test Activity (CSTA) MM1 Excursion Test," July 14, 1993.
66. NBC Defense Program Manager Memorandum, Subject: "Analysis of Fox MM1 Tapes," March 3, 1997.
67. Lead Sheet 3858, MM1 Subject Area Expert, Joe Colonna, April 17, 1997.
68. NBC Defense Program Manager Memorandum, Subject: "Analysis of Fox MM1 Tapes," March 3, 1997.
69. Letter, National Institute of Standards and Technology, June 16, 1997.
70. Letter, Bruker Daltonics, Subject: "Analysis of MM-1 Data," July 15, 1997.
71. "Fox Reconnaissance Vehicle," Information Paper, July 29, 1997.
72. NBC Defense Program Manager Memorandum, Subject: "Analysis of Fox MM1 Tapes," March 3, 1997.
73. Letter, National Institute of Standards and Technology, June 16, 1997, CMAT Control # 1997168-0000-303.
74. Letter, Bruker Daltonics, Subject: "Analysis of MM-1 Data, "July 15, 1997.
75. Lead Sheet 577, pp. 5-7, Interview with 1st Battalion 6th Marines Commanding Officer, March 7, 1996.
76. 6th Marine Regiment (-)(Rein) Sequential Listing of Significant Events - Operation Desert Storm, February 24, 1991.
77. Lead Sheet 577, pp. 5-7, Interview with 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, Commanding Officer, April 4, 1996.
78. "U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C., 1993, p. 45.
79. "U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C., 1993, Preface.
80. Lead Sheet 577, pp. 11 & 12, Interview with 2d Marine Division NBC Officer, March 12, 1996.
81. The four Fox reconnaissance vehicles in the 2d Marine Division were assigned to the 6th Marines, 8th Marines, the Tiger Brigade, and the Division headquarters, Interview, 2d Marine Division NBC Platoon Commander by IMEF Battle Assessment Team NBC Officer, March 20, 1997, p.1.
82. Interview, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines NBC Officer, February 19, 1997, p. 19.
83. Interview, I MEF NBC Officer, February 19, 1997, p. 7.
84. Interview, 2d Marine Division NBC Platoon Commander by 1MEF Battle Assessment Team NBC Officer, March 20, 1991, pp. 1 & 2.
85. "Command Chronology for 1 February to 28 February 1991," 8th Marines, 2d Marine Division, March 14, 1991.
86. "U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C., 1993, p. 45.
87. A second Marine may have been injured by chemical agents after the war, but his case will be investigated separately.
88. Lead Sheet 577, p. 11 & 12, Interview with 2d Marine Division NBC Officer, March 7, 1996.
89. Personnel Status Report, 6th Marine Regiment, 1200 24 February to 1200 25 February 1991.
90. Memorandum, Marine Corps Casualty Section, Subject: "Chemical Casualties During Desert Shield/Desert Storm," March 11, 1996.
91. Lead Sheet 577, pp. 5-7, Statement of 1/6 Commanding Officer, June 13, 1994.
92. Lead Sheet 577, pp. 5-7, Interview of 1/6 Commanding Officer, April 4, 1996.
93. Statement of Injured Marine, January 14, 1992.
94. U.S. Army FM 3-9 U.S. Navy NAVFAC Publication P-467 U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, pp. 38-41.
95. Interview, Injured Marine, February 19, 1997.
96. Interview, Commanding Officer, "B" Company, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, May 8, 1997.
97. Interview of Injured Marine, March 19, 1991.
98. Interview of 1/6 Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, February 19, 1997, pp. 22-25.
99. Interview of Platoon Sergeant, "B" Company, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1997, pp. 9-10.
100. Interview of Commanding Officer, "B" Company, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, February 19, 1997, pp. 15, 21.
101. Interview of Staff NCOIC, NBC Decon and Chemical Casualty Team, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, pp. 23-25.
102. Interview of 1/6 Fox reconnaissance vehicle Commander, February 19, 1997, p. 22.
103. Statement, 1st Platoon Commanding Officer, "B" Company, 1st Armored Assault Battalion, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, April 2, 1991.
104. Statement, Corpsman, Subject: "Suspected Chemical Injury to Sgt. [Redacted]," December 18, 1991.
105. Lead Sheet 3859, Interview of Corpsman, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, April 2, 1997.
106. Lead Sheet 3860, Interview of Medical Officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, March 26, 1997.
107. Statement, Medical Officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, Subject: "Suspected Wound/Resulting from Chemical Exposure on 24 February 1991 ICO: Sgt [Redacted], USMC, [serial number]," March 4, 1992.
108. E-mail Statement, I MEF Battle Assessment Team NBC Officer, January 15, 1997. He described the blisters as "classic mustard/Lewisite blister agent wounds," without any graduated skin coloration between the blisters.
109. 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, 2d Marine Division, Commanding Officer Letter, Subject: "Injuries Sustained in Combat Operations During Operation Desert Storm; Case of Sergeant [Redacted]," April 23, 1992.
110. "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This Chemical Weapons Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. It has been signed by 165 States and ratified by 93 States (as of June 1997.) It was signed by the U.S. on Jan 13, 1993 and ratified on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the Convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. [http://www.unog.ch/frames/disarm/distreat/chemical.htm]